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Abstract
This article calls attention to the inherent complexities of analysing and understanding the hospitalities of cities. Drawing on an urban sociological view of the city it proposes a metaphor – the agora and the fortress – as two extreme opposites, to identify levels, places and forms it can comprise. Utilizing the 'dynamic model of hospitality' as an analytical framework, it explores and exemplifies several host–guest relationships from a city government perspective and their dynamic interactions with higher levels of agency. These interactions are discussed in the context of cosmopolitanism, urbanism and public policy. The article concludes that the hospitalities of cities involve a variety of human phenomena that cannot be defined without ambiguity, but which are essential to our understanding of the flourishing and growth of cities, and their hospitalities. Future research should therefore include many lines of enquiry and research that no one single discipline can pursue.

Prior to the First World War, public pricing policy was essentially of no concern to officials and politicians in the UK/US. Trade associations performed functions that ran afoul of antitrust laws (Scherer and Ross, 1990). Price-fixing, secret price-shading and other collusive pricing behaviour were subject only to the restraint of trade doctrine, 'interpreted in such a narrow way as to make almost anything legal' (Mitchell, 1978: 20). This changed rapidly during the two world wars, when severe shortages forced governments to act and regulate prices to stop 'profiteering', prevent wage/price inflation and ensure that the poor could buy their rations. Moreover, under wartime conditions, the pursuit of private interest was perceived as less acceptable and gradual shifts were occurring in political viewpoints on the welfare implications of monopolies (power), admitting the danger of detriment to the consumer. Therefore, official committees were established to investigate the desirability of restraints such as resale price maintenance and tying. Laws were enacted and courts rendered judgements that altered prevailing views as to what was (socially) desirable in pricing and what was not. As a result, collective price agreements were gradually outlawed and firms were forced to look afresh at their pricing practices. This initiated a whole new body of literature prescribing what businessmen should do in setting prices (e.g. Dean, 1950; McNair and May, 1957; Lawyer, 1963; Abrahams, 1964; Sampsom, 1964; Hinkle, 1965; De Vos and Schomer, 1966; Walker, 1967; Darden, 1968; Oxenfeldt, 1975).

Online businesses collect a wealth of data on customers, often without properly informing them. Increasingly, these data can be used for behavioral price discrimination. In this two-study article, we explore how consumers would respond if businesses were compelled to disclose their use of discriminatory behavioral pricing techniques. Using different disclosure frames, we examine the effects of disclosure on purchase intention and purchase probability. The findings indicate that specific disclosure frames affect purchase intentions. Furthermore, we find that a disclosure frame that is more in line with a consumer's self-interest increases purchase intention. Specifically, the frame indirectly influences intention to purchase through its effect on the perception that the use of behavioral pricing information serves self-interest. In this way, our study draws attention to a potentially unanticipated effect of regulatory intervention. Implications for future research and legal policy are discussed, focused on the need to design and empirically test the effectiveness of disclosures online.