The Impact of Homeownership on Unemployment in the Netherlands
In: Homeownership and the Labour Market in Europe, S. 113-135
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In: Homeownership and the Labour Market in Europe, S. 113-135
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 15025
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 5821
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This paper estimates the impact of the murder of film maker Theo van Gogh on November 2, 2004, on listed house prices in Amsterdam with a unique dataset. We use an hedonic-market approach to show that general attitudes towards Muslim minorities were negatively affected by the murder. Specifically, we test for an effect on listed house prices in neighborhoods where more than 25% of the people belong to an ethnic minority from a Muslim country (type I). Relative to the other neighborhoods, house prices in type I neighborhoods decreased in 10 months by about average 3%, with a widening gap over time. The results are robust to several adjustments including changes in the control group. There is no significant difference in the time it takes for houses to be sold in type I versus other neighborhoods. Finally, people belonging to the Muslim minority were more likely to buy and less likely to sell a house in a type I neighborhood after the murder than before.
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In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 07-013/3
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 11726
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 8005
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 16513
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 11294
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This study documents two empirical regularities, using data for Denmark and Portugal. First, workers who are hired last, are the first to leave the firm (Last In, First Out; LIFO). Second, workers' wages rise with seniority (= a worker's tenure relative to the tenure of her colleagues). We seek to explain these regularities by developing a dynamic model of the firm with stochastic product demand and hiring cost (= irreversible specific investments). There is wage bargaining between a worker and its firm. Separations (quits or layoffs) obey the LIFO rule and bargaining is efficient (a zero surplus at the moment of separation). The LIFO rule provides a stronger bargaining position for senior workers, leading to a return to seniority in wages. Efficiency in hiring requires the workers' bargaining power to be in line with their share in the cost of specific investment. Then, the LIFO rule is a way to protect their property right on the specific investment. We consider the effects of Employment Protection Legislation and risk aversion.
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 15028
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