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PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of process orientation at the employee level on operational performance (OP) and customer-focused performance (CP), where the components process thinking by staff, process mapping (PM) and process standardization (PS) are cumulative developments, building on each other.Design/methodology/approachStructural equations modeling is used to analyze survey data collected from 198 participants at a business school in the period 2012/2013.FindingsThe results show that the impact of process thinking by staff on both OP and CP is mediated by PM and PS and improvement. The study also shows that process thinking by staff is a prerequisite for PM and standardization.Originality/valueThis research makes several important theoretical and managerial contributions toward the objective of a better understanding of the working of process orientation. It shows that different components of process orientation reinforce each other; process orientation maturity depends on the effort being applied in creating a particular sequence of process management components and that these components should be considered as cumulative developments, building on each other.

We investigated the consequences for exchange outcomes of the violation of an assumption underlying most social psychological research on exchange. This assumption is that the negotiated direct exchange of commodities between two actors (pure exchange) can be validly represented as two actors splitting a fixed pool of resources (split pool exchange). We designed five experimental conditions to determine differences in bargaining behavior in pure exchange and split pool exchange. We conclude that the validity of research using the split pool exchange approach is questionable, since we observed much less variance in outcomes and more efficient agreements in split pool exchange than pure exchange. Moreover, although theories accurately predicted outcomes of split pool exchange, they could not accurately predict outcomes of pure exchange. We discuss possible implications of our findings for exchange and research on exchange.

Explaining cooperation in social dilemmas is a central issue in behavioral science, and the prisoner's dilemma (PD) is the most frequently employed model. Theories assuming rationality and selfishness predict no cooperation in PDs of finite duration, but cooperation is frequently observed. We therefore build a model of how individuals in a finitely repeated PD with incomplete information about their partner's preference for mutual cooperation decide about cooperation. We study cooperation in simultaneous and sequential PDs. Our model explains three behavioral regularities found in the literature: (i) the frequent cooperation in one-shot and finitely repeated N-shot games, (ii) cooperation rates declining over the course of the game, and (iii) cooperation being more frequent in the sequential PD than in the simultaneous PD.

This study focuses on externalities of exchanges of voting positions in collective decision-making. Exchanges are represented by nonconstant two-person cooperative games. It is assumed that the rate of exchange is specified by the Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, and a model is specified to identify the exchanges. Externality effects of these exchanges are assessed with two conflict measures we develop here. The measures assess within-group and between-group conflict, respectively, and are applied to collective decision-making in the European Union regarding support for fishery infrastructure. The application shows that the measures provide indispensable insights into the decision-making setting and that these can be used for strategic intervention in the setting. It also shows that both actors' power and the outcomes in exchange with externalities are very different from those in exchange without externalities as studied by theories of network exchange.

In collective decision making bilateral deals can increase or decrease the likelihood of finding compromises, depending on whether such deals have externalities. Positive externalities mean third actors profit from bilateral deals, whereas negative externalities mean bilateral deals hurt third actors. We develop the first model of collective decision making that takes externalities into account. The model computes the expected outcomes of the issues to be decided and construes four coalitions of actors on each pair of issues. Then it searches for a set of alternative expected outcomes, such that no coalition can further increase the payoffs of one of its members, either (i) without decreasing the payoffs of one of its members, or (ii) without decreasing the payoffs of any actor. The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution is used to pick a single outcome. The model is tested on data from decisions in the European Union.

In collective decision making bilateral deals can increase or decrease the likelihood of finding compromises, depending on whether such deals have externalities. Positive externalities mean third actors profit from bilateral deals, whereas negative externalities mean bilateral deals hurt third actors. We develop the first model of collective decision making that takes externalities into account. The model computes the expected outcomes of the issues to be decided and construes four coalitions of actors on each pair of issues. Then it searches for a set of alternative expected outcomes, such that no coalition can further increase the payoffs of one of its members, either (i) without decreasing the payoffs of one of its members, or (ii) without decreasing the payoffs of any actor. The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution is used to pick a single outcome. The model is tested on data from decisions in the European Union. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2008.]

In collective decision making bilateral deals can increase or decrease the likelihood of finding compromises, depending on whether such deals have externalities. Positive externalities mean third actors profit from bilateral deals, whereas negative externalities mean bilateral deals hurt third actors. We develop the first model of collective decision making that takes externalities into account. The model computes the expected outcomes of the issues to be decided and construes four coalitions of actors on each pair of issues. Then it searches for a set of alternative expected outcomes, such that no coalition can further increase the payoffs of one of its members, either (i) without decreasing the payoffs of one of its members, or (ii) without decreasing the payoffs of any actor. The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution is used to pick a single outcome. The model is tested on data from decisions in the European Union. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2008.]

In collective decision making bilateral deals can increase or decrease the likelihood of finding compromises, depending on whether such deals have externalities. Positive externalities mean third actors profit from bilateral deals, whereas negative externalities mean bilateral deals hurt third actors. We develop the first model of collective decision making that takes externalities into account. The model computes the expected outcomes of the issues to be decided and construes four coalitions of actors on each pair of issues. Then it searches for a set of alternative expected outcomes, such that no coalition can further increase the payoffs of one of its members, either (i) without decreasing the payoffs of one of its members, or (ii) without decreasing the payoffs of any actor. The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution is used to pick a single outcome. The model is tested on data from decisions in the European Union.

We carried out 2 studies to evaluate the relationship between attachment style and crying in adults. Data were collected from 2 independent large samples, measuring as 2 different operationalizations crying in general and in response to music. The results in both studies showed a consistent
pattern. As anticipated, the group with a dismissive attachment style cried less than the other groups, and the preoccupied attachment style group cried more intensely than the secure group. The preoccupied and fearful attachment style groups reported the most negative emotions while crying,
whereas the secure group reported more crying over positive emotions. These results show that attachment style is a determinant of adult crying behavior.