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AbstractThe shift in Beijing's priorities to more balanced and people-oriented development has led some localities to make more efforts in developing social policy areas. By investigating the personnel institution, a political incentive mechanism, this article aims to shed light on the structure of political incentives in China and why local political leaders improve public welfare in a non-democratic setting. A content analysis of 69 regulations that cover one-third of all municipal leaders shows that the formal evaluation rules for leaders in some localities have become more welfare-oriented to reflect Beijing's new focus on social policy areas. A statistical analysis further reveals that different political incentives operate for municipal Party leaders and mayors, and that political incentives to develop social policy vary across geographic regions. The statistical analysis exploits an original dataset I compiled from an online archive and statistical yearbooks, and contains biographic and career history data on municipal leaders between 2003 and 2010.

The shift in Beijing's priorities to more balanced and people-oriented development has led some localities to make more efforts in developing social policy areas. By investigating the personnel institution, a political incentive mechanism, this article aims to shed light on the structure of political incentives in China and why local political leaders improve public welfare in a non-democratic setting. A content analysis of 69 regulations that cover one-third of all municipal leaders shows that the formal evaluation rules for leaders in some localities have become more welfare-oriented to reflect Beijing's new focus on social policy areas. A statistical analysis further reveals that different political incentives operate for municipal Party leaders and mayors, and that political incentives to develop social policy vary across geographic regions. The statistical analysis exploits an original dataset I compiled from an online archive and statistical yearbooks, and contains biographic and career history data on municipal leaders between 2003 and 2010. (China Q/GIGA)

Are evaluation targets negotiable in China's cadre evaluation system? If so, which ones and how are they negotiated? Little empirical work answers these questions, which reveals the reconciliation of political control with local governance considerations in a centralized system. This article bridges the literature on bureaucratic bargaining with that on the target responsibility system by examining intra-governmental bargaining in the performance target-setting process. In-depth interviews reveal a "tournament" logic of target-setting bargaining. Drawing on interviews and an original dataset of personnel rules, we conceptualize and classify performance targets based on their negotiability. The findings bring to light the presence of bargaining, albeit bounded, in the top-down rational-instrumental mechanism of the target responsibility system, and the intricate relationship between merit and personal connections in political selection. (J Contemp China / GIGA)

Much comparative politics scholarship has examined whether economic inequality affects democratic values or political support in democracies. Nevertheless, they lack a close examination of the political effects of economic inequality and, more importantly, how economic inequality shapes political support in non-democracies. We provide an empirical test of the effect of economic inequality on regime support using the China data from the Asian Barometer Survey between 2002 and 2015. We argue and demonstrate that perceived economic inequality significantly reduces regime support in China. Moreover, using a causal mediation analysis, we find that the detrimental effect of perceived economic inequality on regime support is not driven by demands for redistribution, but rather by the political value orientation. These findings advance our understanding of the connection between economic inequality and political values and the economic base of political legitimacy in non-democracies.