Suchergebnisse

A retired general examines the leadership challenges of the twenty-first century, addressing outdated practices while citing the importance of tapping the potential of rapidly changing technologies

Part 1. The supernatural legacy of armed conflict -- Evil has long influenced war -- Mystical tricks of a more worldly origin -- Part 2. Modern wars spill over into spiritual arena -- Overwhelming force no longer the answer -- Enhancement of local security more vital -- America needs self-regulating squads -- The Pentagon's new worldwide strategy -- How best to train local security forces -- Light infantrymen need no technology -- Taking strongpoints without bombardment -- Monitoring a large area with few U.S. forces -- New doctrine calls for more squad autonomy -- Part 4. Such squads take raider-like training -- Riflemen need more than rules of engagement -- Creating a more proactive fighter -- What such riflemen add to unit power -- Part 5. Properly preparing the new squad member -- All hands accountability for more moral units -- Reestablishing individual initiative -- Personal decision-making practice -- Troops must help to design own moves -- Afterword: No minor oversight -- Appendix: Korean war sighting.

17 USC 105 interim-entered record; under temporary embargo. ; We consider some dimensions of basic strategy and strategic thinking and use the Afghan case to identify and discuss a few pitfalls—both conceptual and practical—in the United States' thinking regarding, and practice of, strategy and leadership over the past two decades. The Afghan case highlights the perils of intervening militarily with no understanding of the strategic environment and no strategic direction, compounded by constant turnover in leadership, overly optimistic planning, and mistaken metrics that oftentimes measured inconsequential activities to demonstrate "progress." ; U.S. Government affiliation is unstated in article text.