Suchergebnisse

Security experts have long awaited the combining of terrorism with biological weapons. Throughout the 1990s, many wondered daily why this fusion was not occurring because the two appeared to fit together so well. The anthrax letter terrorism that began in September made this a reality.

This paper has four parts. First, I begin my examination of the aerial surveillance measure by reviewing the work by VEREX on this measure. Second, I discuss aerial surveillance as it relates to UNSCOM's mission in Iraq specifically. Third, I make some general observations about the applicability of this measure to detecting biological facilities and activities. Last, I comment on the utility of this measure for UNSCOM and international biological arms control.

As part of the annual meeting of the American Society for Microbiology (ASM), David L. Huxsoll and Raymond A. Zilinskas convened a roundtable of biological weapons inspectors who have served in recent United Nations inspections in Iraq. The roundtable was presented over a three-hour period on May 22, 1995. To give the audience a "feel" for what inspectors do and the conditions under which they work, the roundtable session opened with a 35 mm slide presentation. The photos were taken by Zilinskas in the course of two 1994 inspections of Iraqi biological research and production facilities.

This paper has five parts: (1) a historical background to UNSCOM; (2) an explanation of how I came to work for UNSCOM as a staffer and inspector; (3) a description and analysis of the UNSCOM experience in Iraq; (4) a review of seven verification measures employed by UNSCOM; and (5) concluding thoughts on the wider applicability of the UNSCOM experience.

This article analyses the accomplishments and shortcomings of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and recent attempts to strengthen it. It examines why developing countries show little interest in these efforts. Neither do they seem intent on acquiring this weapons system. Might this situation change? To find out, the article examines past thrid world conflicts, focusing especially on those where chemical weapons have seen use. The lessons from the past are applied to assess the possibility of a country acquiring, then employing biological weapons in future conflicts as an adjunct to, or instead of, chemical arms. Finally, suggestions are made as to possible steps that the international community can take to lessen the threat of biological warfare generally and to involve third world countries in the on-going attempts to strengthen the Convention.

When I agreed to review L. Cole's book Clouds of Secrecy: The Army's Germ Warfare Tests over Populated Areas (PLS, February 1989), I did so because the subject is interesting and important. I did not know Cole, nor had I read any of his previous work. To the editor of the PLS and, implicitly, to its readers, I committed to appraise the book as fairly as I could. As anyone whose working life is spent writing knows, much work goes into producing a book. I regard criticizing a book as a serious responsibility, because I know the labor that the author has gone through before the first copy is printed.