ABSTRACTEnergy Performance Contracting (EPC) is an important and effective energy conservation mechanism, under which an energy service company (ESCO) provides an energy‐saving service to its client and shares the resulting energy cost savings. Using a game‐theoretic model, we investigate the impacts of EPC on two competing manufacturers, of which one is more energy‐efficient in production than the other. The less energy‐efficient firm first proposes an energy‐saving sharing contract to the more energy‐efficient firm, who, if accepting the contract, acts as an ESCO that decides the energy‐saving target and helps realize it for the client. Then the firms engage in Cournot competition by producing/selling substitutable products. By solving the equilibrium solutions, we show that under an EPC project, the total production quantity of both firms increases (so the market price of the product decreases) with the ESCO producing less while its client producing more, which also leads to a higher consumer surplus. Meanwhile, both manufactures are better off under EPC and would obtain strictly higher profits when the service cost rate is high. Nevertheless, EPC may not result in a better environmental performance in that the total energy consumption of both firms may be higher under EPC, which happens when the market size is small and the ESCO has not much energy‐efficiency advantage over its client. We also study four extensions: When the energy saving service and production decisions are made separately, we find the more energy‐efficient firm is worse off when implementing EPC; when the energy‐saving sharing ratio is determined by the ESCO instead of the client, the ESCO extracts all the surplus derived from the EPC project while the total energy consumption of both firms is always reduced; when the energy‐saving sharing ratio is determined via Nash bargaining, the main insights from the base model remain valid; finally, when the client sets the target of overall cost reduction, it extracts all the surplus derived from the EPC project.
AbstractWe study the problem of optimally managing an inventory system with backorders over a finite time horizon where the objective is minimization of expected total discounted costs. The system consists of two locations each stocking the same product. At the beginning of each time period decisions are made about replenishment at each location and about any quantity to transship between the locations before demand is observed. Leveraging the L♮‐convexity of the problem's cost function; we characterize the optimal replenishment and transshipment policy for this system. More specifically, we show the optimal policy can be described using switching curves monotone in the system state. We also discuss two extensions. For a lost‐sales model, we establish L♮‐convexity and apply it to characterize the optimal policy, simplifying the analysis found in previous work. In the other extension, we investigate the optimal policy for a partial transshipment problem where only one location orders from the external supply source and then transships to the other location.
This article investigates a hybrid procurement mechanism that combines a reverse auction with flexible noncompetitive contracts. A buyer adopts such mechanism to procure multiple units of a product from a group of potential suppliers. Specifically, the buyer first offers contracts to some suppliers who, if accepting the contract, do not participate in the auction while committing to selling a unit to the buyer at the price of the subsequent auction. For the suppliers rejecting the offers, they can join the subsequent auction with the other suppliers to compete on the remaining units. When the buyer offers only one flexible noncompetitive contract, we find that the selected supplier may accept the offer regardless of whether he knows his exact cost information. Meanwhile, the buyer can benefit from offering such a contract, as opposed to solely conducting a regular reverse auction or offering a noncompetitive contract that does not allow suppliers declining offers to join the subsequent auction. Moreover, we find that the suppliers' information about their own costs has a significant impact on the buyer's decision. When the buyer makes multiple offers, we analyze the resulting game behavior of the selected suppliers and demonstrate that the buyer can benefit more than just offering one such contract. Therefore, the hybrid procurement mechanism can be mutually beneficial for both the buyer and the selected suppliers.