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For many years, fashion has been an area of interest in consumer research, but scholars have paid little attention to how political ideology influences fashion. This article examines how Chinese consumers used fashion to seek identity and differentiate themselves during the Cultural Revolution. Furthermore, the study connects fashion and consumption and examines how Western fashion theories manifested themselves during this period. Based on my research, in contrast to trickle-down theory, when the lower social class adopted the fashion, the superordinate social class did not distinguish themselves by assuming a new trend. Furthermore, unlike conspicuous consumption theory, instead of showing off their wealth, consumers displayed their poverty during this era. Finally, different from other societies, having high cultural capital was neither popular nor fashionable during the Cultural Revolution.

One globalization paradigm argues that developing countries will increasingly resemble Western societies. Although influenced by Western trends, I argue that global consumerism will not make most Chinese abandon traditional values and adopt a different and totally Western consumer culture. This article, which is based on empirical evidence, stresses the role of culture and how it affects people's strategies toward economic decision-making. I explore the changing values before and after the opening up policy, and how they influenced consumption patterns in different eras. The Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) in China was a campaign designed to pursue a purer form of communism and led to a distinctive set of cultural values and ideologies, resulting in unique consumption patterns. "Status goods" during this period were based on a person's "revolutionary background" and loyalty to Chairman Mao, rather than on individual consumption preferences. After the opening up policy, consumer behavior moved closer to the patterns found in Western capitalist societies, but the mechanisms that drive this consumption are quite different. Chinese traditional values were challenged but did not disappear, and the impact of the Cultural Revolution also had a profound influence on those who lived through it. Contemporary Chinese consumers selectively choose certain cultural values from a range of options in order to legitimize their spending decisions.

Despite grand visions of a cosmopolitan planet living in peace, the first globalization at the turn of the 20th century descended into World War I as the old empires scrambled to preserve themselves as others sought self‐determination. Powers on the losing end of that war reasserted themselves in yet another worldwide calamity within decades.After World War II, in the early 1950s, with the victorious American‐led alliance in the driver's seat, institutions such as the United Nations and the Bretton Woods arrangements created a global stability that enabled peace, prosperity and the "rise of the rest."In 2014, the world order is shifting again with the rise of China reviving in Asia the very kind of nationalist rivalries that led Europe to war twice in the 20th century.Will we be able to build new institutions that accommodate the new powershift without resorting to war, or will the second globalization collapse as well? Top strategists from the US, Japan and China respond to this momentous question.

At the turn of the 20th Century when Western power was at its height, Sun Yat‐Sen sought to blend the Confucian tradition of meritocratic governance and Western‐style democracy in his vision for modern China. With the "rise of the rest" in the 21st Century—led by China—perhaps the political imagination is open once again, this time not only to Western ideas flowing East, but Eastern ideas flowing West as well.The political imagination has been pried open anew not only because of the sustained success of non‐Western modernity in places like Singapore and China, but because democracy itself has become so dysfunctional across the West, from its ancient birthplace in Greece to its most advanced outpost in California. That liberal democracy is the best form of governance ever achieved in the long arc of history is no longer self‐evident. Today, democracy, which has been captured by a short‐term, special‐interest political culture, has to prove and improve itself by incorporating elements of meritocracy and the long‐term perspective. If not, political decay beckons.In this section, we evaluate the tradeoeffs and ponder the possibilities of combining a more knowledegable democracy with a more accountable meritocracy.

The present study examines the spatial assimilation patterns of immigrants who arrived as children. The main objective is to predict the likelihood of living in ethnic areas for decimal generation immigrants (1.25, 1.5, and 1.75) among Asian Indians, Japanese, Chinese, Koreans, Filipinos, and Vietnamese. Using 2013–2017 5-Year ACS Estimates and IPUMS, it applies the measure of local spatial clustering (the Local Moran's I statistic) to identify ethnic areas and the logistic regression model to assess the effects of immigrant generational status, cultural, and socioeconomic assimilation on the probability of living in ethnic areas. The findings show that the 1.25 and 1.5 decimal generation immigrants of Chinese, Filipinos, Japanese, and Koreans demonstrate higher propensities of living in ethnic areas compared to the first generation of each ethnic group, respectively. Meanwhile, their Asian Indians and Vietnamese counterparts show spatial assimilation. Regardless of generational effects, English language ability positively relates to the probability of living in nonethnic areas, whereas economic assimilation indicators reveal mixed results. We found substantial evidence for resurgent ethnicity theory and some support of spatial assimilation model, indicating the ethnic disparity in spatial assimilation patterns among Asian immigrants. Our paper highlights the nonlinear assimilation patterns among Asian decimal generations. Results suggest that, for Asian immigrants in the U.S., age-at-arrival and ethnicity are both significant predictors of residential preference.

We use the Theil index and data from the 2012-2016, American Community Survey 5-Year Sample to document and analyze gender wage inequality for American Indian and Alaska Native (AIAN) women across single, multiracial and ethnic identity groups. Mean differences in hourly wages by gender contribute little to measured wage inequality when individuals are separated based upon their proximity to tribal homeland areas. Instead, we find between-group wage inequality is a function of glass-ceiling effects that differ by AIAN identification and homeland area. Differences in glass-ceiling effects across AIAN identity groups suggest the need to disaggregate data by AIAN ethnic identity. Furthermore, under certain circumstances, it may be appropriate to combine some racial AIAN identity groups into a single population even if the focus is to study policy impacts on citizens of federally recognized AIAN nations for those using government survey data.