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Cover -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Political Theory as a Signifying Practice -- 2. "Une Maitresse Imperieuse": Woman in Rousseau's Semiotic Republic -- The Maternal Voice -- The Field of Female Voice and Vision -- Making a Man -- The Semiotic Republic -- 3. The "Furies of Hell": Woman in Burke's "French Revolution -- Terror and Delight -- Burke's Reflections as Self-Reflections -- Breaking the Code -- The Furies at Versailles -- Postscript: The Maternal Republic -- 4. The "Innocent Magdalen": Woman in Mill's Symbolic Economy -- Political Economy of the Body -- Political Economy of the Female Body -- Angel in the House -- Angel out of the House -- The Innocent Magdalen -- 5. Resignifying the Woman Question in Political Theory -- Notes -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W

Intro -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Democracy and the Problem of Judgment -- 2. Judging at the "End of Reasons": Rethinking the Aesthetic Turn -- 3. Historicism, Judgment, and the Limits of Liberalism: The Case of Leo Strauss -- 4. Objectivity, Judgment, and Freedom: Rereading Arendt's "Truth and Politics" -- 5. Value Pluralism and the "Burdens of Judgment": John Rawls's Political Liberalism -- 6. Relativism and the New Universalism: Feminists Claim the Right to Judge -- 7. From Willing to Judging: Arendt, Habermas, and the Question of '68 -- 8. What on Earth Is a "Form of Life"?: Judging "Alien" Cultures According to Peter Winch -- 9. The Turn to Affect and the Problem of Judgment: Making Political Sense of the Nonconceptual -- Conclusion: Judging as a Democratic World-Building Practice -- List of Abbreviations -- Notes -- Index.

In this sweeping look at political and philosophical history, Linda M.G. Zerilli unpacks the tightly woven core of Hannah Arendt's unfinished work on a tenacious modern problem: how to judge critically in the wake of the collapse of inherited criteria of judgment. Engaging a remarkable breadth of thinkers, including Ludwig Wittgenstein, Leo Strauss, Immanuel Kant, Frederick Douglas, John Rawls, Jurgen Habermas, Martha Nussbaum, and many others, Zerilli clears a hopeful path between an untenable universalism and a cultural relativism that forever defers the possibility of judging at all. Zerilli deftly outlines the limitations of existing debates, both those that concern themselves with the impossibility of judging across cultures and those that try to find transcendental, rational values to anchor judgement. Looking at Kant through the lens of Arendt, Zerilli develops the notion of a public conception of truth, and from there she explores relativism, historicism, and universalism as they shape feminist approaches to judgment. 0Following Arendt even further, Zerilli arrives at a hopeful new pathway seeing the collapse of philosophical criteria for judgment not as a problem but a way to practice judgment anew as a world-building activity of democratic citizens. The result is an astonishing theoretical argument that travels through and goes beyond some of the most important political thought of the modern period.

Max Tomba aims to reconstruct how historical actors reconstructed the past to open the future in ways that diverged from the trajectory of the dominant modernity. Insurgent Universality would break open the dead logic of the juridical, political, and economic trajectory of modernity that limits what is given and constrains what is possible. This essay reflects on the practice and the role of the historian. Beyond merely adopting insurgents' perspectives, the historian must engage in a practice of critical and reflective judgment. The essay draws on Michel-Rolph Trouillot on the silencing of the past, Reinhard Koselleck on the priority of the future, and Marisa Fuentes on the limits of the archives for voicing marginalized points of view. It concludes by calling for judgment and imagination where the archives run dry.

In an age of alternative facts, fact-checking has become almost second nature to critical thinkers who are concerned with the consequences of post-truth for the future of democracy. Drawing primarily on the work of Hannah Arendt and secondarily on that of Michel Foucault, this essay questions fact-checking as a democratic world-building practice and argues for forms of truth-telling that do not fall prey to Western philosophical conceptions of absolute truth and its hostility to plurality, opinion, and contingency.

My response to John Hibbing raises questions about the nature of judgment implied in the biology and politics agenda that he would have us adopt. Although rightly critical of overly rationalist and cognitivist models, the neurobiological turn casts action and judgment as the mere effects of already primed dispositions, for which the giving of reasons is little more than window-dressing on what was going to happen in any case. Furthermore, the reductively biological picture of human beings that emerges in Hibbing's account is hard to square with democratic conceptions of politics that emphasize the capacity for freedom and association with others. Finally, I worry that Hibbing's unapologetic embrace of scientism remains entangled in the fraught history of deterministic explanatory models and American social science.

This essay examines the significantly different approaches of John Rawls and Hannah Arendt to the problem of judgment in democratic theory and practice. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

This essay examines the significantly different approaches of John Rawls and Hannah Arendt to the problem of judgment in democratic theory and practice.