España era en 1962 uno de los pocos países occidentales donde no había una libertad religiosa real, la religión católica era la del Estado y se practicaba la simple tolerancia con protestantes y judíos. Las discusiones del Concilio Vaticano II (1962-1965) mostraron que este tema sería central en la evolución posterior. La actitud recelosa de los obispos españoles fue cambiando a medida que entraban en contacto con sus colegas de todo el mundo. En este artículo analizamos el eco que el Concilio tuvo en España y la respuesta tanto de la jerarquía eclesiástica como del gobierno del general Franco. ; In 1962, Spain was one of the few Western countries where there was no real religious freedom: the State was officially Catholic, and Protestants and Jews were merely tolerated. The discussions held during Vatican Council II (1962-1965) showed that this issue would be central to future development. The suspicious attitude of the Spanish bishops were gradually to change as they came into contact with their colleagues from around the world. This article analyzes the reverberations of the Vatican Council in Spain, and the responses from the ecclesiastical hierarchy and General Franco's government.
The lack of freedom on political expression and association in Franco's Spain meant that the main internal opposition parties encountered many difficulties to develop its activities. This article focus on one of the loopholes that they found to sort out such difficulty: to hoist the flag of «europeism» in order to be able of maintaining the contact with the opposition groups in exile, and to receive political and financial support by its European partners. The franquist government had left this hole after recognizing already in the forties the political impossibility for a fascist regime to fit into the new Europe, built on the basis of respect for the person's fundamental rights. In this regard it plays a pivotal role the European Movement which was the protective umbrella of the activities of its Spanish branch, the AECE, about that most of this first opposition groups agglutinated. The government tolerance with this soft opposition groups broke since the meeting in Munich (1962), considered a provocation by the Spanish authorities and a hidden attempt to search the reconciliation with those who has lost the civil war. The exile or confinement of the most prominent leaders froze at all this incipient democratic opposition. It was necessary to wait five years to find again these groups, now led by the new parties inspired in the socialist or communist ideology. ; La ausencia de libertad de expresión y asociación en la España franquista hizo que los primeros grupos de oposición interna tuvieran muchas dificultades para desarrollar sus actividades. Este artículo se centra en una de las formas que se encontró para sortear esta dificultad: enarbolar la bandera del europeísmo para poder mantener el contacto con la oposición del exilio, y recibir apoyo político y financiero de sus mentores europeos. Ese hueco lo había dejado libre el gobierno franquista al reconocer ya en los años 40 la dificultad de encaje de un régimen fascista en la nueva Europa, recreada sobre el respeto a los derechos fundamentales de la persona. En este sentido juega un papel fundamental el Movimiento Europeo que sirvió de paraguas protector a las actividades de su filial española, la AECE, alrededor de la cual se articularon varios de estos primeros grupos de oposición. Esta tolerancia del régimen con los opositores más moderados se quebró a partir de la reunión de Múnich (1962), que el gobierno español consideró una provocación y un intento de reconciliación con los que habían sido derrotados en la Guerra Civil. El exilio o confinamiento de sus más destacados líderes paralizó casi por completo esta incipiente oposición democrática. Habrá que esperar un lustro para que recobre su fuerza, ahora liderada por grupos de inspiración socialista o comunista.
La Unión Europea pasará a la historia como el más ambicioso proyecto político y económico que se ha llevado a cabo en el Viejo Continente en los últimos cinco siglos. España quedó excluida por el carácter no democrático de su régimen. Lo que este libro aborda es la extraña relación entre una Europa liberal y el régimen de Franco a partir del momento (1957) en que se creó el entonces Mercado Común, liderado por Francia y Alemania. España llamará a sus puertas en 1962, aunque los seis países miembros dejaron claro (1964) que la apertura de negociaciones afectaría exclusivamente a los temas económicos, mientras no cambiase la naturaleza dictatorial del franquismo. El autor pone el énfasis en cómo nos veían los europeos, factor que a la postre determinó el ritmo de las conversaciones que se centrarían en las relaciones comerciales entre ambos. El libro detalla también, las negociaciones que condujeron al Acuerdo Preferencial de 1970.
In this paper, we present and discuss the rent-seeking process which occurred during Franco's regime in Spain (1939-75). Once the Civil War (1936-39) was over, those who won the war (militia-man, right-wing factions) took control of the key positions in the new government. That meant the transfer of rents from the budget to veterans of war and their relatives, fuelled by the creation of an increasingly strong and well organised interest's group. The author takes a public choice approach and is inspired by a similar study by R. Holcombe on the American Civil War.
Marshall pointed out that a specific form of industrial organisation (industrial districts) increased the wealth of some regions in England and Germany, and connected it with the accumulation of capital and investment, social capital, externalities and increasing returns. In his view, industrial location was closely linked to demography, local governments, freedom and social institutions. He recognised that districts were a main territorial framework for knowledge-based economic growth.
Marshall pointed out that a specific form of industrial organisation (industrial districts) increased the wealth of some regions in England and Germany, and connected it with the accumulation of capital and investment, social capital, externalities and increasing returns. In his view, industrial location was closely linked to demography, local governments, freedom and social institutions. He recognised that districts were a main territorial framework for knowledge-based economic growth.
Marshall pointed out that a specific form of industrial organisation (industrial districts) increased the wealth of some regions in England and Germany, and connected it with the accumulation of capital and investment, social capital, externalities and increasing returns. In his view, industrial location was closely linked to demography, local governments, freedom and social institutions. He recognised that districts were a main territorial framework for knowledge-based economic growth.
This work purposes to show the central role of Thomas Hobbes in the formation of capitalist ideology. He is the first author to present the ideology of the businessman (homo oecocomicus), with its most distinctive characteristic, individualism. Every constitutive element of the capitalist system is found in Hobbes' writings. His mentality is bourgeois and uses a model that can only correspond to a mercantile society of capitalist character, in which political rights are less important than security in the market. The economic liberalism of Adam Smith inherits from Hobbes its individualistic basis and its chrematistic platform.
La política cultural, económica y social del franquismo vino marcada por las características ideológicas del grupo que en cada momento controlaba la agenda del régimen. En un primer periodo (1939-57) esta pugna se establece entre falangistas y el grupo del CSIC/Arbor. En el segundo (1957-75) contenderán para tomar las riendas el grupo falangista y los tecnócratas. Es fácil postular la continuidad de ideas, aunque con personas distintas. Entre los falangistas la realización de su revolución pendiente será la guía de acción. Más problemática es la continuidad del 2º grupo. Es posible identificar vínculos entre los tradicionalistas y la institución religiosa Opus Dei. Pero subsiste la duda sobre la existencia de una estrategia tradicionalista/Opus Dei de control del Estado que se crearía como una plataforma cultural, para más tarde convertirse en proyecto político/económico. ; The economic and social cultural policy of Franquism was the outcome of the ideological fea-tures of the group that controlled the agenda of the regimen. In the first period (1939-57) the falangist and the traditionalistgroup cohesioned by the CSIC/Arbor. In the second period (1957-75) both groups would contend for control. It's not difficult to see the continuity of ideas. The falangists would try to put into practice their "unfinished revolution". But this continuity is least apparent when we come to the traditionalist group. It is possible to identify links between traditionalists and the religious institution Opus Dei. However, it is arguable whether exists or not a traditionalist/Opus Dei strategy of control of Government, through a cultural platform in the first period, that would turn into a political and economic project
