Suchergebnisse

ABSTRACTResearch Question/IssueUsing a sample of Chinese listed firms between 2010 and 2020, this study examines the effect of minority shareholders' online voice on controlling shareholders' tunneling.Research Findings/InsightsWe find that minority shareholders' online voice significantly reduces controlling shareholders' tunneling. The effect is more pronounced in firms with higher information asymmetry and weaker investor protection. We further show that minority shareholders' online voice can attract additional attention from other investors and regulators, exerting market and regulator pressure on controlling shareholders. Additional analysis also suggests that the effect of minority shareholders' online voice on controlling shareholders' tunneling increases with the negative tone of the questions and decreases with firms' responsiveness to these questions.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsPast findings of the governance role of minority shareholders mainly focus on their voting rights, but less attention has been paid to their online activism through voice. Our results suggest that minority shareholders' online voice plays an important role in corporate governance by curbing the controlling shareholders' tunneling attempt.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsThis study provides an essential implication for the regulators in emerging capital markets that adopting the online interactive platforms for firms and investors helps to enhance the minority shareholders' monitoring role.

Using a unique dataset based on a survey conducted by the Guangzhou Land Resources and Housing Administrative Bureau from November 2009 to January 2010, this article examines the sources and distribution of the hidden income of residents from different occupational backgrounds, taking into consideration their explicit income and other socio-economic characteristics. The results show that government officials not only had the highest but also the most stable hidden income, followed by employees in state-owned enterprises and employees in colleges or research institutions. Among government officials, those holding higher-level positions possessed more hidden income than those in lower-level positions. These findings have implications for China's labour market, taxation and resource allocation, and need to be taken into consideration in future economic and political policy designs and implementations. (J Contemp China/GIGA)

The 'sandwich class' is an East Asian term referring to the lower middle class. Using a large and unique micro dataset collected in Guangzhou, this paper examines empirically the potential determinants of housing affordability of the 'sandwich class'. It is found that an individual's self-perceived range of housing options is dependent not only on his/her current and predictable economic and financial resources, but also on his/her occupation and socio-demographic characteristics. The empirical findings are found to be robust against potential endogeneity problems and not sensitive to the regression specifications used. The empirical findings reported here help to deepen our understanding of the homeownership affordability determinants of the lower middle class in emerging economies characterised by an underdeveloped housing system.

ObjectivesThis article aims to investigate how local leaders' promotion is governed by the central state's concerns of maintaining political legitimacy in China.MethodsWe offer a theoretical framework regarding how to understand the statistical association between economic performance and local leaders' promotion in China. The empirical work is based on Probit models that were applied on a panel of data covering local leaders of 335 cities between 1999 and 2009.ResultsOur research confirms that a better record of relative local economic growth significantly boosts the promotion probability of the city‐level party secretary. However, the importance of economic work will significantly decrease if the cadres have strong open signals of their competence.ConclusionsThe findings in this article suggest that there exists a performance‐based screening scheme for selecting political elites in China. Portraying the positive image of political elites by the "tags" of their capacity in fostering economic development helps to boost both regime legitimacy and political authoritativeness in the Chinese‐style authoritative political regime.