Suchergebnisse

AbstractRisk‐Adjusted‐Return‐On‐Capital (RAROC) is a loan‐pricing criterion under which a bank sets the loan term such that a certain rate of return is achieved on the regulatory capital required by the Basel regulation. Some banks calculate the amount of regulatory capital for each loan under the standardized approach ("standardized banks," the regulatory capital is proportional to the loan amount), and others under the internal rating‐based (IRB) approach ("IRB banks," the regulatory capital is related to the Value‐at‐Risk of the loan). This article examines the impact of the RAROC criterion on the bank's loan‐pricing decision and the retailer's inventory decision. We find that among the loan terms that satisfy the bank's RAROC criterion, the one that benefits the retailer the most requires the bank to specify an inventory advance rate in addition to the interest rate. Under this loan term, the retailer's inventory level is more sensitive to his asset level when facing an IRB bank compared to a standardized bank. An IRB (standardized) loan leads to higher profit and inventory level for retailers with high (low) asset. For retailers with medium asset, an IRB loan results in a higher retailer profit but a lower consumer welfare. Calibrated numerical study reveals that the benefit of choosing standardized banks (relative to IRB banks) can be as high as 30% for industries with severe capital constraints, volatile demands, and low profit margins, highlighting the importance for retailers to carefully choose the type of banks to borrow from. When the interest rate is capped by regulation, retailers borrowing from a standardized bank are more likely to be influenced by the interest rate cap than those borrowing from an IRB bank. Under strong empire‐building incentives (the bank will offer loan terms to maximize the size of the loan), retailers with medium initial asset level shift their preference from IRB banks to standardized banks.