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AbstractKnowledge depth and knowledge breadth, the two dimensions of individual knowledge bases, are the most fundamental sources of innovation. Following a mixed‐method approach, we collect data from top chemical scientists in the R&D department of a leading US oil and gas company and investigate how individuals leverage their knowledge bases in the innovation process. In the qualitative study, we develop a conceptual framework with the two‐stage innovation process and label two distinct groups of individuals as "Young Geniuses" with high knowledge depth and "Old Masters" with high knowledge breadth. In the quantitative study, our analysis shows two different trajectories toward the innovation process: the negative impact of knowledge depth on early stage knowledge combinations for Young Geniuses occurs extremely early; the diminishing return of knowledge breadth on late‐stage commercialization for Old Masters occurs very late. Our study further analyzes the interaction effect of knowledge breadth for knowledge depth and provides practical implications for managers; in particular, inventors who better comprehend the timing of switching knowledge development can navigate the innovation process to achieve fruitful outcomes.

There is a sizeable positive economics literature on the effect of government on the distribution of income. Mueller (1989, pp. 448–58) offers a good summary of such work. Obviously, the distributional impact of the public sector depends on the behavioral features of the model the analyst employs – and the assumptions he adopts – with respect to the incidence of public spending, taxes, debt and regulation. Owing to the wide range of analytical possibilities, no consensus has emerged concerning the magnitude and direction of government's impact on the income distribution. Some scholars have argued that the middle class is the chief beneficiary of government-mediated wealth transfers (Stigler 1970), while others have found that, on balance, redistribution runs from the rich to the poor (Reynolds and Smolensky 1977). Assessing these conflicting conclusions, Mueller (1989, p. 455) observes that the supposition 'that some government policies – taxes or expenditures – are intended to confer redistributional gains on particular interest groups cannot be questioned.' He goes on to say, however, that 'what the literature does not illuminate is the amount of government activity explained in this way and its net impact on the distribution of income.' This paper begins closing the gap identified by Mueller. In particular, we ask, what is the net impact of interest groups on the distribution of income? Because the interest-group theory of government (McCormick and Tollison 1981) makes no a priori prediction about how incomes are impacted by interest group activity in the polity, our approach is strictly empirical. The paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly explores the analytical possibilities. Empirical evidence from the U.S. states is presented in Section III. There we find that, other things being the same, incomes are distributed more unequally (the Gini coefficient is higher) in states where special interest groups exert greater influence on the political process. Section IV concludes.