Suchergebnisse

China's ambitious military reform deepens with the establishment of a new commission on 22 January 2017 helmed by Chinese President Xi Jinping. The new commission will oversee the integration of military and civilian development. Xi aims to nurture Chinese defence manufacturers that are comparable to Lockheed Martin and Boeing in the United States and develop a military-industrial complex for the military modernisation commensurate with its rising international profile.

AbstractThe consensus in the literature is that fiscal decentralisation is a means to reduce corruption. For China, the attenuating effects of fiscal decentralisation are often enhanced by other factors. This paper argues that prior findings serve to facilitate the design of anti‐corruption measures but they do not address why individuals may engage in corruption. This is especially as individual evidence suggests that engaging in corruption is against professional ethos in China. This paper suggests that intergovernmental transfers and the relative level of economic development of where a public servant is serving influence the decision of whether to engage in corruption. Specifically, intergovernmental transfers and a higher level of local economic development directly affect the resources that a local administration has. In turn, this affects the extent to which one may realise their motivations for a career in the public sector. Empirical estimates for 1998–2013 serve to support the hypothesis.Points for practitioners
Fiscal decentralisation mitigates the prevalence of corruption in China in conjunction with other complimentary factors.
But engaging in corruption is inconsistent with motivations for a public sector career which include engaging in work for society's greater benefit.
Corruption may emerge because public servants feel that they may be unable to achieve their aims for joining the public sector because of local resource constraints.
Empirical findings suggest that increased resources to local administrations from intergovernmental transfers and economic development may discourage public servants from deviating from their stated career motivations, that is, engaging in corruption.

Abstract. Experiments were conducted in a bend flume to study the overtopping breaching process and the corresponding overflow rates of river levees constructed with cohesive sediments. The river and land regions were separated by the constructed levee in the bend flume. Results showed that the levee breaching process can be subdivided into a slope erosion stage, a headcut retreat stage and a breach widening stage. Mechanisms such as flow shear erosion, impinging jet erosion, side slope erosion and cantilever collapse were discovered in the breaching process. The erosion characteristics were determined by both flow and soil properties. Finally, a depth-averaged 2-D flow model was used to simulate the levee breaching flow rates, which is well expressed by the broad-crested weir flow formula. The deduced discharge coefficient was smaller than that of common broad-crested rectangular weirs because of the shape and roughness of the breach.