Kurds, criminal justice, and state legitimacy -- The face of the state : how police are central to modern governance -- 99% of our problems are due to the budget : the lofty expectations and dismal reality of reconstruction -- Nothing on how to investigate, nothing on how to talk to or deal with people : the cultural performance of policing -- If you have no degree, you can work here : qualifications, consent, and coercion -- The law is in one valley, but reality is in a different valley : tribes, political parties, and governments compete for control -- Police, state making, and imperialism -- Appendix : on conducting conflict research.
AbstractScholars have established effective and impartial policing regimes that are central to the development and maintenance of democratic states, especially in post‐conflict scenarios as the international community attempts to rebuild nations in the wake of dictatorial rule. Yet despite how common such efforts are, there remain serious gaps in the academic literature regarding this central aspect of state reconstruction. Recognizing that the model which is most commonly employed in practiced is woefully insufficient, scholars have begun to coalesce around a newer, more reflexive approach toward police reconstruction which more seriously grapples with the many political, economic, and social questions inherent to such efforts. However, despite this growth of the field, there remain significant gaps in the literature, especially around personnel recruitment and resource allocation. This article offers an explanation of these two models of post‐conflict police reconstruction, while explicating the remaining gaps in our collective knowledge.
Existing scientific literature on post-conflict police reconstruction is largely divided between two camps. The first, and most widely employed in practice, can be termed a neo-liberal model, which argues progress comes through technological and organizational sophistication delivered by Western officials. This neo-liberal model has been the guiding principle of the reconstruction of the Iraqi state and police force. However, many scholars have argued this model is woefully inadequate for post-conflict reconstruction and have instead developed an alternative approach which can be termed a reflexive model. Similar to what is known as fourth generation peacebuilding in the International Relations literature, the reflexive model stresses building relationships with local stakeholders and relying on indigenous knowledge to guide post-conflict reconstruction. Drawing from 48 intensive interviews, 87 qualitative surveys, and six months of ethnographic examination of an Iraqi police training academy, this article argues that both the neo-liberal and reflexive models suffer from ignoring the material basis of reconstruction. This article employs the term 'material' in the theoretical sense; while police reconstruction programs spend significant effort on reshaping the ideologies of police, few address the real conditions police face, from the necessary levels of funding and equipment in their training centers, to basic concerns such as adequate pay to draw qualified applicants and prevent corruption. This study examines how economic inequality affects the 'other side' of conflicts, the security sector. The central finding is that the material deprivation experienced by Iraqi police has resulted in an underqualified force consisting of uninterested officers whose capacity and skill deficits have fed directly into the rise of powerful non-state organizations such as the Islamic State. This article explicates a central underlying cause of the problem with the reconstruction of the Iraqi police specifically and the larger case of neo-liberal post-conflict police reconstruction generally.
The field of policing has increasingly come under public scrutiny due to the events surrounding the deaths of citizens at the hands of officers. While this has spurred a call for changes to police training and practices, conspicuously absent from the conversation are the voices of officers themselves. This study addresses this lacuna by examining the attitudes and opinions of rural law enforcement, challenging the notion that the findings of studies concerning urban police can be generalized to rural departments. We argue that opposed to individualistic "rotten apples" theories, rural police behavior is best understood as patterned by the habitus of officers. This study explicates how the field experienced by rural law enforcement interacts with and modifies their response to the hypermasculine training and increasing militarization of American policing to produce an officer habitus distinct from that of their urban counterparts.
