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AbstractThis study assesses what causes American states to assume the authority to administer federal environmental programs within their borders, rather than leave implementation to the Environmental Protection Agency. Some observers have argued that interstate competition for mobile capital may motivate states to seek this authority so that they may reduce the regulatory burdens imposed on industrial polluters. Other scholars highlight the importance of intrastate political and economic factors or vertical influences emanating from federal officials. I argue that the relative importance of each of these classes of explanations will vary across environmental policy arenas, depending on the amount of implementation discretion that federal programs provide to state agencies. Results from event history analyses of two major environmental programs are generally, though not entirely, consistent with this theory.

AbstractThis article examines trends in American state environmental policy scholarship from 1990 to 2019 and assesses the progress that has been made during that time in addressing the numerous deficiencies noted by Lester and Lombard (1990). A survey of more than 300 published articles suggests that researchers have made significant advances in theory and methodology over the last three decades. Yet some core elements of Lester and Lombard's critique continue to apply, and more work needs to be done to reach their goal of a theoretically coherent and methodologically sound body of research. The article concludes by offering suggestions for scholars working in the field.

Many American states have adopted laws designed to prevent environmental agencies from regulating pollution emissions more stringently than is required by federal statute. This study leverages variation in the timing and breadth of state adoption of these "No More Stringent" (NMS) laws to examine the claim that interstate competition for mobile capital leads state governments to relax regulatory standards, resulting in an environmental race to the bottom. The results indicate that the diffusion of NMS laws is driven by two forms of interstate economic competition, a policy competition effect that operates primarily among contiguous neighbors and a cost competition effect that operates primarily among a broader set of economic peers. These findings provide new empirical support for the environmental race to the bottom argument, and suggest new challenges for the use of cooperative federalism arrangements that involve state implementation of federal programs.

AbstractWell‐known theories suggest that administrative procedures may be used as mechanisms of political control of the bureaucracy. This study investigates whether three common regulatory analysis procedures—cost‐benefit analysis, risk assessment, and economic impact analysis—lead to greater influence by political officials on bureaucratic policymaking. Multivariate analyses of data from a unique survey of state administrators indicate that regulatory analysis requirements are associated with decreases in the perceived influence of elected political officials on the content of administrative rules. This association is particularly evident in cases where proposed rules are subjected to a cost–benefit test. These findings contradict prominent theories of administrative procedures, but are consistent with recent research on the political power of administrative agencies.

This study documents state implementation of mechanisms designed to promote public participation in agency rulemaking. Many scholars have questioned the effectiveness of such mechanisms, arguing that they fail to encourage greater participation or that increased participation does not affect the substance of administrative rules. Using data from a unique survey of state administrators, the author employs multivariate analyses to assess the relationship between these measures and the perceived influence of external actors. The results suggest that critics may understate the importance of public notification and access procedures. These devices are associated with increases in the impact that a wide variety of actors are perceived to have on the content of agency rules.

Objective. This study assesses the effect of political corruption on state environmental policy.Method. OLS regression analyses are used to determine if political corruption affects the strength of state environmental programs.Results. The results suggest that political corruption serves to systematically weaken state environmental programs. The effect of corruption is similar in magnitude to conventional explanations of environmental program strength, such as public environmentalism and state wealth. Its impact is particularly pronounced in states with strong organized manufacturing interests.Conclusion. Political corruption may systematically bias the substance of public policy.

Objective: This study assesses the effect of interstate competition on the stringency with which states enforce environmental regulations. Method: Pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis of state surface-mining regulation is used to determine if the enforcement gap between a state and competitor states affects the stringency of state enforcement. Results: The results suggest that state enforcement is systematically affected by the behavior of regional competitors. States adjust their enforcement in response to competitor states when their enforcement stringency exceeds that of their competitors. When competitors' enforcement is more stringent, however, their behavior does not have a significant effect. Conclusion: This study provides empirical evidence for a race to the bottom in state environmental regulation. Tables, 3, References. Adapted from the source document.

Objective.This study assesses the effect of interstate competition on the stringency with which states enforce environmental regulations.Method.Pooled cross‐sectional time‐series analysis of state surface‐mining regulation is used to determine if the enforcement gap between a state and competitor states affects the stringency of state enforcement.Results.The results suggest that state enforcement is systematically affected by the behavior of regional competitors. States adjust their enforcement in response to competitor states when their enforcement stringency exceeds that of their competitors. When competitors' enforcement is more stringent, however, their behavior does not have a significant effect.Conclusion.This study provides empirical evidence for a race to the bottom in state environmental regulation.

In many states, administrative rules are subject to review by elected political officials in the legislative and/or executive branches. Using recently developed measures of state rule review powers, this study investigates whether they serve to enhance or diminish interest group influence on the content of agency regulations. It finds that both greater gubernatorial and legislative rule review authority significantly decrease the amount of interest group influence reported by state agency directors. These results provide evidence that powers of external rule review may serve to counteract the effects of subsystem policy making.