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Presidential saber rattling in the early American republic -- Presidential saber rattling and presidential representation -- Measuring presidential saber rattling -- The causes of presidential saber rattling -- The domestic consequences of presidential saber rattling -- The foreign policy consequences of presidential saber rattling -- The Bush war on terror and presidential foreign policy representation -- Wisdom, virtue, and presidential foreign policy representation.

The Myth of Presidential Representation evaluates the nature of American presidential representation, examining the strongly embedded belief – held by the country's founders, as well as current American political culture and social science theory – that presidents should represent the community at large. Citizens expect presidents to reflect prevailing public sentiment and compromise in the national interest. Social scientists express these same ideas through theoretical models depicting presidential behavior as driven by centrism and issue stances adhering to the median voter. Yet partisanship seems to be a dominant theme of modern American politics. Do American presidents adhere to a centrist model of representation as envisioned by the founders? Or, do presidents typically attempt to lead the public toward their own more partisan positions? If so, how successful are they? What are the consequences of centrist versus partisan presidential representation? The Myth of Presidential Representation addresses these questions both theoretically and empirically

This commentary on Terry Moe's review essay discusses the advantages and limitations of rational choice as an explanatory theory of presidential behavior. It also cautions against the view that rational choice is, or should be, the dominant paradigm for presidential studies.

Saber rattling is a prominent tool of the U.S. president's foreign policy leadership. Yet there has been no study of how presidential saber rattling affects international or domestic political outcomes. This study evaluates how presidential saber rattling affects U.S. economic behavior and performance. Theoretically, the study demonstrates that presidential rhetoric affects the risks that economic actors are willing to take, as well as the consequences of these resulting behaviors for U.S. economic performance. Using monthly time series running from January 1978 through January 2005, vector autoregression methods are applied to show that increased presidential saber rattling produces increased perceptions of negative economic news, declining consumer confidence, lower personal consumption expenditures, less demand for money, and slower economic growth. More broadly, the study demonstrates an important linkage between the president's two most important roles: foreign and economic policy leadership. The president's foreign policy pronouncements not only impact other nations, but also affect domestic economic outcomes.

This article reports descriptive research concerning past presidents' rhetorical leadership of the economy. Using the PERL logical text language, every presidential remark on the economy, unemployment, inflation, and the federal deficit is extracted from Public Papers of the Presidents from the Truman administration through April 2002. These data are coded for the frequency and relative optimism of presidential remarks on the economy. Statistical analysis shows that through time presidents have increasingly discussed the economy, and in more optimistic tones. Additionally, after controlling for actual economic performance and election year effects, some presidents spoke more often and more optimistically about the economy than others. The study also reports case studies of the president's economic rhetoric during the Carter, Reagan, and Clinton administrations that illustrate the nature of presidential rhetoric during economic crises.

Past research on budgeting has ignored the existence of an equilibrating tendency in US federal revenues & expenditures through time. Using time series error-correction models, show the existence of such an equilibrating tendency in federal budgets from 1904 to 1996, & theorize that it is due to the balanced-budget norm. Time-varying parameter estimation methods are then used to reveal substantial variations in the strength of the equilibrating through time. Descriptive evidence from the time-varying coefficients shows that the equilibrating tendency in the federal budget was actually weaker prior to the Great Depression & the acceptance of Keynesian principles. There is little evidence of temporal change in the equilibrating tendency in the modern era due to partisanship or divided government. The results suggest that the balanced budget force is important in changing federal revenues & expenditures, but in a manner more complex than has been suggested by facile theories of the past. 2 Tables, 6 Figures, 1 Appendix, 55 References. Adapted from the source document.

A common assumption by time-series analysts is that the estimated coefficients remain fixed through time. Yet this strong assumption often has little grounds in substantive theory or empirical tests. If the true coefficients change over time, but are estimated with fixed-coefficient methods such as Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) or its many offshoots, then this can lead to significant information loss, as well as errors of inference. This article demonstrates a method, Flexible Least Squares (FLS), by exploring the relative stability of time-series coefficients. FLS is superior to other such methods in that it enables the analyst to diagnose the magnitude of coefficient variation & detect which particular coefficients are changing. FLS also provides an estimated vector of time-varying coefficients for exploratory or descriptive purposes. FLS properties are demonstrated through simulation analysis & an evaluation of the time-varying characteristics of explanations of presidential approval from 1978 to 1997. 4 Tables, 4 Figures, 48 References. Adapted from the source document.