Suchergebnisse

In China's decentralised system, vital public services such as health, education and social welfare are provided by local governments. The intergovernmental fiscal system is critical to ensuring local governments are adequately financed. Since 1994, China has overhauled its public finances to create a system able to finance government operations, support economic growth and fund industrial policies and international initiatives. Its Achilles' heel remains a weak intergovernmental fiscal system that is unable to fund local governments efficiently and equitably. This article analyses local finance through three decades of reform. Despite a promise early in the Xi Jinping administration to realign central–local fiscal relations, local finances have deteriorated since 2015 due to slowing growth, tax cuts and pressures from tightened budget management. Local fiscal difficulties have caused a decline in social spending as a share of gross domestic product. If continued, this trend threatens to reverse recent gains in improving services and undermine other national policy goals. (China / GIGA)

AbstractAfter three decades of spectacular economic successes, China is facing a significant challenge. The string of recent scandals – environmental degradation, melamine-tainted milk powder, fake drugs and chemicals – have all pointed to government weakness in protecting public safety, exposing an enormous gap between China's growing economic prowess and its capacity to govern. With the leadership now focused on improving the regulatory regime, will China "catch up" and build the public institutions needed? This article argues that the reactive, incremental retrenchment of government in the 1980s and 1990s, combined with inadequate finance, had broken the intergovernmental fiscal system and created large distortions in the incentive structure facing government agencies and public institutions (shiye danwei事业单位). Until the intergovernmental fiscal system is repaired and incentives are fundamentally reformed for the public sector, the top-down programme to redirect China's development and build a service-oriented government will have limited effect.

Major steps outlined by Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang in his report to the 6th National People's Congress, May 1984.

China's stunning record of economic development since the 1970s has been marred by an increasingly obvious gap between the country's 'haves' and its 'have-nots'. While people living in some parts of the country have enjoyed dramatically improved conditions of life, those in other districts and regions have slipped ever further behind in terms of access to health, wealth, education, security and opportunity. Paying for Progress in China is a collection of essays which trace the causes of this growing inequality, using new data including surveys, interviews, newly available of.

BACKGROUND: The Chinese government launched health care reforms in 2009 and introduced a national list of essential public health services (EPHS) as an integral part of the plan to deliver health care for all. EPHS was also built into the national plan to promote the equalisation of public services across the country. A national standard was set for financial input to EPHS. As the services are co-funded by the central and local governments, a robust intergovernmental fiscal system is essential to guarantee that the hundreds of thousands of service providers have adequate financing to meet the service commitment. METHODS: We examined the flow of funds through China's complex intergovernmental fiscal system to see whether the promise of equal funding for EPHS was implemented, and how the costs were distributed across levels of government. Information was collated from funding documents issued by all levels of governments involved, for a sample that includes the central government, 12 provincial governments, eight prefectural governments and 11 county-level governments. For each level of government, we examined: (i) when and how much funding they disbursed or received from higher levels; (ii) when and how much matching funds were made; and (iii) the allocation rules adopted. RESULTS: Overall, we found the central government met its commitments for the program on time and in full, and good compliance from local governments in passing through funding from higher levels and as well as meeting their own financial responsibilities. However, we also found the following problems: (i) the involvement of so many levels of government resulted in delays in the disbursement of funds; (ii) the use of outdated population data in calculating required funding resulted in some under-allocation; and (iii) localities that needed funding the most were not well targeted by the distribution of funds. CONCLUSION: This study traces how the 2018 subsidy for EPHS was disbursed from the central government to service providers, focusing on ...