Foreign direct investment is of increasing importance in the European Union. This paper estimates the effect of taxes on foreign direct investment (FDI) flows and on three sub-components of these flows for the countries of the en- larged European Union. The model in the spirit of gravity equations robustly explains FDI flows between the 25 member states. Sample selection needs to be addressed in the estimation. We show that the different subcomponents of FDI should and indeed do react differently to taxes. After controlling for unobserved country characteristics and common time effects, the top statutory corporate tax rate of both, source and host country, turn insignificant for total FDI and investment into equity. However, high source country taxes clearly increase the probability of firms to re-invest profits abroad and lower the percentage of debt financed FDI. This might reflect profit re-allocation to avoid taxes. Market size factors have the expected signs for total FDI. Non-productivity adjusted wages as determinants of FDI are less robust.
Der designierte DGAP-Direktor Guntram Wolff im Gespräch über politische Illusionen, wirtschaftliche Abhängigkeiten und die Rolle unabhängiger Denker. (IP)
This Policy Contribution, based on a note written for the Bundestag EU Committee, explores the possible consequences of a no-deal Brexit for the European Union and assesses preparations on the EU side. It also provides guidance on the optimal strategy for the EU, depending on the choices made by the United Kingdom. Overall, a no-deal Brexit would be disruptive in the short-term: -There would be immediate very significant administrative and logistical challenges in trade. Preparations to reduce those disruptions are underway but are unlikely to be sufficient. But while Most-Favoured Nation tariffs will affect some sectors significantly, the macroeconomic effect on the German economy might not be huge. -If the UK fails to honour its financial commitments to the EU, about €16.5 billion would be missing for the remainder of the current EU budgetary period. The gap could be filled thanks to the existing 'own resources' ceiling. The overall missing 'Brexit bill' would amount to about €45-50 billion. -Not honouring financial commitments would be considered by the EU as akin to default and would likely lead to an uncooperative no-deal Brexit. It would be more disruptive than a cooperative no-deal Brexit, in which the EU and the UK cooperate on a number of pressing emergency files. -The European Commission has issued a number of draft regulations to mitigate the effects of a no-deal Brexit, including on issues such as aviation and visas. These are comprehensive but would not offset the effects of a no-deal Brexit, which would be highly disruptive in some sectors. The effects of a no-deal Brexit in the medium to long term are difficult to assess. A no-deal Brexit would lead to deterioration in long-term political relationships, which would make a new trade arrangement and other cooperation in the future less likely. A specific concern is the situation in Ireland, which is also the most contentious part of the Brexit negotiation. If the EU wants to protect the integrity of its single market, a no-deal Brexit will mean the imposition of customs controls on the Irish border. The European Commission's draft legislation aims to preserve the peace process, but a hard border could provoke renewed violence. The overall strategic direction the EU should take would be to increase the cost to the UK of a no-deal Brexit as much as possible (respecting ethical limits), while showing more flexibility over the political declaration and possibly the withdrawal deal itself.
Reale Renditen fallen weltweit mindestens seit Anfang der 1980er Jahre, so auch in Deutschland. Die Gründe hierfür werden kontrovers diskutiert. Es handelt sich aber um eine langfriste Veränderung von globalem Spar- und Investitionsverhalten aufgrund von demographischen und strukturellen Faktoren. Geldpolitik ist hierfür nicht ursächlich verantwortlich, muss aber darauf reagieren. Nominalzinssätze, wie z.B. auf dem Girokonto, sind nur begrenzt interessant. Für den Sparer ist der Realzins entscheidend, da bei einer hohen Inflationsrate der hohe Nominalzins lediglich den Kaufkraftverlust durch Inflation ausgleicht. Die reale Rendite auf Bargeld und Einlagen privater Haushalte ist nicht wesentlich gesunken, worauf auch die Bundesbank in ihrem letztem Monatsbericht hinweist. Die Inflationsraten sind im Euroraum seit mehreren Jahren rückläufig, was darauf hindeutet, dass die EZB eher zu langsam den Leitzinssatz gesenkt hat. Dies könnte mitverantwortlich sein für die Verschärfung der Rezession im Euroraum. Ein Anheben des Leitzinses in derzeitigen Umständen wäre der wirtschaftlichen Erholung abträglich und würde auch in Deutschland zu noch niedrigeren Inflationsraten führen.
The European Central Bank's monetary policy addresses the euro-area average inflation rate. By setting conditions for the area as a whole it should ensure symmetric price adjustment. Indeed, consumer price inflation rates provide little evidence of asymmetric adjustment during 2009-11. Only Ireland, which is too small to trigger a symmetric reaction, had significantly lower inflation rates. Some asymmetry is visible in total economy unit labour costs (ULC), but ULC developments are largely disconnected from consumer price inflation. Wage developments have been more symmetric, but are also disconnected from inflation rates. Monetary policy therefore cannot do more to react to the southern euro-area recessions. Rigidities need to be removed so that recessions lead to lower prices. European Commission forecasts suggest that Greek inflation rates can be expected to fall, but Italian and German inflation rates will not adjust in the right direction during 2012-13. Less inflation in Italy and more inflation in Germany are urgently needed.
Jean-Claude Trichet deserves praise for fighting inflation and his handling of the financial crisis of 2007-2009. But his legacy is unfinished and we still have to see whether he will be the one who saved the euro. Important challenges remain for the incoming president. First, trust of citizens in the ECB has fallenmassively according to the Eurobarometer survey inmany euro area countries, including Germany and Greece. Trust needs to be regained. Second, the ECB's stance on Greece needs to be reversed both as regards financial sector participation and SMP. The SMP for Italy can be justified but can only be a temporary solution. The ECB will therefore have to further push for a fiscal lender-of-last-resort back-stop that can also exercise conditionality. Third, a rate cut should be considered at this point in time but upcoming political pressure to increase inflation needs to be resisted.
The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the proposed prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances regulation (EIP) are designed to avoid imbalances. However, these instruments overlap, and need clarification. Both the ESRB and the Commission, which is given certain powers by the EIP, must identify and act early on risks. Acting in the face of strong economic and political pressure is difficult. Complementing the current approach with transparent and rules-based mechanisms will reduce this problem. The EIP and ESRB can complement each other in terms of analysis and policy, and close collaboration will be vital. The EIP regulation can be used to ensure that ESRB recommendations are followed up. In the area of financial recommendations relevent to macroeconomic imbalances, the Commission should have a more formal requirement to act on ESRB recommendations. The EIP regulation would benefit from a clause allowing recommendations to be addressed not only to member states. Conflicts between the ESRB and Commission could arise. In this case, the Treaty requires the Commission to issue a recommendation even if the ESRB issues a negative finding. Legally, it might not be possible to exclude the use by the Commission of confidential information obtained in the ESRB.
Einleitung: Die deutschen Staatsschulden sind in den letzten Jahrzehnten kontinuierlich gestiegen. Künftige Generationen werden zusätzlich aufgrund der demographischen Entwicklung durch die umlagenfinanzierten sozialen Sicherungssysteme belastet. Gerade auch der Anstieg der Verschuldung der Bundesländer war in den letzten Jahrzehnten spürbar. So betrug die Verschuldung aller deutschen Bundesländer zusammengenommen 1991 noch 168 Mrd. Euro, während Anfang 2007 die Verschuldung 483 Mrd. Euro betrug, was eine knappe Verdopplung der Schuldenquote der Länder (Verschuldung in Prozent des BIP) auf ca. 21 Prozent impliziert. In der aktuellen Diskussion um die Reform des deutschen Föderalismus besteht Einigkeit in der Diagnose des Problems. Die Entwicklung der Staatsschulden ist kritisch und darf sich so nicht fortsetzen. Uneinigkeit herrscht hingegen über die Ursache des Anstiegs. Ebenfalls wird um die beste Möglichkeit, diesen zu bremsen, gerungen. Verschiedene Autoren argumentieren, dass der Verschuldungsanstieg der deutschen Bundesländer vor allem auf den Moral Hazard Anreiz zurückzuführen ist. Der vorliegende Diskussionsbeitrag diskutiert dies als einen der möglichen Gründe des Schuldenanstiegs. Hierzu wird zunächst das Konzept kurz eingeführt. Anschließend wird die bestehende empirische Evidenz für Deutschland diskutiert. Schließlich wird eine Bewertung und Einordnung in die aktuelle Debatte vorgenommen. Schlußbemerkungen: Im vorliegenden Diskussionsbeitrag wird das "Moral hazard" Problem als einer der möglichen Gründe für den beobachteten starken Anstieg der Verschuldung deutscher Bundesländer diskutiert. Es wurde gezeigt, dass die Finanzmärkte kaum auf die erheblichen Unterschiede in den fiskalischen Fundamentaldaten der Länder reagieren. Mit einer Fallstudie wurde außerdem verdeutlicht, dass das aktuelle Bundesverfassungsgerichtsurteil zu einer eventuellen Haushaltsnotlage von Berlin Berlin die Risikoeinschätzung der Märkte für deutsche Bundesländer nicht verändert hat. Alles in allem scheint es sinnvoll, über eine größere Beteiligung der Gläubiger an Risiken einzelner Länder nachzudenken. Dies dürfte aber den Schuldenanstieg nur bei bereits hoch verschuldeten Ländern begrenzen und möglicherweise einem Notlagenfall vorbeugen, nicht aber den grundsätzlichen "Defizit-Bias" der Finanzpolitik kompensieren. Insgesamt scheinen deswegen vorgelagerte Regeln notwendig, um den Anstieg der Verschuldung schon früh zu unterbinden und somit Belastungen zukünftiger Generationen zu reduzieren.
Foreign direct investment is of increasing importance in the European Union. This paper estimates the effect of taxes on foreign direct investment (FDI) flows and on three sub-components of these flows for the countries of the en- larged European Union. The model in the spirit of gravity equations robustly explains FDI flows between the 25 member states. Sample selection needs to be addressed in the estimation. We show that the different subcomponents of FDI should and indeed do react differently to taxes. After controlling for unobserved country characteristics and common time effects, the top statutory corporate tax rate of both, source and host country, turn insignificant for total FDI and investment into equity. However, high source country taxes clearly increase the probability of firms to re-invest profits abroad and lower the percentage of debt financed FDI. This might reflect profit re-allocation to avoid taxes. Market size factors have the expected signs for total FDI. Non-productivity adjusted wages as determinants of FDI are less robust.
Financial difficulties of U.S. cities have recently become a major issue of concern. However, there is little agreement on why certain cities experience crises while others do not. Two arguments are put forward: Cities suffer from (1) structural problems like high immigration, congestion etc. (2) nonstructural political problems like the weakness of the mayor, union-power etc. Starting from a common pool model of municipal goods we estimate demand equations for spending and debt with structural variables. The estimation is based on 900 US cities in 1985, 1991 and 1999. Structural factors predicted by the model explain most of the variation of spending and debt levels. Furthermore coefficients are stable over time. However, excessively high debt burdens as indicators of potential crisis, and high spending levels are outliers and not explained by structural factors.
