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This article addresses concerns that the growth in global governance may be bringing with it a decline in the significance of democratic sources of political legitimacy. One approach in evaluating such concerns is to ask whether the respective patterns of legitimation for private and public authority differ or whether they refer to a similar set of normative standards. Private transnational governance regimes provide useful contexts in which to assess the presumed democratic erosion. They seem, almost of themselves, to make the case for such a decline: in them regulatory authority is exercised by non-state actors who, by their very nature, lack the kind of authorization afforded by the democratic procedures that legitimize state-based regulation; in addition, they are intrinsically linked to the notion of politics as a form of problem-solving rather than as the exercise of power. Given these characteristics, when governance arrangements of this kind are subjected to criticism, one would expect justificatory responses to relate primarily to performance, with normative criteria such as fundamental individual rights and the imperative for democratic procedure playing only a minor role. On the basis of a qualitative content analysis, the study tests three ideal-type patterns of legitimation for plausibility. The case selected for examination is the recent controversy surrounding the hybrid governance regime that operates to prevent the use of performance-enhancing drugs in sport. The debate offers the possibility of a 'nutshell' comparison of the respective patterns of legitimation used in criticizing and justifying state and non-state regulatory authority. This comparison yields two findings. The first is that the values used to appraise the state-based components of the sporting world's hybrid regulatory regime do not differ systematically from those used to appraise the private elements: contestation and justification in both cases are founded on normative criteria relating to fundamental individual rights and democratic procedure and not just on performance-related considerations. The second finding is that justificatory grounds of the first type do not appear to be diminishing in importance vis-à-vis those of the second.

This article addresses concerns that the growth in global governance may be bringing with it a decline in the significance of democratic sources of political legitimacy. One approach in evaluating such concerns is to ask whether the respective patterns of legitimation for private and public authority differ or whether they refer to a similar set of normative standards. Private transnational governance regimes provide useful contexts in which to assess the presumed democratic erosion. They seem, almost of themselves, to make the case for such a decline: in them regulatory authority is exercised by non-state actors who, by their very nature, lack the kind of authorization afforded by the democratic procedures that legitimize state-based regulation; in addition, they are intrinsically linked to the notion of politics as a form of problem-solving rather than as the exercise of power. Given these characteristics, when governance arrangements of this kind are subjected to criticism, one would expect justificatory responses to relate primarily to performance, with normative criteria such as fundamental individual rights and the imperative for democratic procedure playing only a minor role. On the basis of a qualitative content analysis, the study tests three ideal-type patterns of legitimation for plausibility. The case selected for examination is the recent controversy surrounding the hybrid governance regime that operates to prevent the use of performance-enhancing drugs in sport. The debate offers the possibility of a 'nutshell' comparison of the respective patterns of legitimation used in criticizing and justifying state and non-state regulatory authority. This comparison yields two findings. The first is that the values used to appraise the state-based components of the sporting world's hybrid regulatory regime do not differ systematically from those used to appraise the private elements: contestation and justification in both cases are founded on normative criteria relating to fundamental individual rights and democratic procedure and not just on performance-related considerations. The second finding is that justificatory grounds of the first type do not appear to be diminishing in importance vis-à-vis those of the second.

This article addresses concerns that the growth in global governance may be bringing with it a decline in the significance of democratic sources of political legitimacy. One approach in evaluating such concerns is to ask whether the respective patterns of legitimation for private and public authority differ or whether they refer to a similar set of normative standards. Private transnational governance regimes provide useful contexts in which to assess the presumed democratic erosion. They seem, almost of themselves, to make the case for such a decline: in them regulatory authority is exercised by non-state actors who, by their very nature, lack the kind of authorization afforded by the democratic procedures that legitimize state-based regulation; in addition, they are intrinsically linked to the notion of politics as a form of problem-solving rather than as the exercise of power. Given these characteristics, when governance arrangements of this kind are subjected to criticism, one would expect justificatory responses to relate primarily to performance, with normative criteria such as fundamental individual rights and the imperative for democratic procedure playing only a minor role. On the basis of a qualitative content analysis, the study tests three ideal-type patterns of legitimation for plausibility. The case selected for examination is the recent controversy surrounding the hybrid governance regime that operates to prevent the use of performance-enhancing drugs in sport. The debate offers the possibility of a 'nutshell' comparison of the respective patterns of legitimation used in criticizing and justifying state and non-state regulatory authority. This comparison yields two findings. The first is that the values used to appraise the state-based components of the sporting world's hybrid regulatory regime do not differ systematically from those used to appraise the private elements: contestation and justification in both cases are founded on normative criteria relating to fundamental individual rights and democratic procedure and not just on performance-related considerations. The second finding is that justificatory grounds of the first type do not appear to be diminishing in importance vis-à-vis those of the second.

AbstractThis article is a critical examination of the claim that the emergence of private self-regulatory regimes in the transnational sphere signals a new trend of self-constitutionalization outside the limits of nation-state based or intergovernmental control. It deals with the question to what extent the diffusion of public authority in the sphere beyond the state affects the responsibility of the state(s) to procure the legitimacy of such private self-regulation. First, a conceptual argument is developed which identifies private self-regulatory regimes as rule systems nested in a specific constitutional order of the international society, here described as 'neo-Westphalian' (Section I). Second, implications for the responsibility to procure the legitimacy of collectively binding regulatory functions performed by private actors in the sphere beyond the state are considered (Section II). Often cited as a model example of autonomous societal self-regulation, thelex sportivarenders particularly strong plausibility for the claimed non-existence of purely private self-regulation. The regulation of performance-enhancing substances can serve to demonstrate the complex interactions between multiple public and private sites of constitutional authority (Section III). In conclusion (Section IV), I argue that, although the ultimate responsibility for providing legitimacy continues to lie with the state/world of states, the political order of the international society as construed in neo-Westphalian terms provides a dispersed and fragmented constitutional-style legal framework with few reliable guarantees that states are capable or willing to enact their background role. Therefore, a substantial part of the burden of – initial – legitimation must be carried by those directly involved in private self-regulation by constituting and exercising public authority.

Der Beitrag setzt sich zunächst mit der Frage auseinander, wie weit ein "power shift sideways" tatsächlich geht, der sich in der Übernahme von Normsetzungs- und Normdurchsetzungsfunktionen durch die privaten Selbstregulierungsinitiativen auszudrücken scheint. Es wird das konzeptionelle Argument entwickelt, dass transnationale private Selbstregulierung immer öffentlich regulierte Selbstregulierung ist und es dabei nicht um eine Verantwortungsverlagerung, sondern um die Organisation einer Verantwortungsteilung geht. Im darauf folgenden Teil des Beitrags wird an einem transsektoralen Beispiel aus dem Bereich der "lex sportiva" empirisch dargelegt, wie sich eine solche Verantwortungsteilung in der Praxis ausgestalten kann und auf welche funktionale Arbeitsteilung zwischen den privaten und den öffentlichen Akteuren und Institutionen ihr Gelingen angewiesen ist. (ICE2)

Unter der Bezeichnung "Corporate Social Responsibility" (CSR) sind in den vergangenen Jahren unternehmens- und branchenübergreifende Regelungsinitiativen entstanden, durch die Unternehmen auf dem Wege freiwilliger Selbstregulierung normsetzende Leistungen im Umweltbereich, bei der Durchsetzung von Menschenrechts- und Sozialstandards sowie zur Korruptionsbekämpfung erbringen. In diesem privaten "Normunternehmertum" bildet sich eine Neubestimmung des Zusammenspiels zwischen öffentlichen und privaten Akteuren bei der Erbringung von politischen Steuerungsleistungen ab, die gemeinhin der Zuständigkeit des Staates zugerechnet werden. Im vorliegenden Beitrag wird zunächst eine kurze Bestandsaufnahme der unterschiedlichen Formen vorgenommen, in denen Unternehmen Governance-Leistungen erbringen. Danach wird die Frage erörtert, unter welchen Bedingungen und aufgrund welcher Einflussfaktoren Unternehmen zu Normunternehmern werden. Weiterhin wird kritisch gefragt, ob Governance-Funktionen den Wirtschaftsunternehmen überhaupt überlassen werden sollten. Dies führt schließlich zur Frage nach der Gestalt einer institutionellen Gesamtarchitektur, in welche die private Selbstregulierung im Raum jenseits des Staates eingebettet sein sollte. (ICI2)

Der Verfasser wirft einen kontraintuitiven Blick auf einen Typus von Akteuren, die gemeinhin eher als Produzenten von Ungerechtigkeit gelten. Unter Bezug auf ein Forschungsprojekt, das die Einbindung privater Akteure in grenzüberschreitende politische Steuerungsprozesse untersucht, zeigt er, dass Unternehmen in der Tat als Normunternehmer im Rahmen einer Ko-Produktion von Governance agieren. Solche kollektiven Selbstregulierungsansätze privater Normunternehmer bedürfen allerdings des Schattens einer politischen Metaregulierung durch die Staatenwelt - nicht zuletzt mit Blick auf Fragen der Verteilungs- und Verfahrensgerechtigkeit. (ICE2)

"Wenn die Deutsche Vereinigung für Politische Wissenschaft auf ihrem 23. wissenschaftlichen Kongress die Rede vom ‚Reformstau' und von der vermeintlichen Unfähigkeit von Staat und Gesellschaft zum politischen Wandel aufgreift, dann weckt sie damit die berechtigte Erwartung, dabei genuin politikwissenschaftliche Kernkompetenzen sichtbar und fruchtbar werden zu lassen. Aber worin liegen diese Kernkompetenzen im Umgang mit dem Thema ‚Reform'? Aus meiner Sicht verfügt unser Fach vor allem hinsichtlich zweier Fragestellungen über das Potenzial, in den Debatten über Reform die Rolle einer Leitdisziplin zu übernehmen: Wo liegen die Gründe für Reformblockaden? An welchen normativen Maßstäben sollte sich Reform orientieren?" (Autorenreferat)