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In 1998, Internet-related industries created over a million jobs and generated more than 330 billion in revenue. As of December 1999, almost five million commercial websites had emerged, and that number was increasing at a rate of almost half a million per month. The explosive growth of the Internet economy has drastically changed the way commercial transactions are conducted, making anything from books to databases available at the click of a mouse. This book investigates the underlying economics of the Internet, focusing specifically on the pricing of access, the pricing of goods and services sold online, the relationship between network effects, technological innovation and business strategy, and the issues surrounding taxation of electronic commerce. Addressing the economic aspects of the Internet and electronic commerce as well as traditional pricing practices and market structure, this volume will serve as a roadmap for the current and future terrain of the Internet economy

Introduces a special journal issue on "Information and Political Institutions". [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

I develop a model of electoral competition with partisan campaign support. Voters' utilities are defined over candidate locations and the amounts of party campaign support that they receive. Parties' utilities are defined over the location of the winning candidate and how much support they dole out for their candidates. Analytical results identify cases in which parties will successfully pull the electorally induced preferences of their members away from their median voters' ideal points and towards the party's most favored policies. Equilibrium results yield several testable hypotheses. First, candidate policy positions and parties' campaign contributions should be responsive to district partisan predisposition, independent of the policy preferences of a district's median voter. Second, uncontested elections should occur more often in politically-lopsided districts than in districts where there are more even levels of political competition. Finally, there should be an inverse relationship between candidate policy extremity and partisan campaign support.

I develop a model of electoral competition with partisan campaign support. Voters' utilities are defined over candidate locations and the amounts of party campaign support that they receive. Parties' utilities are defined over the location of the winning candidate and how much support they dole out for their candidates. Analytical results identify cases in which parties will successfully pull the electorally induced preferences of their members away from their median voters' ideal points and towards the party's most favored policies. Equilibrium results yield several testable hypotheses. First, candidate policy positions and parties' campaign contributions should be responsive to district partisan predisposition, independent of the policy preferences of a district's median voter. Second, uncontested elections should occur more often in politically-lopsided districts than in districts where there are more even levels of political competition. Finally, there should be an inverse relationship between candidate policy extremity and partisan campaign support. Figures, Appendixes, References. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2006.]

Using data on party representation for the Rules, Appropriations, and Ways and Means Committees from the 47th–103rd Congresses, I test the implications of a recently developed theory by Dixit, Grossman, and Gul. Their theory predicts that, in any particular Congress, majority and minority party representation on committees should be a function of the maximum political strength enjoyed by the majority party during the entire period for which it has held majority status up to, and including, that Congress. I refute this hypothesis and find that for any given Congress, majority party representation on committees is determined, rather, by the current political strength of the majority party. These findings speak to broad questions about our understanding of the role of the minority party in legislative organization and lawmaking in legislative politics, and in the US Congress, in particular.

Using data on party representation for the Rules, Appropriations, and Ways and Means Committees from the 47th-103rd Congresses, I test the implications of a recently developed theory by Dixit, Grossman, and Gul. Their theory predicts that, in any particular Congress, majority and minority party representation on committees should be a function of the maximum political strength enjoyed by the majority party during the entire period for which it has held majority status up to, and including, that Congress. I refute this hypothesis and find that for any given Congress, majority party representation on committees is determined, rather, by the current political strength of the majority party. These findings speak to broad questions about our understanding of the role of the minority party in legislative organization and lawmaking in legislative politics, and in the US Congress, in particular. 3 Tables, 4 Figures, 22 References. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2005.]

Using state-level data from Illinois General Assembly elections, I test the implications of a formal model of electoral competition where political parties present voters with platforms of ideological locations and levels of partisan support for their candidates. Consistent with the model, I find that candidate policy positions and parties' campaign contributions are responsive to district partisan predisposition, even when controlling for the policy preferences of the district's median voter and other conventional determinants of candidate ideology and funding. Also consistent with the theory, uncontested elections occur more often in politically lopsided districts than in districts where there are more even levels of partisan competition, and there is an inverse relationship between candidate policy extremity and campaign contributions. These results support a theory of activist programmatic parties in the electoral arena and highlight the need for further scholarship on the role of parties in the electorate and their connections with parties in the legislature.