Suchergebnisse

The redefinition of the sports business -- The structures of ownership -- Financial statements, revenues, and costs -- Facilities: "disneyfication" and design -- Stadium financing -- Sports teams and real estate development, or real estate development companies with sports teams? -- Media and sport management -- What are teams worth? Team valuation -- Demand and the sport business: what does the customer want and how does a team owner provide it? -- Pricing strategies -- Capital budgeting and team investments -- League policies, taxes, and profits

AbstractThis paper gives an overview of the economic literature on food and collective reputation. Often both the quality of food and the producer of the food are not known at the time of purchase; therefore, consumers sometimes rely on a collective reputation for the expected quality. This collective reputation could be for a region, commodity, country, franchise, or cooperative. This paper summarizes the theoretical literature that illustrates incentives for firms and regions, as well as the empirical literature that analyzes collective reputation for various types of food. Recommendations for future work and policy implications are given.

In Two Sports Myths and Why They're Wrong, authors Rodney Fort and Jason Winfree apply sharp economic analysis to bust a couple of the most widespread urban legends about professional athletics. Exploring the claim that player salary demands increase ticket prices and asking whether Major League Baseball should emulate the National Football League, this quick read gives us a taste of 15 Sports Myths and Why They're Wrong, forthcoming from Stanford University Press this September. Fort and Winfree take apart these common misconceptions, showing how the assumptions behind them fail to add up. They reveal how these myths perpetuate themselves, substituting the intuitive appeal of emotionally charged myths with rigorous, informed explanations that weaken their potency and loosen their grip on the sports we love. Two Sports Myths breakdown these tall tales just in time for the MLB All-Star Game and will leave you wondering what other myths will be on the chopping block later this fall

In 15 Sports Myths and Why They're Wrong, authors Rodney Fort and Jason Winfree apply sharp economic analysis to bust some of the most widespread urban legends about college and professional athletics. Each chapter takes apart a common misconception, showing how the assumptions behind it fail to add up. Fort and Winfree reveal how these myths perpetuate themselves and, ultimately, how they serve a handful of powerful parties-such as franchise owners, reporters, and players-at the expense of the larger community of sports fans. From the idea that team owners and managers are inept to the notion that revenue-generating college sports pay for athletics that don't attract fans (and their cash), 15 Sports Myths and Why They're Wrong strips down pervasive accounts of how our favorite games function, allowing us to look at them in a new, more informed way. Fort and Winfree argue that substituting the intuitive appeal of emotionally charged myths with rigorous, informed explanations weakens the power of these tall tales and their tight hold on the sports we love. Readers will emerge with a clearer picture of the forces at work within the sports world and a better understanding of why these myths matter-and are worthy of a takedown

AbstractThis paper discusses the benefits and costs of antitrust intervention in agriculture. We argue that over the long run, fixed costs have increased and marginal costs have decreased, which has created a tension between lower food prices and having a large number of farms. As opposed to policies of most industries, agricultural policy seems to place more importance upon producer surplus instead of consumer surplus, which runs directly counter to the goals of antitrust laws. While protecting small farms may potentially be an appropriate use of other policy instruments (such as the Farm Bill), using antitrust laws to break up large agricultural firms and/or protect small farms may result in higher food prices, which is regressive and exacerbates inequality. Furthermore, the application of antitrust law for the purpose of raising food prices and producer surplus is antithetical to its historic purpose.

Objectives. This article tests the presence of demand-driven discrimination attributable to foreign-born players in Major League Baseball (MLB). We quantify the change in demand at MLB games given the number of foreign players on an MLB team. We further measure how matching market population demographics and team demographics affects demand.Methods. We use regression analysis to estimate the effect on attendance of a change in the number of foreign players on a team. We then use these estimates to find the change in revenue for the team.Results. The results show that the effect evolves over time. At the outset of the sample (1985), the net effect of an additional foreign-born player was a decrease in ticket demand. This effect diminished steadily until 1992, when the net effect became positive, peaking in 2000, and then slightly decreasing until the end of the sample (2005). The matching of team and population demographics was not found to be significant.Conclusions. We discuss the implications of this result on league policy decisions.

Recommended readings (Machine generated): George A. Akerlof (1970), 'The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84 (3), August, 488-500 -- Franklin Allen (1984), 'Reputation and Product Quality', RAND Journal of Economics, 15 (3), Autumn, 311-27 -- Heski Bar-Isaac (2007), 'Something to Prove: Reputation in Teams', RAND Journal of Economics, 38 (2), June, 495-511 -- Simon Board and Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013), 'Reputation for Quality', Econometrica, 81 (6), November, 2381-462 -- Iris Bohnet and Steffen Huck (2004), 'Repetition and Reputation: Implications for Trust and Trustworthiness when Institutions Change', American Economic Review, 94 (2), 362-66 -- Gary E. Bolton, Elena Katok and Axel Ockenfels (2005), 'Cooperation Among Strangers with Limited Information about Reputation', Journal of Public Economics, 89 (8), August, 1457-68 -- Luis M. B. Cabral (2000), 'Stretching Firm and Brand Reputation', RAND Journal of Economics, 31 (4), Winter, 658-73 -- Stefano Castriota and Marco Delmastro (2015), 'The Economics of Collective Reputation: Evidence from the Wine Industry', American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 97 (2), March, 469-89 -- Shih-Chen Chiang and Robert T. Masson (1988), 'Domestic Industrial Structure and Export Quality', International Economic Review, 29 (2), May, 261-70 -- Marco Costanigro, Craig A. Bond and Jill J. McCluskey (2012), 'Reputation Leaders and Quality Laggards: the Incentive Structure in Markets with Both Private and Collective Reputations', Journal of Agricultural Economics, 63 (2), June, 245-64 -- Marco Costanigro, Jill J. McCluskey and Christopher Goemans (2010), 'The Economics of Nested Names: Name Specificity, Reputation, and Price Premia', American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 92 (5), October, 1339-50 -- James D. Dana, Jr. and Yuk-Fai Fong (2011), 'Product Quality, Reputation, and Market Structure', International Economic Review, 52 (4), November, 1059-76 -- Shabtai Donnenfeld and Wolfgang Mayer (1987), 'The Quality of Export Products and Optimal Trade Policy', International Economic Review, 28 (1), February, 159-74 -- Dirk Engelmann and Urs Fischbacher (2009), 'Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game', Games and Economic Behavior, 67 (2), November, 399-407 -- Rodney E. Falvey (1989), 'Trade, Quality Reputations and Commercial Policy', International Economic Review, 30 (3), August, 607-22 -- Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (1989), 'Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player', Econometrica, 57 (4), July, 759-78 -- Daniel Houser and John Wooders (2006), 'Reputation in Auctions: Theory, and Evidence from eBay', Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 15 (2), Summer, 353-69 -- Benjamin Klein and Keith B. Leffler (1981), 'The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance', Journal of Political Economy, 89 (4), August, 615-41 -- David M. Kreps and Robert Wilson (1981), 'Reputation and Imperfect Information', Journal of Economic Theory, 27 (2), August, 253-79

This articles argues that consumers of professional sports leagues are not always better off with more sellers because market power can be exerted in many ways. In the presence of one governing body, allowing individual firms to sell a product can be more harmful than a monopoly. Some recent antitrust lawsuits dealing with North American sports leagues have focused on collective sales through the league compared with competitive sales through teams. This paper gives examples where it is not clear that team sales are better than league sales. Furthermore, we argue that market power depends largely on fan substitution within and across leagues, including NCAA sports. We give a summary of recent research in the area of fan substitution, and suggest directions for future work on understanding substitutability and impacts on market power of professional and collegiate sports teams.