Suchergebnisse

AbstractThe present paper describes conflicts of interest in families which include someone with intellectual disabilities. Data were taken from a study concerned with the 1995 Carers Act. The research examined the experiences and views of 51 families who had some kind of assessment by a social services department. Cases were analysed where it was found that carers, the people for whom they cared and the assessors did not agree about such conflicts. Assessors sometimes stereotyped families and spoke of conflicts of interest when the situation was more complex. In particular, the real conflict was often between the whole family and an inadequate service system that did not offer enough support or choices to the individual. Conflicts which had occurred were related to three major motives driving carers: (1) the need for a break from caring; (2) the need to speak for their disabled relative; and (3) their concern for standards of behaviour. The present authors report on how these situations were handled by assessors and conclude with some recommendations for good carer assessments which will help to resolve conflicts of interest. A greater degree of informed choice for individuals with intellectual disabilities will in itself resolve many potential conflicts of interest.

Public reason is a formal concept in political theory. There is a need to better understand how public reason might be elicited in making public decisions that involve deep uncertainty, which arises from pernicious and gross ignorance about how a system works, the boundaries of a system, and the relative value (or disvalue) of various possible outcomes. This article is the third in a series to demonstrate how ethical argument analysis—a qualitative decision-making aid—may be used to elicit public reason in the presence of deep uncertainty. The first article demonstrated how argument analysis is capable of probing deep into a single argument. The second article demonstrated how argument analysis can analyze a broad set of arguments and how argument analysis can be operationalized for use as a decision-making aid. This article demonstrates (i) the relevance of argument analysis to public reasoning, (ii) the relevance of argument analysis for decision-making under deep uncertainty, an emerging direction in decision theory, and (iii) how deep uncertainty can arise when the boundary between facts and values is inescapably entangled. This article and the previous two make these demonstrations using, as an example, the conservation and sustainable use of lions.