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The Supreme Court of Tennessee reconsidered several problems in the field of Statutory Interpretation during the Survey period, but its decisions largely followed principles already established in Tennessee and other jurisdictions. Constitutional Requirements Certain problems in the field of legislation arise in Tennessee by reason of state constitutional provisions. The Court is committed to the position of interpreting these provisions more or less irrespective of the construction of comparable provisions in other state constitutions.' The Constitution of the State of Tennessee provides: "No bill shall become a law, which embraces more than one subject; that subject to be expressed in the title." A chief justice of the Tennessee Supreme Court who was a member of the constitutional convention of 1870 which drafted this provision has explained its purpose: "The Convention evidently designed to cut up by the roots, not only the pernicious system of legislation, which embraced in one act incongruous and independent subjects, but also the evil practice of giving titles to acts which conveyed no real information as to the objects embraced in its provisions." The title of a statute may be either narrow and restricted or broad and general, as the legislature may determine. In either case, if the legislation under the title is germane to the general subject, it is not invalid under the one-subject provision. If the title is general, it justifies provisions in the body of the statute not incongruous with its provisions as to the manner, means and instrumentality whereby it may be enforced or its purpose accomplished.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that, under appropriate circumstances, either the plaintiff or the defendant may seek and obtain a summary judgment.' The detailed requirements of Rule 56 have been discussed elsewhere, and they will not be discussed herein other than as they aid in delineating the area covered by summary judgments. In determining the scope of Rule 56, the purpose of the rules as a whole must be considered as well as the effect of the discovery procedures of the rules. In addition the summary judgment rule must be explicitly distinguished from a motion for judgment on the pleadings provided elsewhere in the rules. At common law the purpose of pleadings was to arrive at an issue of law or fact. If a party challenged the legal sufficiency of an opponent's pleading by demurrer, an issue of law was thus raised and decided by the judge. However, if a pleading were met by a denial, an issue of fact was thus raised to be decided by the jury. The complicated rules that followed from this system, and the importance attached to departures from the rules led to the establishment in many states of a system of procedure and pleading enacted by act of the legislature.

The present Tennessee Constitution as interpreted by the courts permits the legislature to grant to the governing boards of counties a considerable amount of power to determine and regulate matters which are of local concern. There is no reason to doubt that the legislature could authorize county governing boards great freedom in determining the form and organization of county government. Thus the General Assembly could go far in establishing county home rule in Tennessee. The chief difficulty in relying on the General Assembly's granting considerable authority under the existing constitutional provision to the governing boards of the counties to determine local matters is that the General Assembly could repeal the enabling act. Thus counties would not be protected from the General Assembly as many advocates of constitutional home rule feel desirable.

Evidence of Guilt: Restrictions Upon its Discovery or Compulsory Disclosure By John MacArthur Maguire Boston: Little, Brown &Co. 1959. Pp. xi, 295. $12.50 reviewer: Edmund M. Morgan ================================= Government and Public Administration By John D. Millett New York. McGraw-Hill Book Co. 1959. Pp. x, 477. $7.95 reviewer: Henry N. Williams

On Understanding the Supreme Court By Paul A. Freund Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1949. Pp. 130. $3.00 reviewer: Noel T. Dowling ================================== Courts on Trial By Jerome N. Frank Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949. Pp. vii, 441. $5.00 reviewer: Hugo L. Black, Jr. ================================== Hugo L. Black: A Study in the Judicial Process By Charlotte Williams Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1950. Pp. vii, 208. $3.50. reviewer: George H. Cate, Sr. ==================================== Hatch Act Decisions (Political Activity Cases) of the United States Civil Service Commission By James W. Irwin Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1949. Pp. 304. $1.50 reviewer: Henry N. Williams