Suchergebnisse

In November 2007, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) launched its 'Transparency in Defence Expenditure', or TIDE, initiative, designed to fight corruption in military expenditures and arms procurement. Its initial focus was on sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), a region regarded as the most corrupt in the world. By focusing solely on the bribe-takers in SSA while studiously avoiding reference to the bribe-makers, DFID has opened itself up to accusations of double standards and hypocrisy. Corruption in arms procurement in SSA represents a small segment of a complex global pipeline that links Western arms firms and licensing governments to corrupt foreign officials and offshore financial institutions; tackling this web of corruption requires major reforms at the level of global governance, not just in governance procedures in SSA. With an analysis limited by inappropriate neoliberal methodologies and tainted by the alleged corrupt practices of British arms firms operating within SSA, DFID has been forced to put its TIDE initiative on the back burner.

Within contemporary liberal peace discourse, poverty and underdevelopment are being constructed as 'new threats' that feed conflict and terrorism. This perception has encouraged a growing convergence between the security and development policies of the major donors. However, in Africa, where the need to simultaneously tackle conflict and underdevelopment is most pressing, the global institutions have failed to acknowledge that the neo-liberal policies that they pursue have been instrumental in structuring the domestic political and economic tensions that have contributed to violent conflict. Moreover, the current preoccupation with the war on terror has encouraged the co-option of development resources for security functions resulting in the incremental securitisation of development policies. Regardless of its expanding base and the process of mission creep, the liberal peace complex has failed to secure sustainable peace in Africa. Into the vacuum created by failure, the 'new barbarian' agenda that underpins the 'war on terror' has surreptitiously moved, expanding its reach and its wake of pillage and destruction.

Theories of how and why violent conflicts occur generally distinguish between structural factors on the one hand and accelerating or triggering factors on the other (Azar, 1990). Structural factors, which must be viewed as long term, include interrelated political, social and economic elements, such as the failure to meet basic human needs, population pressure, unequal distribution of wealth, depletion of natural resources, environmental degradation and ethnic tensions. Accelerating or triggering factors on the other hand, operate in the context of the above adverse structural factors but involve specific events, attitudes or decisions of dominant actors, which provoke or encourage violence. Triggering factors include the unequal distribution of power, the abuse of military power, the proliferation of small arms ideological conflict, struggles related to natural resources. How these triggers activate violence depends heavily upon the specific context.
By examining the process of disarmament and demilitarisation within the southern African region, this article seeks to highlight the contradictions between treating the symptoms rather than the underlying causes of violence. In the final section some lessons from the region's experience will be highlighted which might be pertinent to national and international attempts at establishing peace and stability in future conflict zones.

Theories of how and why violent conflicts occur generally distinguish between structural factors on the one hand and accelerating or triggering factors on the other (Azar, 1990). Structural factors, which must be viewed as long term, include interrelated political social and economic elements, such as the failure to meet basic human needs, population pressure, unequal distribution of wealth, depletion of natural resources, environmental degradation and ethnic tensions. Accelerating or triggering factors on the other hand, operate in the context of the above adverse structural factors but involve specific events, attitudes or decisions of dominant actors, which provoke or encourage violence. Triggering factors include the unequal distribution of power, the abuse of military power, the proliferation of small arms ideological conflict, struggles related to natural resources. How these triggers activate violence depends heavily upon the specific context. By examining the process of disarmament and demilitarisation within the southern African region, this article seeks to highlight the contradictions between treating the symptoms rather than the underlying causes of violence. In the final section some lessons from the region's experience will be highlighted which might be pertinent to national and international attempts at establishing peace and stability in future conflict zones. (ROAPE/DÜI)