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This book critically examines the role of cinema and television in shaping and spreading narratives of memory politics in contemporary Russia to provide a better understanding both of the various ways the Russian government practices memory politics, and the existence of alternative and critical voices and criticism.

How are extensive internet control, surveillance and restricted online anonymity reconceptualized into virtues of effective state governance, rather than violations of civic rights? The Russian government has instrumentalized ostensibly sound legitimations - countering terrorist and extremist propaganda, combatting child pornography - to bring about a dramatic decline in internet freedom. While these policies have been widely studied, scholarship examining how the Russian government legitimates and cultivates popular support for restricting online freedoms remains scarce. This article therefore studies how restrictions of internet freedom are framed in political and media discourses. It focuses on the case of Telegram, a popular messaging application that was banned in Russia in April 2018 for its refusal to provide the FSB with access to encrypted messages in compliance with anti-terrorism legislation. It finds that media framing of the ban was more diverse than the official governmental line. While national security framing was important, the 'rule of law' frame occurred most frequently, and conspiracy framing was markedly infrequent.

This book examines this societal dynamics of memory politics in Russia. Since Vladimir Putin became president, the Russian central government has increasingly actively employed cultural memory to claim political legitimacy and discredit all forms of political opposition. The rhetorical use of the past has become a defining characteristic of Russian politics, creating a historical foundation for the regime's emphasis on a strong state and centralised leadership. Exploring memory politics, this book analyses a wide range of actors, from the central government and the Russian Orthodox Church, to filmmaker and cultural heavyweight Nikita Mikhalkov and radical thinkers such as Aleksandr Dugin. In addition, in view of the steady decline in media freedom since 2000, it critically examines the role of cinema and television in shaping and spreading these narratives. Thus, this book aims to gain a better understanding of the various means through which the Russian government practices its memory politics (e.g., the role of state media) and, on the other hand, to sufficiently value the existence of alternative and critical voices and criticism that existing studies tend to overlook. Contributing to current debates in the field of memory studies and of current affairs in Russia and Eastern Europe, this book will be of interest to scholars working in the fields of Russian Studies, Cultural Memory Studies, Nationalism and National Identity, Political Communication, Film, Television and Media Studies. ; Peer reviewed

This title is published in Open Access with the support of the University of Helsinki. ; This book examines the societal dynamics of memory politics in Russia. Since Vladimir Putin became president, the Russian central government has increasingly actively employed cultural memory to claim political legitimacy and discredit all forms of political opposition. The rhetorical use of the past has become a defining characteristic of Russian politics, creating a historical foundation for the regime's emphasis on a strong state and centralised leadership. Exploring memory politics, this book analyses a wide range of actors, from the central government and the Russian Orthodox Church, to filmmaker and cultural heavyweight Nikita Mikhalkov and radical thinkers such as Aleksandr Dugin. In addition, in view of the steady decline in media freedom since 2000, it critically examines the role of cinema and television in shaping and spreading these narratives. Thus, this book aims to gain a better understanding of the various means through which the Russian government practices its memory politics (e.g., the role of state media) and, on the other hand, to sufficiently value the existence of alternative and critical voices and criticism that existing studies tend to overlook. Contributing to current debates in the field of memory studies and of current affairs in Russia and Eastern Europe, this book will be of interest to scholars working in the fields of Russian Studies, Cultural Memory Studies, Nationalism and National Identity, Political Communication, Film, Television and Media Studies.

This book examines the societal dynamics of memory politics in Russia. Since Vladimir Putin became president, the Russian central government has increasingly actively employed cultural memory to claim political legitimacy and discredit all forms of political opposition. The rhetorical use of the past has become a defining characteristic of Russian politics, creating a historical foundation for the regime's emphasis on a strong state and centralised leadership.Exploring memory politics, this book analyses a wide range of actors, from the central government and the Russian Orthodox Church, to filmmaker and cultural heavyweight Nikita Mikhalkov and radical thinkers such as Aleksandr Dugin. In addition, in view of the steady decline in media freedom since 2000, it critically examines the role of cinema and television in shaping and spreading these narratives. Thus, this book aims to gain a better understanding of the various means through which the Russian government practices its memory politics (e.g., the role of state media) and, on the other hand, to sufficiently value the existence of alternative and critical voices and criticism that existing studies tend to overlook. Contributing to current debates in the field of memory studies and of current affairs in Russia and Eastern Europe, this book will be of interest to scholars working in the fields of Russian Studies, Cultural Memory Studies, Nationalism and National Identity, Political Communication, Film, Television and Media Studies.

Since Vladimir Putin was elected president of Russia in 2000, the rhetorical use of the past has increasingly become a defining characteristic of Russian politics. Through a new national holiday, references to history in official statements, the erection of monuments and other forms of state symbolism the regime has sought to mobilise cultural memory in support of its legitimacy. The recent and distant past alike were drawn upon to create a historical foundation for the regime's emphasis on a strong state and centralised leadership, as well as for stepping up the restrictions on political opposition. Yet the Russian government is not the only one who has used history to spread its ideas about how the Russian state "traditionally" should be governed. Various societal, cultural and religious groups and organisations, have put forward their own historically framed visions on Russian statehood. This dissertation examines this societal dynamics of memory politics in contemporary Russia in the period 2000-2012. It analyses a wide range of actors, from the central government and the Russian Orthodox Church, to cultural heavyweight Nikita Mikhalkov and radical thinkers such as Aleksandr Dugin. In addition, in view of the steady decline in media freedom since 2000, it critically examines role of cinema and television in shaping and spreading these historical narratives. This makes it possible to, on the one hand, gain a better understanding of the various means through which the Russian government practices its memory politics (e.g., the role of state media) and, on the other hand, to sufficiently value the existence of alternative and critical voices and criticism that tend to be missed.

This article analyses the emergence of the political myth of Pëtr Stolypin and its recent institutionalization as an exemplary image for Russian politics. The article considers the memory of Stolypin together with the myth of the Time of Troubles, that served the Putin regime well in its first and second terms, to demonstrate how the post-revolutionary frame of reference implicit in the latter has been replaced by the pre-revolutionary frame of "stability Stolypin-style": a new brand of stability-oriented state patriotism that taps into the very same societal fears and insecurities connected to memories of the 1990s, but is geared to fit a situation in which recent accomplishments have to be safeguarded against the perceived threat posed by domestic rather than foreign enemies. Instead of promising a stable and prosperous future, the Stolypin myth cautions that recent achievements can all too easily be lost again.

In recent years, the Russian government has dramatically expanded its restrictions on the internet, while simultaneously consolidating its grip on traditional media. The internet, however, because of its transnational configuration, continues to evade comprehensive state control and offers ever new opportunities for disseminating and consuming dissenting opinions. Drawing on a wide range of disciplines, including media law, human rights, political science, media and cultural studies, and the study of religion, this book examines the current state of the freedom of speech, freedom of expression, and media freedom in Russia, focusing on digital media and cross-media initiatives that bridge traditional and new media spheres. It assesses how the conditions for free speech are influenced by the dynamic development of Russian media, including the expansion of digital technologies, explores the interaction and transfer of practices, formats, stylistics and aesthetics between independent and state-owned media, and discusses how far traditional media co-opt strategies developed by and associated with independent media to mask their lack of free expression. Overall, the book provides a deep and rich understanding of the changing structures and practices of national and transnational Russian media and how they condition the boundaries of freedom of expression in Russia today.

Datafication and the use of algorithmic systems increasingly blur distinctions between policy fields. In the financial sector, for example, algorithms are used in credit scoring, money has become transactional data sought after by large data-driven companies, while financial technologies (FinTech) are emerging as a locus of information warfare. To grasp the context specificity of algorithmic governance and the assumptions on which its evaluation within different domains is based, we comparatively study the sociotechnical imaginaries of algorithmic governance in European Union (EU) policy on online disinformation and FinTech. We find that sociotechnical imaginaries prevalent in EU policy documents on disinformation and FinTech are highly divergent. While the first can be characterized as an algorithm-facilitated attempt to return to the presupposed status quo (absence of manipulation) without a defined future imaginary, the latter places technological innovation at the centre of realizing a globally competitive Digital Single Market.

This paper examines the practices, performance, and perceptions of the messaging platform Telegram as an actor in the 2020 Belarus protests, using publicly available data from Telegram's public statements, protest-related Telegram groups, and media coverage. Developing a novel conceptualization of platform actorness, we critically assess Telegram's role in the protests and examine whether Telegram is seen as playing an active role in Belarusian contentious politics. We find that Telegram's performance and practices drive citizens to form affective connections to the platform and to perceive Telegram as an ally in their struggle against repressions and digital censorship. Meanwhile, the Belarusian state uses Telegram's aversion to censorship and content moderation to intervene in contentious politics by co-opting grassroots approaches and mimicking manipulative efforts of other authoritarian regimes. Our conceptual framework is applicable to post-Soviet authoritarian contexts, but can also serve as a useful heuristic for analyzing platform actorness in other regime types.

Datafication and the use of algorithmic systems increasingly blur distinctions between policy fields. In the financial sector, for example, algorithms are used in credit scoring, money has become transactional data sought after by large data-driven companies, while financial technologies (FinTech) are emerging as a locus of information warfare. To grasp the context specificity of algorithmic governance and the assumptions on which its evaluation within different domains is based, we comparatively study the sociotechnical imaginaries of algorithmic governance in European Union (EU) policy on online disinformation and FinTech. We find that sociotechnical imaginaries prevalent in EU policy documents on disinformation and FinTech are highly divergent. While the first can be characterized as an algorithm-facilitated attempt to return to the presupposed status quo (absence of manipulation) without a defined future imaginary, the latter places technological innovation at the centre of realizing a globally competitive Digital Single Market.