Suchergebnisse

A global epidemiological surveillance system is needed both for verification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and as a confidence-building measure for the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). This proposal should be part of the agenda of the Fourth Review Conference of the BWC, with preliminary consideration and analysis conducted at the national level and by appropriate international expert groups in preparation for the Review Conference. An example of the kind of program that might be constructed is described. Such a program would make it very difficult for hostile use of biological agents to remain undetected, would catalyze a dramatic increase in global public, agricultural, and veterinary health, and would offer reasonable assurance that emerging diseases would be detected at an early stage. These benefits easily justify the expenditures that would be required.

Lundin, Rosenberg, and Woodall all comment, rightly, that a program of global epidemiological surveillance should be justified first on the basis of its benefits to global public health, and only secondarily on the basis of its contribution to weapons control. I agree, but I present my proposal in the context of weapons control because it is in that context that I became convinced of the necessity of such a program. My intent was to determine how one would recognize, and thereby deter, the clandestine use of biological agents (which I believe to be the most likely form of use). This analysis led to the conclusion that a global program of epidemiological surveillance is essential for biological weapons control.