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Intro -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- Table of Contents -- LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 THE ORIGINS OF CFSP -- 1.1.1 The European Defence Community and the European Political Community -- 1.1.2 From European Political Cooperation to a Common Foreign and Security Policy -- 1.2 A CFSP LEGAL ORDER? -- 1.3 THE RESEARCH QUESTION -- 2 The Concept of Legal Order -- 2.1 INTRODUCTION -- 2.2 DEFINING THE LEGAL ORDER -- 2.2.1 Legal Positivism and the Systemic Features of a Legal Order -- 2.2.2 Degrees of Legality? -- 2.3 TYPES OF LEGAL NORMS AND INSTITUTIONAL THEORY -- 2.3.1 Institutional Legal Positivism -- 2.3.2 Types of Legal Norms -- 2.3.3 The Effect of Effectiveness -- 2.3.4 Binding Quality and its Consequences -- 2.4 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS -- 2.4.1 Treaty-Based Legal Orders -- 2.4.1.1 Treaties as a Source of Legal Norms -- 2.4.1.2 Additional Declarations and Interpretative Statements -- 2.4.2 Hierarchical Relations between Legal Orders -- 2.4.3 The Legal Personality of an International Entity -- 2.5 CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS -- 3 The Purposes and Scope of CFSP -- 3.1 INTRODUCTION -- 3.2 THE PREAMBLE AND COMMON PROVISIONS -- 3.2.1 Vertical Delimitation: CFSP and the Member States -- 3.2.2 Horizontal Delimitation: The Union's Issue Areas -- 3.3 THE SPECIFIC CFSP OBJECTIVES -- 3.3.1 Safeguarding the Common Values, Fundamental Interests, Independence and Integrity of the Union -- 3.3.2 Strengthening the Security of the Union in All Ways -- 3.3.3 Preserving Peace and Strengthening International Security -- 3.3.4 Promoting International Cooperation -- 3.3.5 Developing and Consolidating Democracy and the Rule of Law, and Respect for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms -- 3.4 CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS -- 4 Legal Bases for CFSP Decision-Making -- 4.1 INTRODUCTION -- 4.2 COMPETENCES AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE INSTITUTIONS.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU finds itself between exceptionalism and normalization. Because of its special position and because the legislative procedure is not applicable to this policy area, questions of legality are not usually raised in the context of CFSP. At the same time, CFSP has become a policy area to which most EU rules and principles simply apply. This chapter assesses questions of (the review of) legality in the context of CFSP. As questions of legality make sense only in the context of legal acts, this chapter will first revisit the nature of CFSP acts as well as their consequences in the light of the 'normalization' of CFSP. Second, questions of legality will be assessed in relation to the legal basis of CFSP acts, and in particular, the choice of legal basis and the possibility of combining CFSP and other legal bases to enhance options for legality review.

The European Union increasingly uses 'soft' international arrangements rather than formal international agreements in establishing relations with non-EU states. This contribution aims to raise the question of to what extent a move from hard to soft law in relations between the EU and its partners can be seen as allowing the Union to 'step outside' the legal framework (if that indeed is what is happening) and disregard the rules and principles that define the way in which EU external relations are to take shape. Possible consequences include the risk that these instruments are not subject to appropriate safeguards, that parliamentary influence (by the European Parliament as well as by national parliaments) is by-passed and that transparency is affected. There are various reasons for the EU not to use formal procedures, but a turn to informality does come at a price.

The impact of Brexit on the external relations of the EU and the UK runs the risk of receiving less attention because of the difficult internal negotiations on the future of the UK-EU relationship. Yet, the legal complexities related to the fact that the UK will no longer be part of the EU's external relations regime are equally challenging, and increasingly present themselves now that "Brexit day" approaches. The present contribution analyses the consequences of Brexit for the UK to negotiate and conclude new international agreements, as well as the impact of the UK's withdrawal on existing international agreements concluded by the EU and its Member States with almost all States in the world.

Studies on the (non-)compliance with CFSP norms often misinterpret the legal nature of those norms. Classifying CFSP norms as 'non-binding' may help in distinguishing this policy area from other European Union's (EU) policies, but does not do justice to the committing nature of the norms. Irrespective of the limited role Court's may play in relation to CFSP, the norms often intend to bind the Member States. This has been the case from the outset, but seems strengthened now, as the Lisbon Treaty streamlined procedures and consolidated the EU's external action. In studying resistance to CFSP norms, it is worthwhile to take their legal nature into account. In that sense, the broad definition of soft law used in the introduction to this special issue is helpful as it includes binding norms without enforcement mechanisms. Yet, the question remains whether one can still hold that judicial enforcement and the principles of primacy and direct effect are completely alien to the area of CFSP.

Studies on the (non-compliance with CFSP norms often misinterpret the legal nature of those norms. Classifying CFSP norms as 'non-binding' may help in distinguishing this policy area from other European Union's (EU) policies, but does not do justice to the committing nature of the norms. Irrespective of the limited role Court's may play in relation to CFSP, the norms often intend to bind the Member States. This has been the case from the outset, but seems strengthened now, as the Lisbon Treaty streamlined procedures and consolidated the EU's external action. In studying resistance to CFSP norms, it is worthwhile to take their legal nature into account. In that sense, the broad definition of soft law used in the introduction to this special issue is helpful as it includes binding norms without enforcement mechanisms. Yet, the question remains whether one can still hold that judicial enforcement and the principles of primacy and direct effect are completely alien to the area of CFSP.

Studies on the (non-)compliance with CFSP norms often misinterpret the legal nature of those norms. Classifying CFSP norms as 'non-binding' may help in distinguishing this policy area from other European Union's (EU) policies, but does not do justice to the committing nature of the norms. Irrespective of the limited role Court's may play in relation to CFSP, the norms often intend to bind the Member States. This has been the case from the outset, but seems strengthened now, as the Lisbon Treaty streamlined procedures and consolidated the EU's external action. In studying resistance to CFSP norms, it is worthwhile to take their legal nature into account. In that sense, the broad definition of soft law used in the introduction to this special issue is helpful as it includes binding norms without enforcement mechanisms. Yet, the question remains whether one can still hold that judicial enforcement and the principles of primacy and direct effect are completely alien to the area of CFSP. Adapted from the source document.

The question of the immunities of the European Union ('eu') is clearly under-researched. However, with the new global ambitions of the eu, which are even more prominent in the current — post-Lisbon Treaty — legal regime, the classic institutional law theme of the immunities of international organizations deserves to be addressed in the context of the eu as well. This contribution first of all looks into the legal position of the eu under international law. This is followed by an analysis of the legal provisions on the eu's immunities in the treaties and other relevant documents. The paper also addresses actual and potential situations in which eu immunities are or can be invoked. It is concluded that, although the eu's legal regime in this area follows the rules of international diplomatic law, it is special because of the extensive, yet complex, international competences of the eu as well as of the role of the organization's own Court of Justice