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In this article, a framework is provided for analyzing conditions that lead to positive or negative relations between trustworthiness and formal control in the context of manager-subordinate relationships, a domain often discussed controversially in the literature. In analyzing the relationship between managerial formal control and subordinates' trustworthiness, the author draws on self-determination theory. Self-determination theory is useful in showing how to link characteristics of organizational regulation (i.e., managerial formal control) with individual intentions (i.e., subordinates' intentions to behave in a trustworthy fashion). Subsequently, empirical findings related to formal control and trustworthiness are integrated into this framework to deduce a set of propositions that can be tested in the future.

Human resource (HR) practices used to inject internal competition into the workplace are the subject of heated debates in business practice; this is however not the case in the field of human resource management (HRM) research. In this article, we first augment previous research in the field to offer an initial conceptualization of competitive HR practices. We then develop a conceptual framework that explains the processes and conditions that drive and determine the impact of competitive HR practices on employees at work. Blending insights from social comparison theory and uncertainty research, we theorize a set of conditions that specify when competitive HR practices unfold their "dark" side, and when the "not so bad" or even "a good side" of competitive HR practices might emerge.

AbstractManuscript TypeEmpiricalResearch Question/IssueSocial norm theory goes beyond economic efficiency arguments and provides a framework that allows for the subjective, judgmental, and socially interactive processes involved in the determination ofCEOremuneration. Building on this theory, we argue that currentCEOpay practices infringe a social norm. This norm states that a firm's wages ought to be fair. Thus, according to the social norm theory view, large inequalities betweenCEOpay and low‐level incomes, as well as inequity concerns ofCEOpay decoupled from performance, become a matter of public distress. If such publicly shared fairness norms become infringed, some amount of norm enforcement becomes likely, particularly when the punishment is of low cost. Norm enforcement also becomes likely if selective incentives and/or intrinsic norm enforcement are present to support punishing actions.Research Findings/InsightsWe test our model using a vignette‐survey study and a representative sample of 800 Swiss citizens. We are able to show that individual differences – more precisely status attributes and moral development – drive perceptions of norm infringement. We demonstrate that the willingness to punish firms with norm‐infringingCEOpay is high if low‐cost punishment opportunities are provided, such as public votes onCEOpay regulation. In addition, the willingness to punish is also driven by feelings of deprivation which fuel intrinsic interest to punish norm infringers even at high individual costs.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsWe adapt and contextualize social norm theory for theCEOpay debate. A model that explains how individual differences drive norm infringement perceptions, and how these differences lead to behavioral punishment intentions, is developed and tested empirically.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsThe war for talent and the urge to offer incentives toCEOsimpose costs on society, and firms are confronted with those costs. As a consequence, more and more people demandCEOpay regulation, which narrows firms' latitude. For firms, the evidence implies that they would be well advised to consider the climate of public opinion when determining executive pay. They may either reduceCEOpay or should communicate to the public why certain compensation designs may be favorable and in the interests of the enterprise and stakeholders. For politicians, the findings of our study show that there is a demand forCEOpay regulations and that this demand has to be acknowledged in some way in policy‐making.

In the course of the New Public Management reform movement, public administrations have increasingly implemented output-oriented control schemes, including systems to evaluate employees' performance. However, contradictory evidence exists about how such output control that fundamentally differs from traditional bureaucratic control affects performance-relevant employee attitudes and behaviors. In this article, we present evidence that performance evaluations have positive or negative consequences depending on the specific design of the system. Analyzing survey data from 184 employees and 60 supervisors from the German municipal administration by structural equation modeling, we find performance evaluations employed as Management by Objectives (MbO) have a positive impact on trust in the employer and that those designed as Systematic Performance Appraisal (SPA) affect trust negatively. Both relationships are mediated by perceived cooperative climate. These findings advocate employing performance evaluations that are participative, adaptive, learning-oriented, and transparent and thus enable fair cooperation between organizational members.

Trust is typically portrayed as beneficial to all concerned; something which is inherently good. In this article we focus on interpersonal trust and argue that, while there are undoubted benefits, trust can also be problematic; there are circumstances in which it can become a 'poisoned chalice' for one or other of the parties involved. We question whether the potential for negative experiences in relation to trust has been fully explored and argue that its true dark side lies within the dynamics of the trust relationship. From this stance we use the social exchange and gift giving literatures to re-appraise trust in a way that highlights the importance of expectation and intent and demonstrates the circumstances in which trust may not be beneficial for one of the parties involved. We conclude with a research agenda which we believe will further develop our understanding of this complex human interaction.

Current reforms in the public sector are characterized by the introduction of businesslike incentive structures, in particular the introduction of "pay for performance" schemes in public institutions. However, the public sector has some specific characteristics, which might restrict the naive adoption of pay for performance. Our article analyzes whether the impact of pay for performance on performance is bound to conditions, and if this is the case, under which conditions pay for performance has a positive or a negative effect on performance. We explore this contingency in a meta-analytic review of previous experimental studies on the effects of pay for performance on performance. We further show why pay for performance sometimes negatively affects personal efforts. With an experimental vignette study we demonstrate (a) that motivation is likely to be a key influence on the effect of performance-related pay on performance, and (b) that pay for performance is generally more costly as it appears because it almost always produces hidden costs of rewards. Our findings help to explain the modest success of pay for performance in the public sector. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThis article analyses the determinants of citizens' trust in the European Commission. We examined four predictors of citizens' trust in political institutions: political participation, value congruence, performance outcomes and attributability of performance outcomes. We argue that these factors impact trust in the European Commission, which is a necessary precondition for making a risky investment and willingness to pay taxes, which can be understood as behavioural consequences of trust. To examine our hypotheses we have implemented a vignette study. Our analyses show that value congruence, the European Commission's perceived performance and attributability impact risky investments via trust, as expected. Political participation exerts a direct significant influence on risky investments.

Despite recent attention to trust, comparatively little is known about distrust as distinct from trust. In this paper, we drew on case study data of a reorganized court of law, where intergroup distrust had grown between judges and administrators, to develop a dynamic theory of distrust. We used insights from the literatures on distrust, conflict escalation, and professional–organization relations to guide the analysis of our case data. Our research is consistent with insights on distrust previously postulated, but we were able to extend and make more precise the perceptions and behaviors that make up the elements of the self-amplifying cycle of distrust development, how these elements are related, and the mechanisms of amplification that drive the cycle. To help guide and focus future research, we modeled the process by which distrust emerges and develops, and we drew inferences on how it can be repaired.