This article discusses the policy dilemma states are facing when developing and using cyber weapons while also trying to strengthen their cyber defenses. The entire cyber domain is built on the foundation of hardware with common processing architectures connected by a standardized system for exchanging packetized data. Thus many of the same cyber vulnerabilities exist across many organizations and countries. The author uses the example of Stuxnet to illustrate how trying to keep vulnerabilities secret so that they can be used for offense will likely result in vulnerabilities going unfixed, thus hampering defensive efforts. Adapted from the source document.
AbstractNear‐Earth orbit is a key global resource, hosting assets critical to governments, militaries and commercial entities and providing services for global communications, remote sensing, national and international security, and accurate positioning and timing. It is also an increasingly crowded, congested and contested environment, at risk from both intentional and unintentional activities and events, and threats natural and human‐made. Ensuring the long‐term sustainability of the space environment is an increasingly recognized need by all users of space. This article considers the viability of principles regarding sustainable common‐pool resources (CPRs) established by Elinor Ostrom for space governance. In this initial consideration, we focus specifically on the issues of boundaries, collective choice arrangements and monitoring. Within those contexts, Ostrom's principles appear most useful for identifying gaps in the current space governance system and mechanisms. Further, while Ostrom provides multiple success stories for her model, they typically include common‐pool regimes functioning at a local level, with success stories on a larger scale elusive. Near‐Earth orbit is perhaps the largest‐scale CPR to consider. Consequently, not only is additional work needed to relate Ostrom's model specifically to space, but to determine the limits of applicability of Ostrom's model and other models that should be considered.Policy Implications The global commons of outer space, particularly the region where satellites orbit around the Earth, faces a collective action problem of how to ensure the long‐term sustainability of space activities. The current governance mechanisms for outer space activities were largely developed during the cold war, and are not sufficient to deal with the collective action problems stemming from the growing number of space actors and users. Space actors exist with varying levels of capabilities, which complicates defining resource appropriator rights and responsibilities. Common agreement is needed among space actors on the bounds of the space domain to allow resource appropriators to set the governance limitations, who has the right to make use of it and what governance regime applies. Existing institutions for debating, creating and modifying space governance regimes fall short of the requirement that most actors affected by the rules can participate in their creation. Space situational awareness will play a crucial role in monitoring the status of the space commons, adherence to rules and norms, and creating transparency and confidence among space actors.
This article examines the technical feasibility of verifying space activities during launch, re-entry and on-orbit operations and discusses the political and diplomatic challenges to the implementation of a space verification regime. The article also analyses the changing landscape of the space security regime in response to new geo-political realities -- changes that provide opportunities for progress. Adapted from the source document.
In: The SAIS review of international affairs / the Johns Hopkins University, the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Band 36, Heft 2, S. 15-28
In: The SAIS review of international affairs / the Johns Hopkins University, the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Band 36, Heft 2, S. 15-28
Enthält Rezension von: Gillespie, Paul G. ; Weller, Grand T.: Harnessing the heavens: national defense through space. - Waterloo : Imprint Publications, 2008. - 235 S. + Moltz, James Clay: The politics of space security: strategic restraint and the pursuit of national interests. - Chicago/Ill. : Standfort University Press, 2008. - 367 S
The long-term sustainability of space activities is an emerging issue to which actors in the global space community –including governments, agencies, and industry– are devoting increasing amounts of attention and resources. Considering the sustainability of space activities involves taking into account the present population of space debris, the size of the debris population in the most commonly-used Earth orbits in the future, and the possibility of collision events between objects in space. Addressing space debris and other threats to space sustainability involves both technological and political solutions. The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (copuos) has led a major effort to define such solutions and has established a working group tasked with the development of non-binding long-term sustainability (lts) guidelines. This article includes an overview of the concept of space sustainability, a discussion of the need, development, and current status of the lts guidelines, as well as an analysis of some of the guidelines themselves. It concludes with a broader discussion of space as an area without state sovereignty – one of the key aspects that have influenced the development of non-binding measures to address the space sustainability challenge. In this context, and given the governance questions that arise from the interaction between states and non-state actors in this domain, this discussion should be of interest to international relations scholars and practitioners.