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Schneller, effizienter, vernetzter, disruptiver: Wie Quantentechnologien sich auf die globale Sicherheit auswirken werden – und was das für Deutschland und Europa bedeutet. (IP)

This policy brief suggests that European countries should institute national reviewing boards overseen by intelligence agencies to vet Huawei equipment. If that is not feasible due to a lack of resources or capabilities especially among smaller countries, European governments should consider pooling resources and create a common reviewing board. This would also prevent duplication of efforts on national levels. European authorities should also demand from Huawei to clearly separate its international from its domestic business operations in order to further reduce the risk to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of European mobile networks. ; Finding a European response to Huawei's 5G ambitions ; publishedVersion

Einst als "Befreiungstechnologien" gefeiert, dienen digitale Techniken heute Autokratien wie China und Russland als nützliche Tools zur Unterdrückung und im Konflikt mit dem Westen. Ein Überblick. (IP)

Résumé Cet article examine l'impact du Service européen pour l'action extérieure (SEAE) sur la coordination de la politique extérieure européenne dans les États membres de l'Union européenne. L'analyse s'appuie sur une comparaison entre la France et l'Autriche. Les deux pays se caractérisant par des différences de taille, de population mais aussi d'ambition diplomatique, l'impact du SEAE y est différent. L'analyse tend également à démontrer que l'impact du SEAE est important sur les administrations centrales et les représentations permanentes des deux pays à Bruxelles, mais qu'il est en revanche moindre sur les ambassades nationales situées dans les pays tiers.

The internet is the backbone of our digital world. It creates the conditions for economic development and prosperity worldwide. Yet, this critical common good - the open, global, and trustworthy internet - is under threat. As digital connectivity penetrates every aspect of economic, political, and social life, it has become a central object of geopolitical maneuvering. Preserving an open, global, and trustworthy internet infrastructure must thus be a priority for global leaders. The technical bodies that govern the internet are currently ill-equipped to address the political fault lines that put the global internet at risk. The G20 and G7 should actively work to mitigate these political fault lines so that technical bodies can continue to effectively administrate and develop an internet that works for the global common good.

2010 was a seminal year. Stuxnet, an American-Israeli cyber operation sabotaged Iranian uranium enrichment centrifuges. It became publicly known as the first cyber operation in history that destroyed physical objects. This operation had the clear goal of degrading Iran's uranium enrichment capability, but in general there has been little research as to why hegemons launch destructive cyber operations. This brief argues that the main motivations are threefold: territorial conquest, threat prevention, and retaliatory actions. Key Findings: Iran, North Korea, South Korea, Ukraine and Taiwan have been the main targets of destructive great power cyber operations. For the US, future targets will possibly be limited to countries that aim to acquire nuclear weapons - Iran and North Korea. Given ongoing border disputes, China and Russia will likely target neighboring countries with such destructive campaigns - for China those are Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan, and for Russia they are Georgia, Moldova, and Japan. To prevent destructive cyber operations, Germany and other EU states have been engaged in cyber capacity building and threat-intelligence sharing across continents. But Berlin needs to set priorities. When it comes to combatting state-sponsored cyber campaigns, Germany should deepen ties with non-EU countries that have been or likely will be targets of damaging rather than merely disruptive operations, i.e., in Southeast Asia, East Asia, the Caucasus, and Southeast Europe.

Deutschlands wichtigste Verbündete haben ihre Rollen bei der Gestaltung des Cyberraums definiert. Die USA betrachten sich als demokratische, werteorientierte Cybermacht, die bereit sind, gegen Gegner hart vorzugehen. Großbritannien will als verantwortungsvolle Cybermacht rücksichtsloses Verhalten unterbinden. Frankreich will sich als stabilisierende Kraft böswilligen Akteuren entgegenstellen. Und Deutschland? In seiner ersten Nationalen Sicherheitsstrategie könnte es Ideen für künftige Aktivitäten im Cyberraum entwickeln, indem es den Fokus auf Zuverlässigkeit und die Abstimmung mit Partnern richtet. Dafür sollte die Bundesregierung die im Folgenden genannten Schritte angehen.

The United States has abandoned old-fashioned thinking that focused on deterring cyber operations below the threshold of armed conflict. It now opts for a new doctrine of "persistent engagement" in cyberspace, which emphasizes offensive cyber operations to shape the behavior of adversaries. Rather than follow in the footsteps of the US, the EU should shape cyberspace into an environment of defense superiority, thereby helping forestall attacks both at and below the level of armed conflict.

Future scenarios for the war in Ukraine explore how the use of information could affect the cohesion of Russia and of the West in the medium term. The four possible variations of Russian/Western cohesion - high/high, low/high, high/low, low/low - indicate how each side would define the outcome of the conflict. These possible outcomes, in turn, generate lessons about how a liberal West might use information to tip the scales on an autocratic Russia.

In 2030, the world's major powers increasingly exploit vulnerabilities in so-called smart cities. In particular, spooks target those cities that operate services based on Chinese tech infrastructure, including Shanghai, St. Petersburg, and Buenos Aires. When a wave of hundreds of such disruptions hits, the major powers downplay this huge incident as a "normal accident" inherent in complex systems. Since the usual suspects - Moscow, Beijing, Washington, Iran, and North Korea - are all negatively affected, none of them seem to have a motive. Indeed, the cause of the disruptions turns out to be much deeper, with roots stretching back a decade. Assessing this hypothetical incident offers real insight into the systemic nature of tech risk.

Germany's major allies have declared their roles in shaping cyberspace. The United States sees itself as a democratic, values-driven cyber power ready to impose substantial costs on adversaries engaged in nefarious conduct. The United Kingdom strives to be a responsible cyber power that eschews reckless behavior. France aims to operate as a stabilizing power that counters a destructive Russia and other malicious actors. But what kind of cyber power is Germany to be? As it draws up its first national security strategy, the country can rectify its lack of vision and narrative for its domestic and international cyberspace efforts. This policy brief proposes that Germany espouse a sober focus on reliability that links its cyberspace strategy to those of its allies, thereby providing a vital anchor for Western cybersecurity. To do this, Germany should: Defend countries that look to it for support and build capacities to provide that assistance; Consistently promote strong and transparent cybersecurity to encourage partners abroad to adopt policies that do the same; More prominently declare that it has offensive cyber capabilities and that it would deploy them for defensive purposes in accordance with international law; Share offensive cyber capabilities with trusted partners, if requested, in crisis situations.

This report explores how the cyber threat environment of the European Union could develop in the next five years. It not only describes two plausible future scenarios for European policy-makers that are characterized by different levels of disruption, but also envisions strategies and mechanisms that the EU could deploy to overcome the various challenges that lie ahead.

This paper examines the policy documents of 193 United Nations member states and Taiwan. It analyzes what countries perceive as critical infrastructure (CI). While it may at first appear clear what CI sectors are, e.g., energy, education, water, and food, this view varies by member state. By mapping what countries designate as their critical infrastructure sectors, we hope to propel UN cyber discussions, which have so far been slow to result in agreement on a global common denominator for critical infrastructure sectors. Key Findings: 100 of 194 countries have published what they perceive as CI sectors. The CI sectors that countries most frequently mention are ­energy (96%), information and communications technology (ICT) (95%), transport (93%), economy and finance (89%), public services (84%), and health (83%). By far the least-mentioned categories worldwide are research and ­education (15%), national security (45%), food (51%), and water (76%). If it were only a numbers game, the most common CI could be ­included in a global definition. A more inclusive approach would name all the above sectors as CI at the UN. Many countries need further support in defining CI (see Appendix C). While almost all countries in Europe and North America define CI sectors, Asia, Latin America, and Oceania are far behind.