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While liberal-democratic states like America, Britain and Australia claim to value freedom of expression and the right to dissent, they have always actually criminalized dissent. This disposition has worsened since 9/11 and the 2008 Great Recession. This ground-breaking study shows that just as dissent involves far more than protest marches, so too liberal-democratic states have expanded the criminalization of dissent. Drawing on political and social theorists like Arendt, Bourdieu and Isin, the book offers a new way of thinking about politics, dissent and its criminalization relationally. Using case studies like the Occupy movement, selective refusal by Israeli soldiers, urban squatters, democratic education and violence by anti-Apartheid activists, the book highlights the many forms dissent takes along with the many ways liberal-democratic states criminalize it. The book highlights the mix of fear and delusion in play when states privilege security to protect an imagined 'political order' from difference and disagreement. The book makes a major contribution to political theory, legal studies and sociology. Linking legal, political and normative studies in new ways, Watts shows that ultimately liberal-democracies rely more on sovereignty and the capacity for coercion and declarations of legal 'states of exception' than on liberal-democratic principles. In a time marked by a deepening crisis of democracy, the book argues dissent is increasingly valuable. --

Evidence‐based policy and the contemporary politics of spin are said to characterise contemporary politics and policy. The paper asks firstly what sense is to be made of this coincidence, and then documents this coincidence. It then asks how credible is the conception of 'evidence' espoused by advocates of evidence‐based policy when it is conventionally represented as an 'objective' counter to ideology, spin or opinion? It points to major problems with the conventional understandings of 'evidence'. It is suggested that while the evidence‐based policy literature relies on the associations 'evidence' is presumed to have with 'sensory data', this is neither the case nor all that defensible. The paper reprises arguments advanced by Henry Mayer and Hannah Arendt that the relationship of politics to the empirical was and is a far more complex relationship than is conventionally understood to be the case.

If it is true, as Pat Carlen (2010) claims, that contemporary 'justice' policies are exhibiting all the signs of 'penal populism' and 'risk crazed governance', then social democratic criminologists face the dual challenge of explaining why these policies are not only not working but also how this fact continues to be explained away. At stake here are two central questions: firstly, what grounds are available to secure the intellectual legitimacy of criminology; and, secondly, what ways of knowing could secure the legitimacy of a social-democratic criminology. The paper begins by exploring what is at stake when what appears to be a very large number of criminologists claim that theirs is an 'empirical scientific' discipline. The paper argues that neither mainstream criminology nor social democratic criminology can base any claims to intellectual legitimacy by relying on an 'empirical scientific' frame. The paper draws on Spencer (1987) to advance the 'unpalatable thesis' that, as far as the actual practice by conventional criminologists of their kind of social science goes, 'they do not know what they are doing' (Spencer 1987: 333) and that their ignorance of this fact has serious consequences for the progress of their field. The paper shows that there is a gap between the actual practice of conventional criminology and its claims to 'scientific empiricism': what is actually on offer is an 'imperfect empiricism'.The long-forgotten work of Bentham, adumbrated by Vaihinger (1935) and Fuller (1967), is then traced and some of the implications of this theory of fictions for contemporary representations of crime are noted. One implication briefly charted here is that any social democratic criminology needs to rehabilitate the proper role played by fictions as they grapple with the 'wicked problems' that currently populate this field. The long-standing affectation of 'scientific empiricism' by many practicing criminologists has long camouflaged the inability of conventional criminologists to address what are properly 'wicked problems'.

If it is true, as Pat Carlen (2010) claims, that contemporary 'justice' policies are exhibiting all the signs of 'penal populism' and 'risk crazed governance', then social democratic criminologists face the dual challenge of explaining why these policies are not only not working but also how this fact continues to be explained away. At stake here are two central questions: firstly, what grounds are available to secure the intellectual legitimacy of criminology; and, secondly, what ways of knowing could secure the legitimacy of a social-democratic criminology. The paper begins by exploring what is at stake when what appears to be a very large number of criminologists claim that theirs is an 'empirical scientific' discipline. The paper argues that neither mainstream criminology nor social democratic criminology can base any claims to intellectual legitimacy by relying on an 'empirical scientific' frame. The paper draws on Spencer (1987) to advance the 'unpalatable thesis' that, as far as the actual practice by conventional criminologists of their kind of social science goes, 'they do not know what they are doing' (Spencer 1987: 333) and that their ignorance of this fact has serious consequences for the progress of their field. The paper shows that there is a gap between the actual practice of conventional criminology and its claims to 'scientific empiricism': what is actually on offer is an 'imperfect empiricism'.The long-forgotten work of Bentham, adumbrated by Vaihinger (1935) and Fuller (1967), is then traced and some of the implications of this theory of fictions for contemporary representations of crime are noted. One implication briefly charted here is that any social democratic criminology needs to rehabilitate the proper role played by fictions as they grapple with the 'wicked problems' that currently populate this field. The long-standing affectation of 'scientific empiricism' by many practicing criminologists has long camouflaged the inability of conventional criminologists to address what are properly 'wicked problems'.

Francis Castles' The Working Class and Welfare (1985) has achieved classic status within mainstream policy studies and the historiography of the Australian welfare state. Exhuming the functionalist theoretical and 'positivist' methodo logical assumptions embedded in his prior comparative policy research helps to establish why he saw the puzzles he did in the Australasian experience and why the 'wage-earner's welfare state' model emerged as an answer to those puzzles. Castles' work reminds us that our theoretical and methodological assumptions can lead to a problem-setting process that generates a sophistic ated but misleading social heuristic. Castles' work, while it appears to affirm that 'politics matters' denies the contingency of history central to political processes. While he rightly insists we should look at 'occupational welfare', his work deflects attention away from the substantial experience with 'social policy by normal means' that labor governments have promoted.

This paper is an exploration of the contemporary definitions in use of the idea of a standard of living as it has been developed in social policy and economic research both in Australia and overseas. It is suggested that the assumptions underpinning the idea of a standard of living in areas such as poverty research or the analysis of redistributive policies and their effects are neither tenable nor useful. The concept is flawed because it makes unreasonable assumptions about the household and the nature of women's domestic labour. Consideration of the gender blindness of much economics suggests the need for a major revision in our approach to the idea of a standard of living.