Suchergebnisse

There is persistent disagreement over whether or not there is a prima facie moral duty to obey the law. While most contemporary democratic theorists believe that such a duty exists, "philosophical anarchists" argue that such a position would constitute a violation of individual autonomy. In this dissertation, I present and assess a deliberative model of political legitimacy, one that I believe takes seriously the concerns of philosophical anarchists. This work is divided into two parts. First, I review and update existing arguments in favor of law abidance, finding them lacking. Second, I articulate and examine the hypothesis that we (1) have a natural duty to deliberate, which in turn (2) generates a duty to abide by the results of the deliberative procedures. Drawing on literature pertaining to dignity, deliberation, politeness, and apology, I argue that deliberation is an unpersuasive answer to philosophical anarchists. The deliberative procedures can generate a duty of law abidance only if participants feel as though the process did not violate duties of respect for self and others. In order for this to obtain, the deliberators must perform actions which signal or constitute respect. Yet these concrete actions, while necessary to demonstrate respect, can serve to undermine it as well. It is the prerogative of each earnest deliberator to determine for him or herself whether or not the deliberation is respectful. If it is not, the deliberator is discharged from the political obligation to abide by the results of the (disrespectful) deliberation, although she may nevertheless have moral reasons to obey the law. What's more, others may have good moral reasons to coerce this person into law-abidance.

Stout Annual Lecture, Victoria University of Wellington, 24 May 1999