Suchergebnisse

This study is about structural change in the energy system. In a first step an econometric model is presented and in a second step diffusion of GTs is embedded theoretically. By focusing on different green technology industries (GT sector) in Germany, we analyze how policy induced demand stimulates innovation. Taking the size of the market as a proxy for demand and patent counts as a proxy for innovation, we find support that the presence of institutions enabling diffusion of GTs are correlated with innovative activity. Public R&D expenditures also play a significant role. We additionally control for a structural break by comparing the two institutional settings incorporated into the legal system in Germany, namely the Stromeinspeisegesetz (SEG) and the Erneuerbare Energiengesetz (EEG). We cannot find support for the supposition that innovative activity significantly differs for diffusion under the SEG and EEG. The empirical findings also show that electricity prices are not the driving force for innovative activity within the GT sector. The discussion at the end of the paper comes to the result that diffusion of GTs - under the EEG - is difficult to be justified theoretically.

This paper discusses aspects related to the green technology sector in Germany. In a ?rst step institutional reforms enabling diffusion of green technologies are analysed. Cost arguments are also taken into account. In a second step a theoretical model developed by Tanguay et al. (2004) is modified in order to evaluate the effiency of the institutional setting in a political economy framework. The model is able to show that command and control policies (CCPs) are accompanied by cost-inef?ciencies depending on the political weight of the green technology sector. Because actual costs related to the support of green technologies are relatively low, the theoretical predictions of the model are moderated. Nevertheless, as additional money will be transferred to the green technology sector during the next decades, interest groups will gain additional political power and the problem of cost inefficiency can therefore become more relevant. The paper gives important hints whether the CCP system installed in Germany is the right instrument in order to increase the share of energy produced with green technologies from 12.5% (in 2010) up to a level of 30% (in 2020).

Die vorliegende Arbeit beschäftigt sich modelltheoretisch, empirisch und experimentell mit dem Thema der Klimapolitik aus einer politökonomischen Perspektive. Der Ansatz der Neuen Politischen Ökonomie versucht, die ökonomischen Modelle um den politischen Prozess zu erweitern. Die Motivation für dieses Vorgehen steht in einem engen Zusammenhang mit der Erkenntnis, dass es unzureichend ist, die ökonomische Analyse auf Probleme des Marktversagens zu reduzieren. Neben Marktversagen können durch den politischen Prozess Probleme generiert werden (sog. Politikversagen). Im Rahmen einer positiven Analyse kann die Neue Politische Ökonomie Erklärungsansätze liefern, die eng mit der Fragestellung verknüpft sind, warum bekannte Ineffizienzen den politischen Prozess überdauern. Dieses Problem lässt sich in vielen Fällen durch Partikularinteressen erklären. Aus einer normativen Perspektive lassen sich die resultierenden Erkenntnisse für Politikempfehlungen heranziehen. Vordergründig sind dabei jene Handlungsalternativen (zum Teil auch Handlungsbeschränkungen z.B. auf konstitutioneller Ebene) die es dem Staat ermöglichen seine Handlungen möglichst unabhängig von Partikularinteressen durchzuführen. Die vorliegende Arbeit gliedert sich in acht Kapitel. Das erste Kapitel dient zur Einleitung. Kapitel zwei bis sieben umfassen den Hauptteil der Arbeit. In Kapitel acht werden die wesentlichen Ergebnisse noch einmal kurz zusammengefasst.

This paper discusses the political economy of the climate change debate. The objective is to come to a better understanding of why at international levels (e. g. the G–8 summit in Heiligendamm) climate change was one of the main topics at the agenda, despite the fact that climate change cannot be solved by only eight participating countries, even if these eight countries are considered as the "biggest" in the world. The problem of climate change is a supranational one and needs supranational cooperation. Using a strategic trade policy framework, the paper theoretically and from a positive perspective explains why countries like Germany are more engaged in policies related to climate change than other industrial countries, which also have signed the Kyoto Protocol.

Almost all international environmental agreements include a minimum participation rule. Under such a rule an agreement becomes legally binding if and only if a certain threshold in terms of membership or contribution is reached. We analyze a cartel game with open membership and heterogeneous countries to study the endogenous choice of a minimum participation rule and its role for the success of international environmental agreements.

We analyze the effect of 'milestones' on reaching a long-term target, which if missed implies dramatic payoff risks. In our experiment, a cumulative threshold public goods game, milestones are captured by intermediate contribution targets on the way to the final target. Missing the final target leads to a probabilistic total loss for all players, and missing intermediate targets may lead to the same consequences even earlier. The additional intermediate targets feature environmental protection as a process rather than a contest for reaching a final target. The regulating agency is Nature, although political agencies might implement a similar regulation. We test milestone effects by varying the size of milestones in addition to changing the marginal productivity of individual contributions and the payoff risk. Although we observe some milestone effects, additional regulation by milestones on its own does not guarantee that targets are reached. [Copyright Elsevier B.V.]

This paper surveys the recent literature on the political economy of the formation of international environmental agreements. The survey covers theoretical modelling approaches and empirical studies including experimental work. Central to our survey is the question how the political process impacts different stages of agreement formation and stability. We distinguish the rules defined during pre-negotiations that govern negotiations, ratification and implementation. Strategic delegation and lobbying are directly relevant during the negotiation and ratification phases. Implementation, the choice of policy instruments at the national level, will also be impacted by lobbying and indirectly influence negotiations. We find that the basic theoretical framework for the analysis of international environmental agreements is largely unrelated to empirical approaches. Furthermore, we observe that models of the political process of agreement formation, like for example sequential game models, are yet to be developed. Adapted from the source document.

This paper surveys the recent literature on the political economy of the formation of international environmental agreements. The survey covers theoretical modelling approaches and empirical studies including experimental work. Central to our survey is the question how the political process impacts different stages of agreement formation and stability. Relevant are the rules defined during pre-negotiations that govern negotiations, ratification and implementation. Strategic delegation and lobbying are directly relevant during the negotiation and ratification phases. Implementation, the choice of policy instruments at the national level, will also be impacted by lobbying and indirectly influence negotiations.