A critique of political economy: misgovernance equifinality to green economy transformability
In: Critique: journal of socialist theory, Band 51, Heft 4, S. 487-514
ISSN: 1748-8605
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In: Critique: journal of socialist theory, Band 51, Heft 4, S. 487-514
ISSN: 1748-8605
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Working paper
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Working paper
In: Xiandai Faxue/Modern Law Science, Band 33, Heft 4, S. 106-113
In: Journal of Operational Risk, Band 16, Heft 2
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In: Environmental science and pollution research: ESPR
ISSN: 1614-7499
In: The Chinese economy: translations and studies, Band 57, Heft 2, S. 102-122
ISSN: 1558-0954
In: Materials and design, Band 206, S. 109763
ISSN: 1873-4197
In: The journal of business & industrial marketing, Band 36, Heft 8, S. 1486-1503
ISSN: 2052-1189
PurposeThe effective transfer of knowledge within an organization is critical for its sustainable competitive advantage. Based on the norm of reciprocity, it can be concluded that individuals' primary motivation to transfer their treasured knowledge can be summarized as "trust," that is, the individuals trust their selfless transfer behavior can be reciprocated by the recipients in the future.Design/methodology/approachIn this study, a simulation model based on knowledge transfer behavior and reciprocal trust between individuals is built through agent-based modeling and simulation to investigate the factors that influence the efficiency of knowledge transfer within an organization.FindingsExperiments are performed to test the impact of reciprocal trust and organizational structure on the efficiency of knowledge transfer.Originality/valueThe results indicate a significant role of key elements of reciprocal trust and organizational structure, which provides relevant practical guidance for both individuals and organization managers in the context of knowledge transfer.
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In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics, Band 21, Heft 1, S. 269-285
ISSN: 1935-1704
Abstract
The board of committees governing university endowments often chooses between hiring professionals to run funds and trusting denoting entities with the funds. As usual, sophisticated fund managers can construct a well-diversified investment portfolio; however, their interests may not be aligned with the university. On the other hand, donors have the advantage of assuming full liabilities for losses, but they only have access to risky projects due to their limitations in terms of accessing the available investment universe. This paper develops a theoretical framework in an attempt to explain the distinct endowment management strategy adopted by universities, and particularly their choice of endowment operator identity. Our model can provide supports to the governance activities practiced by university endowments both in developed and developing countries. Furthermore, we show theoretically that current capital control regulations imposed by the developing country's government reduce donations and encourage universities to establish donor-advised endowment funds, in which donors surrender ownership of anything they put in the fund, but retain control over how their money is invested.