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The recent emergence of blockchains may be considered a critical turning point in organizing collaborations. We outline the historical background and the fundamental features of blockchains and present an analysis with a focus on their role as governance mechanisms. Specifically, we argue that blockchains offer a way to enforce agreements and achieve cooperation and coordination that is distinct from both traditional contractual and relational governance as well as from other information technology solutions. We also examine the scope of blockchains as efficient governance mechanisms and highlight the tacitness of the transaction as a key boundary condition. We then discuss how blockchain governance interacts with traditional governance mechanisms in both substitutive and complementary ways. We pay particular attention to blockchains' social implications as well as their inherent challenges and limitations. Our analysis culminates in a research agenda that explores how blockchains may change the way to organize collaborations, including issues of what different types of blockchains may emerge, who is involved and impacted by blockchain governance, why actors may want blockchains, when and where blockchains can be more (versus less) effective, and how blockchains influence a number of important organizational outcomes.

PurposeThis paper aims to explain how contractual complexity, including contractual control, coordination and adaptation, makes a difference to the task and relationship conflict, and then, to investigate the moderating roles played by both, total interdependence and interdependence asymmetry, in altering the association between the two types of conflicts.Design/methodology/approachThis study obtained data through a questionnaire survey in the Chinese construction industry and the final sample consisted of 232 responses. The data were analysed using hierarchy analysis using SPSS.FindingsThe results are as follows: first, higher contractual control and coordination reduce the level of relationship conflicts, and higher contractual coordination also reduces the level of task conflicts; second, task conflict positively affects relationship conflict; third, task conflict mediates the relationship between contractual coordination and relationship conflict; and finally, when total interdependence is higher, task conflict induces more relationship conflict. On the contrary, high interdependence asymmetry weakens the positive relationship between task and relationship conflicts.Practical implicationsThis study highlights the importance of contracts in conflict management. The findings can guide practitioners in drafting suitable contracts to deal with task and relationship conflicts more effectively.Originality/valueThis study differentiates the effects of distinct components of contracts on task and relationship conflicts, and then reveals the contingent effects of interdependence on the relationship between task and relationship conflicts in inter-organisational transactions.