Suchergebnisse

An attempt at a better theoretical description of the coup by combining the tactical theories of E. Luttwack (COUP D'ETAT, London, England: 1968) & D. J. Goodspeed (THE CONSPIRATORS, London, England: 1962) with the political systems analysis of K. Deutsch & D. Easton (A FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL ANALYSIS, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 1965). Deutsch's suggestion (THE NERVES OF GOVERNMENT, Glencoe, Ill: 1966) that systems where power is concentrated are more vulnerable is singled out for particular analysis. The case study is the German generals' July 1944 plot to assassinate Hitler. The episode demonstrates the complexity of the interrelationship between a subsystem (the army) & the political center (the Nazi state). The relationship between those 2 elements was one of persistent instability; the army gave the state specific support over a period of time, but not generalized adherence. As military victories turned into defeats in 1943, the relationship between the army & the regime became more exacerbated. Another element of the situation was closure of legitimate channels of communication because Hitler created counterweights to army influence by forming the SS; in the first phase of the war his intuition was proved correct more often than the generals' expertise. To make proper decisions, systems must control the influx of information by 1 of 3 methods: monitoring, gate keeping, & modulation. The analysis shows a distinction between the coup d'etat & the assassination attempt on Hitler; Hitler's death in itself would not have consummated the coup. The project failed because the conspirators did not have the necessary resources with which to act independently. With reservations, Deutsch's proposition in vindicated. S. Karganovic.