Suchergebnisse

This survey reviews the empirical literature on the impact of environmental policy instruments on the rate and direction of technological change. The survey is explicitly focused on the empirical identification of the hypothesis to expect a stronger impact from market-based incentives than from non-market alternatives. The general picture emerging from the recent literature is that there is a clear impact of environmental policy on invention, innovation and diffusion of technologies. Although studies on a differential impact are still very scarce, the available evidence suggests that innovators look carefully for rent opportunities, which in turn depend on the specific incentives signalled by the type of (environmental) policy.

This article studies the likely impact of unconventional gas developments in the U.S. on EU competitiveness. We find, first of all, little evidence for a prosperous unconventional gas development in Europe. Second, the U.S. boom has already a strong impact on both world and European energy markets. In particular, lower U.S. gas and coal prices have changed relative energy prices both at home and abroad. Finally, competitiveness impacts in some (sub)sectors will be considerable. These impacts are not only related to production based on gas use as a feedstock but also on the 'byproducts' from unconventional gas production, such as ethylene, propane and butane. However, several indirect impacts, such as lower coal import prices, may soften the adverse competitiveness impact in the EU.

This paper estimates Nash-type fiscal reaction functions for European governments competing for revenue from diesel excises. It appears that European governments strategically set their excise levels by responding to their neighbors' tax rates. This provides evidence for the presence of tax competition in diesel excises. In fact, a 10% higher rate in neighboring countries (in terms of the user price) induces a country to raise its own rate by between 2 and 3%. This impact is robust for alternative specifications. By imposing restrictions on excise levels, EU harmonization of excises in 1987 and the introduction of a minimum in 1992 exerted a positive impact on the excise level in a number of EU countries. It has not, however, significantly reduced the intensity of tax competition. Indeed, strategic tax responses have not significantly been reduced by these harmonization policies. We also find that high-tax countries appear to compete more aggressively tha! n low-tax countries in the sense that they feature larger strategic tax responses. There is no significant difference between large and small countries.