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Rakesh V. Vohra offers a unique approach to intermediate microeconomics that reverses the conventional order of topics and provides substantive examples and novel practice problems with solutions. The book is suitable for students taking intermediate microeconomics worldwide in economics programs or in M.B.A. programs.

"Pricing drives three of the most important elements of firm success: revenue and profits, customer behavior and firm image. This book provides an introduction to the basic principles for thinking clearly about pricing. Unlike other marketing books on pricing, the authors use a more analytic approach and relate ideas to the basic principles of microeconomics. Rakesh Vohra and Lakshman Krishnamurthi also cover three areas in greater depth and provide more insight than may be gleaned from existing books: 1) the use of auctions, 2) price discrimination and 3) pricing in a competitive environment"--

"Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming. Three advantages characterize the approach. The first is simplicity: arguments based on linear programming are both elementary and transparent. The second is unity: the machinery of linear programming provides a way to unify results from disparate areas of mechanism design. The third is reach: the technique offers the ability to solve problems that appear to be beyond solutions offered by traditional methods. No claim is made that the approach advocated should supplant traditional mathematical machinery. Rather, the approach represents an addition to the tools of the economic theorist who proposes to understand economic phenomena through the lens of mechanism design"--

This article presents a model involving employers and two classes of workers, alike except for labels. Employers choose whom to hire and workers choose whether to invest in training. At one equilibrium, employers discriminate, which, the authors show, is Pareto inferior to another equilibrium where no discrimination occurs. On the basis of this observation, an argument for affirmative action is advanced.

AbstractA classic result of Korte and Hausmann [1978] and Jenkyns [1976] bounds the quality of the greedy solution to the problem of finding a maximum value basis of an independence system in terms of the rank‐quotient. We extend this result in two ways. First, we apply the greedy algorithm to an inner independence system
contained in . Additionally, following an idea of Milgrom [2017], we incorporate exogenously given prior information about the set of likely candidates for an optimal basis in terms of a set . We provide a generalization of the rank‐quotient that yields a tight bound on the worst‐case performance of the greedy algorithm applied to the inner independence system relative to the optimal solution in . Furthermore, we show that for a worst‐case objective, the inner independence system approximation may outperform not only the standard greedy algorithm but also the inner matroid approximation proposed by Milgrom [2017]. Second, we generalize the inner approximation framework of independence systems to inner approximations of packing instances in by inner polymatroids and inner packing instances. We consider the problem of maximizing a separable discrete concave function and show that our inner approximation can be better than the greedy algorithm applied to the original packing instance. Our result provides a lower bound to the generalized rank‐quotient of a greedy algorithm to the optimal solution in this more general setting and subsumes Malinov and Kovalyov [1980]. We apply the inner approximation approach to packing instances induced by the FCC incentive auction and by two knapsack constraints.