Suchergebnisse

Reading the Congolese crisis / Koen Vlassenroot -- The political economy of Beni-Lubero / Timothy Raeymaekers -- Land and conflict / Koen Vlassenroot -- Conflict and the urban space / Anna Verhoeve -- Conflict and artisan mining in Kamituga (South Kivu) / Koen Vlassenroot & Timothy Raeymaekers -- Being at war, being young / Luca Jourdan -- Emerging complexes in Ituri / Koen Vlassenroot & Timothy Raeymaekers -- Linking the local to the global / Jeroen Cuvelier

Dieser Artikel beschäftigt sich hauptsächlich mit der Bedeutung von Zivilgesellschaft in der Demokratischen Republik Kongo. Der Beitrag beginnt mit einer Analyse des gegenwärtigen Diskurses über Zivilgesellschaft in Afrika. Anschließend wird untersucht, welche Rolle zivilgesellschaftliche Organisierungsprozesse in den neunziger Jahren gespielt haben. Zuletzt wird analysiert, wie sich diese zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen seit Oktober 1996 im Kontext eines langwierigen Konflikts positioniert haben. Der Verfasser stellt fest, dass sowohl die theoretische Trennung zwischen Staat und Zivilgesellschaft als auch die Interpretation vertikaler Netzwerke als Zivilgesellschaft für den afrikanischen Kontext problematisch erscheinen. Der Autor sieht seine Skepsis gegenüber der Plausibilität von Zivilgesellschaften in Afrika am Beispiel der DR Kongo bestätigt. Im dortigen Demokratisierungsprozess spielte Zivilgesellschaft nie die Rolle, die ihr zugeschrieben wurde, sie wirkte nur selten konfliktlösend, reproduzierte stattdessen klientelistische Netzwerkbeziehungen und wurde so ein Element des Machtspieles in dieser Region. Zivilgesellschaft als soziologisches Konzept ist daher in Afrika weniger eine feste (demokratisierende) Institution als ein heikler Gedanke, mit dem man sich auseinandersetzen muss. (ICB2)

The objectives of this exercise are threefold. First, through a case‐study of the Banyamulenge ethnogenesis, I demonstrate that this ethnicity was never constructed in a vacuum, but in a 'pre‐imagined' field. The 'creation' of a Banyamulenge identity illustrates perfectly that ethnicities are ongoing processes of continuous change. Ethnicities are dynamic processes that result from the confrontation of a community with its socio‐economic and political environment. Contrary to what local political and social leaders like to believe about their followings, the existence of a Banyamulenge identity is not the result of pure invention. I illustrate how historical events gave meaning to the content of this identity. Second, a close look will be taken at the different internal dynamics within this community to reach a better understanding of the real content of this ethnogenesis. While the Banyamulenge in Uvira were undoubtedly subject to exclusion, widespread ethnic resentment and violence, their marginalised position is also due to a lack of coherent leadership and internal division. An inquiry into the reasons why the Banyamulenge community, even today, still lacks any coherent leadership that is capable of improving the position of their community is crucial. Finally, as recent local history in Uvira suggests, I show that political exclusion tends to be the key to conflicting identity formation. In the case of the Banyamulenge, it seems that their claims to political participation not only had the effect of hardening the boundaries between different identity groups, but also had facilitated the shift to massive violence as an enticing strategy of control and resistance. This work is mainly the result of extensive fieldwork in and around Uvira and Bukavu, complemented by what was learned from the few printed sources that exist.

The objectives of this exercise are threefold. First, through a case study of the Banyamulenge ethnogenesis, I demonstrate that this ethnicity was not constructed in a vacuum, but in a "pre-imagined" field. The "creation" of a Banyamulenge identity illustrates perfectly that ethnicities are ongoing processes of continuous change. Ethnicities are dynamic processes that result from the confrontation of a community with its socioeconomic & political environment. Contrary to what local political & social leaders like to believe about their followings, the existence of a Banyamulenge identity is not the result of pure invention. I illustrate how historical events gave meaning to the content of this identity. Second, a close look is taken at the different internal dynamics within this community to reach a better understanding of the real content of this ethnogenesis. While the Banyamulenge in Uvira were undoubtedly subject to exclusion, widespread ethnic resentment, & violence, their marginalized position is also due to a lack of coherent leadership & internal division. An inquiry into the reasons why the Banyamulenge community, even today, still lacks any coherent leadership capable of improving its position is crucial. Finally, as recent local history in Uvira suggests, I show that political exclusion tends to be the key to conflicting identity formation. In the case of the Banyamulenge, it seems that their claims to political participation not only had the effect of hardening the boundaries between different identity groups, but also facilitated the shift to massive violence as an enticing strategy of control & resistance. This paper is based on extensive fieldwork in & around Uvira & Bukavu, complemented by what was learned from the few extant printed sources. 20 References. Adapted from the source document.

Part 1. Interpretations of Uganda's war in the north: Exploring the roots of LRA violence: political crisis and ethnic politics in Acholiland / Adam Branch ; Uganda's politics of foreign aid and violent conflict: the political uses of the LRA rebellion / Andrew Mwenda ; The spiritual order of the LRA / Kristof Titeca ; An African hell of colonial imagination? The Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda, another story / Sverker Finnstrom -- Part 2. Experiencing the LRA: Chasing the Kony story / Mareike Schomerus ; 'A terrorist is not a person like me': an interview with Joseph Kony / Mareike Schomerus ; On the nature and causes of LRA abduction: what the abductees say / Christopher Blattman and Jeannie Annan ; Between two worlds: former LRA soldiers in northern Uganda / Ben Mergelsberg ; Encountering Kony: a Madi perspective / Ronald Iya -- Part 3. Peace and justice: Northern Uganda: a 'forgotten conflict', again? The impact of the internationalization of the resolution process / Sandrine Perrot ; 'The realists in Juba'? An analysis of the Juba peace talks / Ronald R. Atkinson ; NGO involvement in the Juba peace talks; the role and dilemmas of IKV Pax Christi / Simon Simonse, Willemijn Verkoren and Gerd Junne ; Bitter roots: the 'invention' of Acholi traditional justice / Tim Allen ; The ICC investigation of the Lord's Resistance Army: an insider's view / Matthew Brubacher -- Postscript: a kind of peace and an exported war / Tim Allen, Frederick Laker, Holly Porter and Mareike Schomerus.

El artículo ofrece una interpretación de las razones por las cuales, a pesar del proceso de paz iniciado en el 2003 en la República democrática del Congo, el país se sigue caracterizando por elevados niveles de violencia física y estructural. Una violencia provocada por factores diversos a) la propia intervención internacional que en parte puede al promover acuerdos de poder compartido retribuyendo la violencia armada y b) el proceso de fragmentación de los actores armados que forman complejas formaciones transfronterizas entre emites políticas y económicas locales, actores regionales armados y otras fuerzas transfronterizas como las multinacionales. Unas formaciones que, con sus mecanismos de control, protección y provecho, han dado lugar en unos casos a cierta dosis de orden y estabilidad a las regiones donde operan y en otras han generado, en su competencia por el acceso a los recursos naturales, una fuerte violencia armada e inestabilidad produciéndose una situación de "no paz, no guerra". Unas formaciones que compiten (o se insertan) en el actual proceso de reconstrucción del estado congoleño reproduciendo las lógicas patrimoniales y depredadoras del régimen de mobuto aunque con mayores dosis de violencia física y estructural en su lucha por el control de los recursos naturales o las redes comerciales ; The article offers an interpretation of the reasons why despite the peace process in course since 2003, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DCR) is still a country with high levels of physical and structural violence. This violence stems from different factors a) the international intervention itself, which can partly foster shared power agreements which reward armed violence and b) the fragmentation of the armed actors, who are reshuffled in complex trans-border formations between political and economic local elites, armed regional actors and other trans-border forces such as multinationals. These formations have mechanisms for control, protection and profit that have in certain cases spawned some regional order and stability, but that in other occasions have given rise to a strong armed violence and instability in their struggle for commodities, that leads to a "not peace, not war" scenario. These formations compete (or insert themselves) in the current reconstruction process in DCR; they reproduce the predatory patrimonialist logics of Mobutu´s regime with an additional scaling up of physical and structural violence in their struggle for the control of commodities or trade networks

There has been a slow, but growing awareness among external actors that some local non-state security actors should be involved in security governance in conflict-affected situations. Already in 2006, the OECD published a report that called for a 'multi-layered' approach to reforming actors and institutions that provide security and justice services (Scheye and McLean, 2006). Often these actors consist of local authorities, such as customary chiefs, village elders, or business people working in collaboration with different kinds of self-defense groups. The idea behind 'multi-layered' security governance is that the inclusion of local non-state actors in security governance will improve security provision to people because they have more legitimacy. But in reality 'multi-layered' security governance is often marked by conflict and competition as much as by collaboration and common solutions to people's security problems. ; There has been a slow, but growing awareness among external actors that some local non-state security actors should be involved in security governance in conflict-affected situations. Already in 2006, the OECD published a report that called for a 'multi-layered' approach to reforming actors and institutions that provide security and justice services (Scheye and McLean, 2006). Often these actors consist of local authorities, such as customary chiefs, village elders, or business people working in collaboration with different kinds of self-defense groups. The idea behind 'multi-layered' security governance is that the inclusion of local non-state actors in security governance will improve security provision to people because they have more legitimacy. But in reality 'multi-layered' security governance is often marked by conflict and competition as much as by collaboration and common solutions to people's security problems.