Suchergebnisse

We analyze the role of targeted enforcement of emissions taxes when the regulator wants to minimize aggregate emissions via the adoption of new more environmentally friendly technology. The regulator wants to speed up the path of technology adoption generated by a policy of uniform enforcement (that monitors adopters and nonadopters with the same probability) by engaging in a regulatory deal where a reduced monitoring probability is granted in "exchange" for adoption of the new technology. We set up a theoretical model, characterize the circumstances in which such dealing minimizes aggregate emissions, and test our hypothesis using economic laboratory experiments. Our analytical and experimental results suggest that even though such a deal might imply an increased level of violation by adopters, such tolerance is rather an integral part of an overall enforcement strategy that minimizes aggregate emissions when the rate of adoption is endogenous. (JEL L51, Q53, Q55, Q58)

Abstract
This article presents an agroecosystem resilience index (ARI) relative to two types of exogenous drivers: biophysical and socioeconomic threats. The ARI is based on a theoretical framework of socioecological systems and draws upon multicriteria analysis. The multicriteria consist of variables related to natural, productive, socioeconomic, and institutional systems that are weighted and grouped through expert judgment. The index was operationalized in the Rio Grande basin (RGB), in the Colombian Andes. The ARI was evaluated at the household level using information from 99 RGB households obtained through workshops, individual semistructured interviews, and surveys. The ARI is a continuous variable that ranges between 0 and 1 and results in five categories of resilience: very low, low, medium, high, and very high. When faced with climate change impacts, 19% of households showed low resilience, 64% showed medium resilience, and 16% showed high resilience according to the ARI. When faced with price fluctuations, 23% of households showed low resilience, 65% showed medium resilience, and 11% showed high resilience. Key variables associated with high resilience include the diversity of vegetation cover, households that have forests on their properties, a high degree of connectivity with other patches of forest, diversification of household economic activities, profitability of economic activities, availability of water sources, and good relationships with local institutions.

Los medios de comunicación deberían tener la posibilidad de suministrar una información veraz, imparcial e independiente, pues de ellos depende, a no dudarlo, la tranquilidad de una comunidad y, en ocasiones, de todo un país. No lo hacen, sin embargo, pues estando sometidos a la censura impuesta por los políticos y los anunciadores, terminan autocensurndose, con lo que de informadores devienen en desinformadores. ; The press, TV and broadcasting would be free to give a truly, impartial and independent information. Really they are the security for a community and for a country. However, they can not to have it because must accept the political and publicitys laws. Then, born for them the censure and the autocensure

The press, TV and broadcasting would be free to give a truly, impartial and independent information. Really they are the security for a community and for a country. However, they can not to have it because must accept the political and publicity's laws. Then, bom for them the censure and the autocensure. ; Los medios de comunicación deberían tener la posibilidad de suministrar una información veraz, imparcial e independiente, pues de ellos depende, a no dudarlo, la tranquilidad de una comunidad y, en ocasiones, de todo un país. No lo hacen, sin embargo, pues estando sometidos a la censura impuesta por los políticos y los anunciadores, terminan autocensurándose, con lo que de informadores devienen en desinformadores.

We examine situations in which a decision maker decides for another person as well as herself under conditions of payoff equality, and compare such decisions under responsibility to individual decisions. Estimating a structural model we find that responsibility leaves utility curvature unaffected, but accentuates the subjective distortion of very small and very large probabilities for both gains and losses. This results in an accentuation of prospect theory's four-fold pattern of risk preferences under responsibility. In addition, we also find that responsibility reduces loss aversion according to some common definitions of the latter. These results serve to reconcile some of the still largely contradictory findings in the literature on decisions for oneself and others under payoff equality. (author's abstract)

The slippery slope framework of tax compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of tax compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase tax compliance intentions and mitigate intended tax evasion across societies that differ in economic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster compliance through different channels: trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of tax compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for tax collection.

The slippery slope framework of tax compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of tax compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase tax compliance intentions and mitigate intended tax evasion across societies that differ in economic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster compliance through different channels: trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of tax compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for tax collection.

The slippery slope framework of tax compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of tax compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase tax compliance intentions and mitigate intended tax evasion across societies that differ in economic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster compliance through different channels: trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of tax compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for tax collection.