Suchergebnisse

Hauptbeschreibung: Die wettbewerbstheoretischen Beiträge von Erich Hoppmann, in denen das Leitbild der Wettbewerbsfreiheit und ein evolutorisches Wettbewerbsverständnis im Vordergrund standen, haben die wettbewerbspolitische Diskussion in Deutschland maßgeblich geprägt. Das Werk Hoppmanns aus heutiger Sicht kritisch würdigend und an seinen Beitrag anknüpfend setzen sich die in diesem Band zusammengestellten Aufsätze renommierter Autoren mit grundsätzlichen Fragen der angemessenen Wettbewerbspolitik in einer freiheitlichen Gesellschaft auseinander. Beachtung wird dabei nicht zuletzt der Frage des

AbstractThe paper examines the theory of competitive federalism, focusing specifically on Hayek's and Buchanan's significant contributions to this theory. Looking at the rivalry between sub‐units in federal systems and drawing an analogy between market competition and intergovernmental competition, the theory of competitive federalism stresses the critical role viable exit options play as operating force in both arenas. The principal claim argued for in this paper is that by exclusively focusing on exit in its territorial dimension, the theory of competitive federalism obfuscates the fact that "exit" can mean two critically different things in federal systems. It can mean exiting from the territory over which a government exercises its assigned authority, and it can mean exiting from a polity in the sense of giving up one's membership status in the respective community. The paper discusses the nature, the significance, and the implications of the difference between these two kinds of exit.

[Political Economy as Applied Economics] What we call an economy, i.e. the nexus of economic activities and relations within some defined regional limits - e.g. a local, a national or the world economy -, has always been subject to measures taken, or constraints imposed by political authorities. How economies work is inevitably, and to a significant extent, contingent on the political environment within which they operate. It is not surprising that economists studying the working principles of economic systems have rarely been content with confining their work to describing and explaining the economic realities they observe. Their ambitions always extended to passing judgments on the policies that shaped these realities and to providing guidance for what politics ought to do to improve economic matters. In economics explanations of what is and judgments on what politics should do are often not only more closely intertwined than in most other fields of scientific inquiry, and more than from practitioners in other fields the general public expects economists to pass such policy judgments. [.]

AbstractTheories of competitive federalism generally focus onexitas the principal mechanism for making governments responsive to the interests of those who are subject to their powers. This paper draws attention to the fact that democratic governments act in two distinguishable roles, as 'territorial enterprises' and as 'club enterprises'. Asterritorial enterprisesthey define and enforce the rules and terms that apply to everybody, whether citizen or alien, who resides and/or operates within their jurisdictional boundaries. Asclub enterprises, they define and enforce the rules and terms ofmembershipin the respective polity. The focus of this paper is on the implications of the fact that 'exit' means something different when one looks at governments' role as territorial enterprises (exit = leaving the territory) in contrast to their role as club enterprises (exit = giving up one's membership status/citizenship).

In the debate on how to deal with the current Eurozone crisis, Germany's insistence on binding rules has drawn attention to the ordoliberal tradition of the Freiburg School and its concept of Ordnungspolitik. The purpose of this paper is twofold, firstly, to provide a summary of the history and the core tents of this tradation and, secondly, to discuss the rationale behind its rule-based concept of Ordnungspolitik.

Theories of competitive federalism generally focus on exit as the principal mechanism for making governments responsive to the interests of those who are subject to their powers. This paper draws attention to the necessity to specify more clearly the meaning of 'exit' in light of the fact that democratic governments act in two distinguishable roles, namely as what I propose to call 'territorial enterprises' and 'clubs enterprises'. As territorial enterprises, governments define and enforce the rules and conditions under which private law subjects, citizens and non-citizens alike, may pursue their private purposes within the territory of the respective jurisdiction. As club enterprises, governments define and enforce the rules and conditions of membership in the respective political community. Accordingly, individuals are subject to government's power in two capacities. As private law subjects they can choose, like customers, among competing territorial enterprises according to their respective relative attractiveness, separately for the various purposes they pursue. As citizens, they share, as members of a polity, in the inclusive bundle of benefits and costs that come with the membership status. The focus of this paper is on the implications of the fact that 'exit' means something different when one looks at citizens as customers of territorial enterprises (exit = leaving the territory) as opposed to their role as citizens-members (exit = giving up one's membership-status/citizenship).

Bei diesem Beitrag handelt es sich um eine erweiterte und um Fußnoten ergänzte Schriftfassung der Achten Wilhelm-Röpke-Vorlesung, die Prof. Dr. Viktor J. Vanberg, Vorstand und Senior Research Fellow am Walter Eucken Institut in Freiburg, am 13. Februar 2014 in der Thüringer Aufbaubank in Erfurt gehalten hat. Die jährlich zum Todestag des großen Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlers stattfindende Veranstaltung des Wilhelm-Röpke-Instituts e.V. soll dazu beitragen, Röpkes Wirken als Wissenschaftler, Politikberater und Publizist in Erinnerung zu rufen und seine Ideen auf aktuelle Probleme anzuwenden.

[Einleitung: Das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Liberalismus und Demokratie] Zwischen den Idealen der Demokratie und des Liberalismus besteht, so scheinen nicht wenige ihrer jeweiligen Advokaten zu vermuten, ein inhärentes Spannungsverhältnis. Auf der liberalen Seite spricht ein Autor wie Randall Holcombe in seinem Buch 'From Liberty to Democracy' von 'Gefahren der Demokratie', die er darin sieht, dass mit ihrer Ausweitung regelmäßig eine Ausdehnung des Staates und ein Niedergang individueller Freiheit einhergehe, und er stellt die letztendliche Vereinbarkeit von Demokratie und einer freiheitlichen, marktwirtschaftlichen Ordnung in Frage. Ein anarcho-libertärer Autor wie Hans-Hermann Hoppe sieht in seinem Buch 'Democracy - The God That Failed' (2001) in der Demokratie die Quelle aller Sünden des modernen Wohlfahrtsstaates. Dem stehen Vertreter des Demokratieideals gegenüber, die ihrerseits den Verdacht hegen, dass für Liberale die Demokratie nur dann und solange akzeptabel sei, wenn bzw. solange sie 'liberale Entscheidungen' hervorbringe, und dass sie, wo dies nicht der Fall sei, einer autoritären Regierung als geringerem Übel den Vorzug geben würden. Dabei wird gern auf die sicherlich nicht sonderlich glückliche Berater-Rolle verwiesen, die liberale Ökonomen in der Zeit des Pinochet-Regimes in Chile gespielt haben. [.]