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This article examined the premises of interpersonal deception theory (IDT) within an advice-giving context. Advisors with quality and persuasion goals provided advice concerning stock rankings to decision makers either primed or not primed to be suspicious of advisors' motives. Two competing hypotheses were proposed. First, suspicious decision makers were predicted to accept less advice from all advisors and be no more likely to detect advisors' motives than nonsuspicious decision makers. Second, suspicious decision makers were predicted to be better able to detect the motives of advisors and accept less advice from the advisor with the persuasive motive than nonsuspicious decision makers. The first hypothesis was supported. The persuasive advisor had significantly higher confidence than the quality advisor on the rankings used to give advice, although not on private rankings. Advisors' confidence on these rankings fully mediated their influence on the decision maker.

Participants were given information for and against the decriminalization of marijuana and discussed the issue in groups. Factors affecting rated importance of information after the group discussion were examined. Participants did not rate information that was mentioned during the discussion as more important than information not mentioned, and participants did not rate shared information they mentioned as more important than unshared information. Participants did rate shared information other group members mentioned as more important than unshared information others mentioned. Participants did not rate their own information as more important than other's information, and information that was repeated was not rated as more important. Participants did perceive information supporting their individual position as more important than information against their position, and this confirmation bias was lessened in groups containing an opinion minority. A comparison of minority and majority members in minority-containing groups found that minority members were more open to information than majority members.

Two experiments focused on nonverbal mirroring in a group discussion. In Experiment 1, each participant interacted with two confederates. Confederates disagreed with each other and with the participant during discussion. One confederate mirrored the nonverbal behavior of the participant; the other did not. Participants rated the imitating confederate as more confident and persuasive. However, they were not more likely to change their viewpoint to match that of this confederate. Independent coders, unaware of the hypotheses, did not rate the two confederates as significantly different. In Experiment 2, each participant again interacted with two confederates. One confederate agreed with the participant during the discussion, and the other disagreed. One confederate rubbed his or her face during the discussion. The other shook his or her foot. The hypothesis that participants would be more likely to mirror the nonverbal behavior of the confederate who agreed with them during discussion received no support.

This article reviews research that examines the use of language in small interacting groups and teams. We propose a model of group inputs (e.g., status), processes and emergent states (e.g., cohesion, influence, and innovation), and outputs (e.g., group effectiveness and member well-being) to help structure our review. The model is integrated with how language is used by groups to both reflect group inputs but also to examine how language interacts with inputs to affect group processes and create emergent states in groups, and then ultimately helps add value to the group with outputs (e.g., performance). Using cross-disciplinary research, our review finds that language is integral to how groups coordinate, interrelate, and adapt. For example, language convergence is related to increased group cohesion and group performance. Our model provides the theoretical scaffolding to consider language use in interacting small groups and suggests areas for future research.

Effective use of available information is a problem that plagues group decision-making tasks. Groups heavily favor shared information, or information that is known to all group members, which can lead to incorrect decisions and selection of inferior alternatives. However, groups may be less prone to overlooking unshared information if they are focused to value uniqueness and novel input from group members. The present research demonstrates that groups that value uniqueness, or a separatist orientation, correctly solved a hidden profile task more often than groups with a synchronous orientation, or groups that value similarity. Separatist groups repeated more unshared information than synchronous overall. Separatists also repeated more shared information than synchronous groups. Further, groups with a correct minority member also repeated more unshared information than groups with either a majority correct or no correct members. Results are discussed in terms of group focus and biases that affect the discussion of information.

This article tests conversion theory through linguistic analysis of group discussions and also tests the effects of linguistic mimicry in homogeneous groups and minority/majority groups. Supporting conversion theory, majorities had a more interpersonal, outward focus as tested through use of more third person plural pronouns ("they"). Supporting conversion theory's validation process, minority members who used a higher percentage of causation words were more influential. Majority members who used more second person pronouns ("you") had less influence in the group, in support of previous research that found that "you" words were counterproductive with conflict. It was hypothesized that there would be a positive relationship between linguistic mimicry and discussion of information shared by all group members, but this was only found in homogeneous groups.

This article examined strategic requests for information in a group structured as a judge advisor system (JAS) with one group member designated as the decision maker and the other two members as advisors. The decision maker could solicit advice from the two advisors. One advisor's advice contained only information shared in common with the decision maker, and the other's advice contained half unshared information. The authors proposed an alternative to research on information sampling and mutual enhancement and predicted that the decision maker would prefer information from the advisor with more unshared information. The decision maker solicited more information from the advisor with more unshared information and rated this advisor's information as more important and influential than the advisor with only shared information.

People often mimic each other. Research has examined the positive social benefits of mimicry and factors that lead to increased mimicry. Two studies examine whether a participant is more likely to mimic nonverbal behavior of someone who shares the same opinion as the participant than someone who does not. The participant made a decision between two vacation destinations and discussed the choice in a three-person group. The two other group members were confederates. One agreed with the participant's choice and one disagreed. Each confederate emitted a different nonverbal behavior consistently throughout discussion. Results offer some support to the hypothesis that the participant would be more likely to mimic nonverbal behavior of the confederate who is in agreement with the participant.

Three experiments examined three factors that may impede the discovery of hidden profiles: commitment to initial decision, reiteration effect, and ownership bias. Experiment 1 examined whether groups in which members are not asked to make an initial decision before group discussion are more likely to uncover hidden profiles than groups in which members are asked to make an initial decision. Experiment 2 examined this commitment to an initial decision and also the repetition of information for individuals. Experiment 3 explored the reiteration effect in groups and examined whether information that is usually repeated more in groups is viewed as more truthful. Experiments 1 and 2 found no support for the commitment to initial decision hypothesis for uncovering hidden profiles. Experiment 2 found that repetition of `common'information significantly reduced individuals' ability to uncover hidden profiles. Experiment 3 found that information individuals owned (both common and unique) before discussion was rated as more valid than other information. Experiment 3 did not find that common information, which is generally repeated more, was rated as more valid than unique information. Limitations of the current studies and suggestions for future research are discussed.

This study compared how the judge advisor system (JAS) and unstructured groups discuss common and unique information. Three differences between the two were measured for their effect on communication of information. These were responsibility for decision, consensus seeking, and equity of participation. Participants were given information about two drugs and had to decide which of the two to market. Half met in unstructured 3-person groups and made the decision as a group. The rest met in JASs whereby the judge discussed the information with each advisor separately and then made the decision individually. Advisors mentioned but did not repeat a higher proportion of unique information than group members. Judges felt more responsible for, reported putting more effort toward, and had higher confidence in the decision than did group members. There was more inequity of participation and consensus seeking in JASs compared to groups. Differences are discussed in light of results found on information exchange.

The study examined detection of deception in unsanctioned, consequential lies between either friends or strangers using an ultimatum game. The sender was given an amount of money to divide with the receiver. The receiver did not know the precise amount the sender had to divide, and the sender had the ability to deceive the receiver about the monetary amount. Not surprisingly, senders were more likely to deceive strangers than friends, and receivers were more suspicious of strangers than friends. When senders lied, they stated their offer more times and gave more supporting statements for their offer. Receivers had a strong truth bias, although the majority of senders were truthful, and friends had more of a truth bias than strangers. Receivers were not able to detect deception at a rate above chance. Friends were not better at detecting deception than strangers. However, because most participants were truthful and there was a strong truth bias, a high percentage of participants were able to detect when their partner was truthful, in confirmation of the veracity effect.