Suchergebnisse

Much of the recent debate about the status of customary international law in the U.S. legal system has revolved around the alien tort provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789, currently section 1350 of Title 28. In Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, the decision that launched modern human rights litigation in the United States, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit relied on the view that customary international law has the status of federal common law in upholding section 1350's grant of federal jurisdiction over a suit between aliens. The court's position that customary international law was federal law was the prevailing view at the time—a view that has subsequently been dubbed the "modern position." It was the view set forth in the black letter of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law. Filártiga triggered a revisionist challenge to the modern position, with revisionists arguing that customary international law has the status of federal law only if given that status through statute or treaty, or perhaps through sole executive action; in the absence of such incorporation, customary international law has, at best, the status of State law in our legal system.

Plaintiffs and respondents, Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. and United Carriers, Inc., were respectively the charterer and owner of the Hercules, a crude oil tanker that was bombed in international waters by Argentine military aircraft during the war over the Malvinas or Falkland Islands. The ship was severely damaged and had to be scuttled off the coast of Brazil. After unsuccessfully seeking relief in Argentina, the companies filed suit against defendant and appellant, the Argentine Republic, in the Southern District of New York. Plaintiffs argued that the federal courts had jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute (28 U.S.C. §1350 (1982)), which confers federal jurisdiction over "any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (28 U.S.C. §§1330, 1602-1611 (1982)) (FSIA) is by its terms the sole basis of federal jurisdiction over cases against foreign states. A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court (per Rehnquist, C.J.) unanimously reversed the Second Circuit and held that the FSIA provides the exclusive basis of federal jurisdiction over suits against foreign states.

In this first decision by the United States Supreme Court on the scope and application of the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, better known as the Hague Service Convention, petitioner, a West German company, challenged the respondent's attempt to serve process on petitioner by serving its wholly owned U.S. subsidiary in accordance with the state's rules rather than pursuant to the procedures of the Convention. The Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, found that the relationship between the German parent and the U.S. subsidiary was such that, under state-law rules of agency, the U.S. subsidiary was the parent's involuntary agent for service of process. Because service could thus be perfected entirely within the United States, the court held that it was not necessary to follow the procedures of the Hague Service Convention. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed, and the Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court (per O'Connor, J.) affirmed and held: (1) the Hague Service Convention is "mandatory" and preempts inconsistent state-law methods of service in all cases to which it applies; (2) the Convention applies where there is occasion to transmit a document abroad to charge persons with formal notice of a pending action; and (3) whether it is necessary to transmit a document abroad for such purposes is determined by the forum state's internal law.