Suchergebnisse

The Spanish process of addressing Euskadi Ta Askatasuna's (ETA) violent past has not followed a single transitional justice model or established a truth commission akin to those in South Africa, Latin America or Eastern and Central Europe. Instead, the case of Spain is marked by diverse legal, political and civic endeavours, sparking distinct discussions and artistic depictions regarding the dialectic between justice, forgiveness and reconciliation when addressing past crimes. By drawing on Hannah Arendt's influential perspective on reconciliation and its critiques (in particular, by Jacques Derrida), this article combines philosophy and film studies to contribute to the interpretation of Icíar Bollaín's recent film, Maixabel (2021). The film explores real-life instances of reconciliatory transformation that were part of the short-lived 'reparatory encounters' between ETA criminals and their victims. Bollaín's realist directorial intent notwithstanding, the significance of the encounters and reparatory justice leading to personal healing and social reconciliation is not self-evident but a matter of debate and legitimately different standpoints and experiences. This article sheds light on the hidden cracks of the cinematic mirror of the reparatory encounters by analysing the directorial intent, Maixabel, and Maixabel Lasa's testimony, the key inspiration for the movie. Bollaín's understanding of her film and the reparatory encounters echoes the Arendtian vision in that it separates reconciliation from forgiveness. In contrast, the film, and the real-life Maixabel Lasa's self-understanding, construct alternative views of reparatory reconciliation that embrace both public and personal acts of forgiveness. This leads to a phenomenologically richer depiction of reconciliation, forgiveness and transitional justice, one that does not conform to the rigid constraints of philosophical prescriptivism.

In this article, I reflect on the intersection between feminism and documentary art as truth-telling by focusing on Alcaldessa ( Ada Colau for Mayor), the most relevant documentary of the long-term collaboration between the film-maker Pau Faus and Ada Colau, the first female mayor of Barcelona (2015–2023). My argument is critical of a reductionist interpretation which portrays Alcaldessa as a personalist postfeminist documentary overly fixated on 'biography rather than policy'. In contrast, I posit that Faus' documentary, delving into Colau's initial electoral campaign (2014–2015), offers valuable insights into pivotal aspects of an underexamined political vision that merges the principles of new municipalism with a focus on the 'common people' ( gent comú) and feminism. Furthermore, the documentary sheds light on unreconciled dilemmas inherent in the lived new politics and feminist leadership, issues that often remain concealed within the ideological trappings of political manifestos and programmes.

This paper is focused on the meaning of the artist's 'theatre of violence' and self-sacrifice in Charlie Brooker's The National Anthem (2011), a parable of power and resistance in the age of technology. To interpret 'the first great artwork of the 21th century' (as this resistance is called in the film), I critically draw on Jean Baudrillard's post-Maussian theory of spectacular terror and on Walter Benjamin's reflection on technology and the aestheticization of violence. Technology and mass media carve out a 'domain of the sensible' where hegemonic power and reactive violence are, as in The National Anthem, theatrically staged with contrasting effects, carnivalesque and dramatic, funny and abject. In Brooker's film, the aestheticization of dominant power and subversive violence obliterate, and at the same time unveil, a moral problematic. By manoeuvring the logic of the spectacle of hegemonic power, the artist short-circuits it, and clings to the aspiration to an alternative or a political 'heteroglossia' (Bakhtin) the staging of a global carnival is a moral protest meant to free people from the delusions of political and mass media power.

Baudrillard interpreta el «nuevo terrorismo» como un intercambio simbólico de regalo y contra-regalo: la muerte del terrorista es un contra-regalo irrefutable que rompe el círculo coercitivo de las relaciones sociales «impuestas» por el sistema global. A su vez, la concepción de Derrida tiene dos dimensiones, explicativa y normativa: en primer lugar, Derrida considera el 11-S como un síntoma multifacético de una crisis autoinmune que tiene aspectos políticos, religiosos y tecno-capitalistas. En segundo lugar, Derrida arguye que existe un «momento» de terror, violencia y sacrificio que es constitutivo en las decisiones y en la responsabilidad éticas.
De forma crítica, argumentaré que la concepción de Baudrillard se basa en una noción extremada y partidista de un sistema que se interpreta como un inmenso mandato de un gobernante totalitario. Por su parte, Derrida convierte de forma innecesaria la observación de que las acciones humanas pueden tener consecuencias perversas en una ley de la autoinmumidad inspirada en la biología. Al considerar el terror como algo constitutivo incluso en las relaciones éticas más comunes, Derrida corre también el riesgo de convertir un fenómeno extremado en un concepto que lo abarca todo, y de perder contacto con la práctica ética corriente. Concluiré que las concepciones de Baudrillard y de Derrida sobre el terror y el terrorismo comparten un «gusto por lo extremado» que las hace en última instancia poco convincentes.

For Baudrillard, the «new terrorism» should be understood as a symbolic exchange of gift and counter-gift: the terrorist's death is an unanswerable counter-gift that disrupts the coercing circle of social relationships «imposed» by the global system. In turn, Derrida's conception has two dimensions, explicative and normative. First, Derrida considers 11/9 as a multi-faceted symptom of an autoimmunitary crisis that has political, religious and technological-capitalist aspects. Second, Derrida argues that there is an Abrahamic «moment» of terror, violence and sacrifice that is constitutive to ethical decisions and responsibility. On the critical side, I will argue that Baudrillard's view is premised on an extreme and partisan notion of a system interpreted as a totalitarian ruler writ large. In turn, Derrida unnecessarily turns the common observation that human actions can have perverse consequences into a law of autoimmunity inspired by biology. By seeing terror as constitutive even to the most common ethical relationships, Derrida also runs the risk of turning an extreme phenomenon into a catch-all concept, and of losing touch with the day-to-day ethical practice. I will conclude that Baudrillard's and Derrida's conceptions of terror and terrorism partake in a «taste for the extreme» that makes them ultimately unconvincing. ; Baudrillard interpreta el «nuevo terrorismo» como un intercambio simbólico de regalo y contra-regalo: la muerte del terrorista es un contra-regalo irrefutable que rompe el círculo coercitivo de las relaciones sociales «impuestas» por el sistema global. A su vez, la concepción de Derrida tiene dos dimensiones, explicativa y normativa: en primer lugar, Derrida considera el 11-S como un síntoma multifacético de una crisis autoinmune que tiene aspectos políticos, religiosos y tecno-capitalistas. En segundo lugar, Derrida arguye que existe un «momento» de terror, violencia y sacrificio que es constitutivo en las decisiones y en la responsabilidad éticas. De forma crítica, argumentaré que la concepción de Baudrillard se basa en una noción extremada y partidista de un sistema que se interpreta como un inmenso mandato de un gobernante totalitario. Por su parte, Derrida convierte de forma innecesaria la observación de que las acciones humanas pueden tener consecuencias perversas en una ley de la autoinmumidad inspirada en la biología. Al considerar el terror como algo constitutivo incluso en las relaciones éticas más comunes, Derrida corre también el riesgo de convertir un fenómeno extremado en un concepto que lo abarca todo, y de perder contacto con la práctica ética corriente. Concluiré que las concepciones de Baudrillard y de Derrida sobre el terror y el terrorismo comparten un «gusto por lo extremado» que las hace en última instancia poco convincentes.

In recent years, various European and UN documents have been advancing the idea of `open, transparent and regular' dialogue between religion and democracy. Is this the naïve (or, at worst, hypocritical) rhetoric of the `Good European'? This article will discuss this issue starting from the debate between Habermas and Rawls on the role of religion in the public sphere. My approach presupposes a passage from deliberation to democratic rhetoric, the correlative abandonment of some of the tenets of Habermas's secularism, as well as a greater concern with the question of the power asymmetries underpinning discursive exchanges.