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While collaborative governance has many benefits for environmental planning and management, those benefits are not politically feasible if they impact on process efficiency. This study assesses collaboration's effect on the duration of water permitting processes, specifically the United States' Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's hydropower relicensing process. Collaboration was measured using a survey of participants in 24 recent hydropower relicensing processes. A Cox proportional hazards model with mixed effects assessed the relationship between collaboration, regulatory framework, hydropower facility characteristics, and relicensing process duration. Collaboration was not associated with time to license. Instead, process duration depended on the regulatory framework (especially the switch to the Integrated Licensing Process and presence of endangered species) and facility characteristics (generating capacity and facility type). The results suggest that agencies should consider engaging collaboratively during planning and permitting, given that collaboration's benefits to decision quality do not incur a cost on overall process time.

Despite collaborative governance's popularity, whether collaboration improves policy performance remains uncertain. This study assesses the link between collaborative decision making and licensed environmental management protocols in the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC's) process for licensing hydropower facilities in the United States. Using results from a previous study of FERC relicensing (Ulibarri, forthcoming), one high-, one medium-, and one low-collaboration case were selected. Using documents including meeting minutes, public comments, and issued licenses, I assessed collaboration and license outputs, then conducted process tracing to examine whether and how differences in collaboration produced differences in license quality. High collaboration resulted in jointly developed and highly implementable operating regimes designed to improve numerous resources, while low collaboration resulted in operating requirements that ignored environmental concerns raised by stakeholders and lacked implementation provisions. These results support the hypothesis that collaboration can improve environmental outcomes, revealing the pragmatic value of collaboration. [Correction added on 13 January 2015, after first online publication: the occurrences of '0' in the abstract were erroneous and have now been corrected.

© 2015 The Authors Policy Studies Journal published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of Policy Studies Organization. Despite collaborative governance's popularity, whether collaboration improves policy performance remains uncertain. This study assesses the link between collaborative decision making and licensed environmental management protocols in the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC's) process for licensing hydropower facilities in the United States. Using results from a previous study of FERC relicensing (Ulibarri, forthcoming), one high-, one medium-, and one low-collaboration case were selected. Using documents including meeting minutes, public comments, and issued licenses, I assessed collaboration and license outputs, then conducted process tracing to examine whether and how differences in collaboration produced differences in license quality. High collaboration resulted in jointly developed and highly implementable operating regimes designed to improve numerous resources, while low collaboration resulted in operating requirements that ignored environmental concerns raised by stakeholders and lacked implementation provisions. These results support the hypothesis that collaboration can improve environmental outcomes, revealing the pragmatic value of collaboration. [Correction added on 13 January 2015, after first online publication: the occurrences of '0' in the abstract were erroneous and have now been corrected.

Environmental governance scholars argue that optimal environmental performance can be achieved by matching the scale of governance to the scale of the resource being managed. In the case of water, this means managing at the scale of the watershed. However, many watersheds lack a single watershed-scale organization with authority over all water resources and instead rely on cross-jurisdiction coordination or collaboration among diverse organizations. To understand what "watershed governance" looks like fully, this paper maps organizations with rights to use, regulate, or manage water in four subwatersheds in California (the American, Cosumnes, and Kings Rivers in the Sacramento-San Joaquin watershed and the Shasta River in the Klamath watershed). We assemble datasets of water organizations, water rights holders, and water management plans and use content analysis and social network analysis to explore what water management looks like in the absence of a single basin authority. We describe the institutional complexity that exists in each watershed, compare the physical and institutional interconnections between actors in the watersheds, and then ask to what extent these connections map onto watershed boundaries. We find that the ways in which water management is complex takes very different forms across the four watersheds, despite their being located in a similar political, social, and geographic context. Each watershed has drastically different numbers of actors and uses a very different mix of water sources. We also see very different levels of coordination between actors in each watershed. Given these differences, we then discuss how the institutional reforms needed to create watershed-scale management are unique for each watershed. By building a stronger comparative understanding of what watershed governance actually entails, this work aims to build more thoughtful recommendations for building institutional fit.

How do social networks differ between highly collaborative and less collaborative forms of governance? Drawing on a prior study that characterized the level of collaboration for three federal hydropower relicensing processes, we develop exponential random graph models of meeting attendance and participation networks. We find that the highly collaborative relicensing process had lower overall density and a propensity for relatively fewer and stronger interactions. Reciprocity is highest in the high-collaboration process, indicating that it is characterized by mutual interactions. In the low-collaboration process, patterns of connections between any three members of the network displayed a more unidirectional structure, suggesting asymmetrical interactions between active versus passive members of the network. By linking network structure to collaborative dynamics, this study helps elaborate potential mechanisms of successful collaboration.

Numerous environmental regulations require organizations to codify prospective activities in a written plan. However, evidence suggests that many plans are never implemented, raising questions about why public agencies continually require plans, whether mandating plans allows agencies to meet their policy aims, and what additional purposes plans serve. Adopting concepts from literature on research utilization, we develop a plan use typology, defining instrumental use as occurring when the requirement to write a plan directly addresses a stated policy problem, conceptual use as occurring when the requirement to write a plan indirectly addresses a policy problem by raising awareness of an issue or improving governance capacity, and tactical use as occurring when the requirement to write a plan serves a political or symbolic purpose unrelated to solving the policy problem. We then apply the typology to four California statutes that require local and regional utilities to write water management plans. We first assess the statutes to identify the goals underlying the requirement to write a plan and assess what plan uses are emphasized in guidance documents and the written plans themselves. Lastly, we interview the plan writing organizations to capture their perspectives on the value and limitations of these plans. We find that legislators turn to plans to support instrumental and conceptual goals but that the plans themselves and the way they are used by authoring agencies primarily serve conceptual and tactical uses, suggesting a disconnect between the policy goals underlying plans and their actual use.

Governments, businesses, and civil society organizations have diverse policy tools to incentivize adaptation. Policy tools can shape the type and extent of adaptation, and therefore, function either as barriers or enablers for reducing risk and vulnerability. Using data from a systematic review of academic literature on global adaptation responses to climate change (n = 1549 peer-reviewed articles), we categorize the types of policy tools used to shape climate adaptation. We apply qualitative and quantitative analyses to assess the contexts where particular tools are used, along with equity implications for groups targeted by the tools, and the tools' relationships with transformational adaptation indicators such as the depth, scope, and speed of adaptation. We find diverse types of tools documented across sectors and geographic regions. We also identify a mismatch between the tools that consider equity and those that yield more transformational adaptations. Direct regulations, plans, and capacity building are associated with higher depth and scope of adaptation (thus transformational adaptation), while economic instruments, information provisioning, and networks are not; the latter tools, however, are more likely to target marginalized groups in their design and implementation. We identify multiple research gaps, including a need to assess instrument mixes rather than single tools and to assess adaptations that result from policy implementation. Key policy insights Information-based approaches, networks, and economic instruments are the most frequently documented adaptation policy tools worldwide. Direct regulations, plans, and capacity building are associated with higher depth and scope of adaptation, and thus more transformational adaptation. Capacity building, economic instruments, networks, and information provisioning approaches are more likely to target specific marginalized groups and thus equity challenges. There are many regions and sectors where certain tools are not widely documented (e.g. ...

Abstract A frequent barrier to addressing some of our world's most pressing environmental challenges is a lack of funding. Currently, environmental project funding largely comes from philanthropic and public sources, but this does not meet current needs. Increased coordination and collaboration between multiple levels and sectors of government, in addition to private sector funding, can help address the environmental funding challenge. New financial tools and strategies can enable this transition and facilitate uptake of innovative solutions. One such mechanism, the Environmental Impact Bond (EIB), is an emerging financial tool with the potential to transform the environmental funding landscape. However, these financial instruments are not well understood or recognized beyond those actively involved in EIB projects or in the field of conservation finance. As EIBs gain momentum, there is a clear need for a common framework, including definitions and nomenclature, research needs, and outlook for the future. In this paper, we define EIB mechanics, elucidate the difference between EIBs and Green Bonds, and propose a common vocabulary for the field. Drawing on first-hand experience with the few EIBs which have been deployed, we review and assess lessons learned, trends, and paths for the future. Finally, we propose a set of future targets and discuss research goals for the field to unify around. Through this work, we identify a concrete set of research gaps and objectives, providing evidence for EIBs as one important tool in the environmental finance toolbox.

A frequent barrier to addressing some of our worlds most pressing environmental challenges is a lack of funding. Currently, environmental project funding largely comes from philanthropic and public sources, but this does not meet current needs. Increased coordination and collaboration between multiple levels and sectors of government, in addition to private sector funding, can help address the environmental funding challenge. New financial tools and strategies can enable this transition and facilitate uptake of innovative solutions. One such mechanism, the Environmental Impact Bond (EIB), is an emerging financial tool with the potential to transformthe environmental funding landscape. However, these financial instruments are not well understood or recognized beyond those actively involved in EIB projects or in the field of conservation finance. As EIBs gain momentum, there is a clear need for a common framework, including definitions and nomenclature, research needs, and outlook for the future. In this paper, we define EIB mechanics, elucidate the difference between EIBs and Green Bonds, and propose a common vocabulary for the field. Drawing on first-hand experience with the few EIBs which have been deployed, we review and assess lessons learned, trends, and paths for the future. Finally, we propose a set of future targets and discuss research goals for the field to unify around. Through this work, we identify a concrete set of research gaps and objectives, providing evidence for EIBs as one important tool in the environmental finance toolbox. ; Published version