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Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Original Title Page -- Original Copyright Page -- General Editor's Introduction -- Table of Contents -- Introduction -- 1: Origins of The Idea -- The Growth of 'Organized Opposition' -- Quasi-Cabinets -- The 'Cabinet of the Opposition' -- 2: Shadow Cabinets Emerge -- Opposition Still in Disarray -- The Leadership Issue -- Sir William Harcourt and the Shadow Cabinet -- 3: A Steady Development -- Opposition Led in the Commons by Northcote -- Gladstone and the Shadow Cabinet -- The Liberals in Trouble: Chamberlain Departs -- John Morley and the Shadow Cabinet -- Opposition Responsibilities and Ministerial Appointments -- Campbell-Bannerman Becomes Leader of the Opposition -- Balfour and the Conservative Tarty -- The Conservatives and the 1911 Crisis -- Further Developments up to 1918 -- 4: Elected Front Bench -- Emergence of a Labour Opposition in 1922 -- Relations Between the P.L.P and the I.L.P. -- Lloyd George and the Liberal Shadow Cabinet -- Amery, Churchill and the Conservative Shadow Cabinet -- 5: From Macdonald to Churchill -- Lansbury Becomes Leader -- An Elected Shadow Cabinet and Lront Bench -- The Labour Opposition and the Second World War -- Victory Yet Defeat -- Churchill as Leader of the Opposition -- Opposition Becomes More Effective -- Approach of the 1950 General Election -- 6: The Modern Shadow Cabinet -- Divided We Fall -- Bevan, Greenwood and Crossman -- Checks and Balances -- Extensive Network of Committees -- 7: Election and Selection -- Lord Morrison Deplores Increasing Formalization -- P.L.P. Opposition Lront Bench 1951-64 -- Opposition 'Double Banking' -- Approach of the 1964 General Election -- 'Shadows' into Realities -- 8: Conservatives in Opposition -- Sir Alec Douglas-Home's Shadow Cabinet -- Re-allocation of Responsibilities -- Edward Heath Becomes Leader.

Intro -- Preface -- References -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1: Public Confidence in Criminal Justice: What's the Problem? -- References -- Chapter 2: Constructing Public Confidence: A Chronology of the Research Agenda -- 2.1 1970s: Two Perspectives on Public Opinion about Crime and Justice -- 2.2 1980s: 'False Shadows' and 'True Substances' -- 2.3 1990s: Real, Measurable, and Caused -- 2.4 2000s: Consolidation of an Agenda -- 2.5 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 3: Deconstructing Public Confidence: The Public Confidence Agenda as a Governmental Project -- 3.1 Identifying Objects in the 'Grid of Specification' -- 3.2 Violating the 'Things to Be Known' -- 3.3 'Reality Effects' -- 3.4 The Real and the Unreal: Relocating the Problem -- 3.5 Undermining Alternative Approaches: Dismissing Deliberation -- 3.6 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 4: Archaeology: Surfaces of Emergence for the Public Confidence Agenda -- 4.1 Note on Method: Excavating the History of the Present -- 4.2 The Removal of Justice from Public View -- 4.3 The Move Towards an Emphasis on Instrumental Goals in Penality -- 4.4 Homo criminalis and 'The Science of the State': The Coming of Criminology -- 4.5 'Justice Tempered by Understanding': Modern Criminology in Britain -- 4.6 Bringing the Public Back in: From Full Adult Suffrage to Managerialist Accountability via the (Re)invention of 'Public Opinion' -- 4.7 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 5: Genealogy: How the Public Confidence Agenda Got Its 'Hooks' into Criminal Justice -- 5.1 Note on Method: Tracing the Movement of a Concept Through Texts -- 5.2 A Few 'Black Sheep': Police Misconduct and Public Confidence in Policing -- 5.3 'Vital to Maintain Public Confidence in the Criminal Justice System': Playing the Confidence Card

In Brazil, police officers have increasingly competed in elections, mirroring expanded roles in government for coercive agents in cases such as the United States, the Philippines, and Mexico. In this paper, I develop a theory of how voters perceive these candidates. The symbol of the police officer represents the abstract idea of order and stability, more than just a crime fighter. Corruption scandals and insecurity in Brazil and Latin America have given rise to "order" in response to the chaos of politics as usual as a compelling electoral brand. I therefore expect that voters associate police officer candidates with strong, decisive leadership, social conservatism, a strong commitment to the rule of law, honesty in government, and a weak commitment to democracy. An image-based conjoint experiment fielded to a representative sample of Brazilian voters ( N = 3,098) finds support for the theoretical framework, but respondents did not perceive the police officer candidate as less democratic than other professional profiles. The results help to inform our understanding of electoral politics in post-transition democratic regimes, demonstrating how armed agents of the state might remain popular and influential within the context of a consolidated democracy.

Despite a violent and extremist past, some armed rebel movements often abandon their arms and successfully contest power through elections. This paper seeks to understand the environmental factors that determine an insurgent successor party's electoral success. Using first a cross-national analysis of insurgent successor party performance and then a subnational analysis of Salvadoran elections from 1994–2019, it is shown that the party's ability to leverage identities forged during the war and organize its appeals along a highly polarized pro- and anti-government axis is crucial to electoral success. This is understood as an organizational capability, the capacity to oppose. At the national level, the existence of an authoritarian successor party increases the longevity of such polarization while subnationally levels of violence help to solidify the wartime cleavage as the most important for local politics.

AbstractIn this article, I argue that the need to motivate bureaucrats to invest in high‐quality policy implementation alters the appeal of executive unilateralism. If executive orders are less durable than legislation, then the bureaucracy will have weaker incentives to invest in policy making. This affects presidents' willingness to compromise and work with Congress to pass legislation, rather than pursue unilateral action. Unilateralism becomes less attractive as bureaucratic capacity increases and as the relative durability of executive orders decreases. I formalize this logic in a simple formal model and discuss fruitful extensions for future work.