A situation whereby the communes have the most efficient of income sources, including several local taxes, means that a metropolitan area - which is typically composed of several districts and several dozen communes - does not have a uniform and effective system of financing its activites. It may be claimed that the system of financing local governments in Poland ignores the metropolitan areas which appear in the Polish space, causing numerous negative implications for their functioning. The first part of the paper concentrates on how metropolitan areas are being shaped in Polish space, through an analysis of tax-based incomes of communes in seven regions (Dolnoslaskie, Kujawsko-Pomorskie, Lodzkie, Malopolskie, Pomorskie, Slaskie and Wielkopolskie). The second part of the paper refers to the growing importance of metropolitan areas for the development of European space and their common perception as engines of economic growth and sustainable development in Europe. Based on the above a research hypothesis has been formulated: a mechanism for equalising incomes of local governments which has been set up within the equalising part of general grants favours the communes which are located in the peripheries with regards to the metropolitan cities and their metropolitan areas. The author attempts to verify this hypothesis through an analysis of data on the amounts of the equalising part of the general grant which communes receive or are expected to transfer to the state budget between 2007 and 2009.
The regional policy of the EU attempts at minimising the scale of disparities in the level of socio-economic development of regions. Regional policy is one of the key policies of the EU as shown by the fact that over a third of the Community's budget is spent on it. The main objective of regional policy is to help backward regions to catch up, restructure declining industries, diversify agriculture as well as revitalise cities. Poland, the largest of the new member states is at the same time one of the most lagging behind. The Structural Funds are perceived in Poland as one of the main instruments serving regional development. Since the EU and Poland put a great emphasis on regional policy it seems worthwhile to reflect upon its effectiveness. This article does not aim at analysing the changes in the level of disparities between countries or even regions of the EU – there is sufficient literature dealing with this issue. It needs to be noted however, that there often exist far greater disparities in the level of socio-economic development within regions rather than between them. This results from the concentration of positive effects of regional policy in regional centres. The author aims at presenting a methodology and results of research performed in a Polish region of Lodzkie. It concentrated on measuring the level of socio-economic development in the communes of Lodzkie and the scale of intra-regional disparities. Most available analyses of the effectiveness of regional policy concentrates on measuring the level of disparities between regions, mostly due to the fact that there is insufficient statistical material that would allow such comparisons on a lower level of territorial division. The author proposes a methodology that allows such comparisons for Polish communes. It is then tested on communes of Lodzkie (177 administrative units). The results seem to confirm that the regions are strongly polarised – with most of the socio-economic development concentrated in the centre of the region and a peripheral area around it. This leads to a conclusion that specific actions need to be undertaken in order to fully benefit from regional policy activities.
Résumé Les analyses empiriques de l'autonomie financière des gouvernements locaux se concentrent généralement sur les différentes sources de revenus dont ceux-ci disposent. Dans le présent article, nous étendons cette analyse à l'aspect lié à autonomie dans les dépenses et combinons ces deux dimensions de l'autonomie dans une évaluation exhaustive de l'autonomie financière des gouvernements locaux. La mise en œuvre de l'autonomie financière est un moyen d'évaluer la cohérence de la politique du gouvernement central à l'égard des gouvernements locaux. Nous utiliserons ensuite notre approche dans le cadre d'une comparaison entre deux pays – la Finlande et la Pologne. Remarques à l'intention des praticiens Les principales implications de notre approche concernent l'évaluation systématique de l'autonomie des gouvernements locaux sur le plan de leurs recettes et de leurs dépenses et la combinaison de ces deux dimensions de l'autonomie dans une analyse exhaustive de l'autonomie financière des gouvernements locaux. La mesure développée de l'autonomie financière peut servir d'outil de gestion dans la politique du gouvernement central à l'égard des gouvernements locaux.
Traditionally, empirical assessment of local government financial autonomy has concentrated on the different income sources available to local governments. In this article we extend such evaluation to the expenditure autonomy side and combine these two dimensions of autonomy into a comprehensive evaluation of local government financial autonomy. The operationalization of financial autonomy offers a basis for an evaluation of the consistency of central government policy towards local governments. Our approach is then used for a comparison of two countries — Finland and Poland. Points for practitioners Key implications in our approach are the systematic evaluation of both income and expenditure autonomy of local governments, and combining these two dimensions of autonomy into a comprehensive evaluation of local government financial autonomy. The measurement of financial autonomy which is developed can be used as a management tool in central government policy towards local governments.
The debate on cohesion policy has recently intensified due to the increasing tensions within the EU and requires constant inputs with regards to various instruments which are applied. In Poland, a unique mechanism for guarantee distribution was adopted – the guarantees are mainly distributed through NGOs (nonbanking organisations granting guarantees – NOGG).
Thus, the article aims to investigate the relationship between the level of regional development, the experience of nonbanking organisations granting guarantees and their performance which leads to observations and recommendations with regards to the functioning and assessment of guarantees as cohesion policy instruments. We have used panel regression for 156 observations covering 26 NOGG in Poland.
The results confirm that there exist positive associations between the level of regional development, NOGG size (measured with guarantee capital) and experience and some financial performance measures. We posit, that a prerequisite for the high performance of these organisations is to ensure that they have an adequate level of guarantee capital and experience. We call for future EU-wide comparative research allowing deeper understanding of various guarantee distribution mechanisms performance.
The debate on cohesion policy has recently intensified due to the increasing tensions within the EU and requires constant inputs with regards to various instruments which are applied. In Poland, a unique mechanism for guarantee distribution was adopted – the guarantees are mainly distributed through NGOs (nonbanking organisations granting guarantees – NOGG). Thus, the article aims to investigate the relationship between the level of regional development, the experience of nonbanking organisations granting guarantees and their performance which leads to observations and recommendations with regards to the functioning and assessment of guarantees as cohesion policy instruments. We have used panel regression for 156 observations covering 26 NOGG in Poland. The results confirm that there exist positive associations between the level of regional development, NOGG size (measured with guarantee capital) and experience and some financial performance measures. We posit, that a prerequisite for the high performance of these organisations is to ensure that they have an adequate level of guarantee capital and experience. We call for future EU-wide comparative research allowing deeper understanding of various guarantee distribution mechanisms performance. ; El debate sobre la política de cohesión se ha intensificado recientemente debido a las crecientes tensiones en el seno de la UE y requiere constantes aportaciones en relación con los distintos instrumentos que se aplican. En Polonia, se adoptó un mecanismo único para la distribución de garantías: las garantías se distribuyen principalmente a través de las ONG (organizaciones no bancarias que conceden garantías - NOGG). Así pues, el artículo pretende investigar la relación entre el nivel de desarrollo regional, la experiencia de las organizaciones no bancarias que conceden garantías y su rendimiento, lo que da lugar a observaciones y recomendaciones con respecto al funcionamiento y la evaluación de las garantías como instrumentos de la política de cohesión. Hemos utilizado ...
Countries chosen for comparison within the framework of this paper are different in terms of geographical location, size, levels of socio-economic development and adopted local government systems. The major criterion for choosing case study countries was their geographical location, as it is the authors' intention to highlight differences in approach to fiscal equalisation between the Nordic countries (Finland and Sweden), Central European countries (Poland and Hungary), and the Mediterranean countries (Greece and Portugal). The hypothesis which is put forward and tested by the research team is as follows: The attitudes and approaches towards fiscal equalisation between local governments in: (1) the Nordic countries, (2) the Central European countries and (3) the Mediterranean countries differ significantly, reflecting cultural differences and different economic conditions in these countries. Specifically, the following sub-hypotheses are put forward and tested: + higher level of socio-economic development tends to favour stronger equalisation policy and mechanisms between local governments; + countries where local governments participate to a greater degree in public sector expenditures require far stronger equalisation mechanisms. The paper starts with snap-shot descriptions of countries chosen for analysis. Country backgrounds present situation in terms of socio-economic development, inequality in terms of personal wealth distribution and approaches to equalisation of personal incomes in respective countries. Each country's background also includes basic information on administrative division, scope of tasks performed by local governments, general structure of local government incomes and level of local government expenditure relative to GDP or central government spending. The second part of the paper is devoted to describing in more detail the grant systems and income equalisation mechanisms applied in all six case study countries. The final, third, part of the paper presents examples of how equalising measures work in relation to selected local governments which provide an overview of local governments of different income level prior to equalisation. This part then leads to conclusions, revisiting the hypotheses formulated above. The conclusions described in the paper are of a tentative character, showing possible research problems for future in-depth analyses which were not possible in a large, six-country comparison.
The last two decades witnessed an ongoing trend towards fiscal decentralisation in Europe – sub-central governments have been given more responsibilities and greater shares in public spending (Bloechliger & Vammalle 2012). The policy of decentralisation brings with it a promise of increased efficiency in terms of service provision and resource allocation on local and regional levels. The often unwanted consequence of decentralisation is that growing taxing powers and financial autonomies given to territorial units are accompanied by growing disparities in terms of wealth and/or income distribution between local governments. Hence the need for fiscal equalisation appears. The overriding objective of fiscal equalisation is to correct imbalances in fiscal capacity of territorial units resulting from sub-central autonomy and differentiation in terms of tax bases and to allow local and regional governments to provide their citizens with services of comparable quality and quantity. A recent study across eighteen countries (Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and United Kingdom) showed that fiscal equalisation involves transfers varying from 0.5% to 3.8% of GDP (Bloechliger, Merk, Charbit, Mizell 2007).Depending on specific arrangements, equalisation mechanisms may be in line with the chosen policy for development, supporting either territorially balanced development or placing emphasis on development engines. This paper builds on notions of fiscal federalism and fiscal equalisation to give a better view of approaches to income equalisation between territorial units in six European countries. Countries chosen for comparison within the framework of this paper are different in terms of geographical location, size, levels of socio-economic development and adopted local government systems. The major criterion for choosing case study countries was their geographical location, as it is the authors' intention to highlight differences in approach to fiscal equalisation between the Nordic countries (Finland and Sweden), Central European countries (Poland and Hungary), and the Mediterranean countries (Greece and Portugal). The hypothesis which is put forward and tested by the research team is as follows: The attitudes and approaches towards fiscal equalisation between local governments in: (1) the Nordic countries, (2) the Central European countries and (3) the Mediterranean countries differ significantly, reflecting cultural differences and different economic conditions in these countries. Specifically, the following sub-hypotheses are put forward and tested: + higher level of socio-economic development tends to favour stronger equalisation policy and mechanisms between local governments; + countries where local governments participate to a greater degree in public sector expenditures require far stronger equalisation mechanisms. The hypotheses are backed up by reasonable expectation that the extent of horizontal equity pursued in each country is based on value judgments of political actors in power. There might also be efficiency motives for equalisation grants (King 1984, 140-146). The first sub-hypothesis may be justified by the need of developing countries to favour rapid growth and encourage people to move from low productivity areas to highly productive areas, resulting with strategies favouring development engines and cautious with regards to high levels of redistribution (i.e. by means of equalisation grants to local governments in lagging areas). Respectively the more developed countries tend to emphasise equality at the expense of a lower growth rate and tend to favour stronger equalisation policy and mechanisms between local governments. The second sub-hypothesis is a natural anticipation that big volumes of local government activities lead rather to big than low volumes of equalisation of local government expenditures. The paper starts with snap-shot descriptions of countries chosen for analysis. Country backgrounds present situation in terms of socio-economic development, inequality in terms of personal wealth distribution and approaches to equalisation of personal incomes in respective 3 countries. Each country's background also includes basic information on administrative division, scope of tasks performed by local governments, general structure of local government incomes and level of local government expenditure relative to GDP or central government spending. The second part of the paper is devoted to describing in more detail the grant systems and income equalisation mechanisms applied in all six case study countries. The final, third, part of the paper presents examples of how equalising measures work in relation to selected local governments which provide an overview of local governments of different income level prior to equalisation. This part then leads to conclusions, revisiting the hypotheses formulated above. The conclusions described in the paper are of a tentative character, showing possible research problems for future in-depth analyses which were not possible in a large, six-country comparison.
