Suchergebnisse

Despite the increased interaction between the highest national courts of Member States and the European Court of Justice, and the sophisticated literature on constitutional pluralism which conceptualises it, the relationship between these courts remains difficult. The first-ever preliminary reference by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany is a good example of this. The Gauweiler saga offers an opportunity to address three constitutional issues underlying this difficult relationship. First, Gauweiler is yet another example of how the German court in particular is in a privileged position vis-à-vis other national courts when it comes to interacting with the Court of Justice but also affecting the European-level political process. Secondly, the conceptual distinction between primacy and supremacy of EU law is relevant and may further the protection of individual rights within the Union. Thirdly, "judicial dialogues" may be useful in furthering rights protection, but constitutional pluralists are wrong to assert that such dialogues can settle the inevitable competition between national courts and the Court of Justice.

One of the measures that the Eurozone Member States took in their attempt to combat the financial and debt crisis was to give financial assistance to the crises-ridden states. The purpose of such assistance was to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole. Thus, these mechanisms can be referred to as financial stabilisation mechanisms. The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the different mechanism of financial stabilisation and their constitutional significance. Due to the fact that there are actually several mechanisms, the discussion will focus mainly on the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the permanent mechanism. Out of the various constitutional questions that such mechanisms give rise to, this paper will emphasise those issues that relate to the asymmetrical structure of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The choice to focus on issues that relate to the asymmetry of the EMU stems from the fact that these questions are politically most contentious, which also meant that addressing them proved legally difficult.

Has a shift occurred in the internal market paradigm towards an economic union paradigm, whereby the internal market is used to foster economic policy goals adjacent to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)? The Banking Union is a case in point in this shift, as it stands at the crossroads between the internal market and the EMU. In the Banking Union, internal market and monetary and economic policy objectives are intertwined. This article maps out this shift and assesses how Article 114 TFEU has been used in it. The article argues that although the establishment of the Banking Union seems to be a natural continuum of developing the internal market and the EMU, such use of Article 114 TFEU is questionable in light of current doctrine and problematic due to the asymmetry of the EMU.