Turnover: How Lame-Duck Governments Disrupt the Bureaucracy and Service Delivery before Leaving Office
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 86, Heft 4, S. 1348-1367
ISSN: 1468-2508
15 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 86, Heft 4, S. 1348-1367
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: Revista española de investigaciones sociológicas: ReiS, Heft 132, S. 105-130
ISSN: 1988-5903
Este artículo examina las organizaciones de inmigrantescon una perspectiva triple: desde el punto devista de sus relaciones con las autoridades públicas,de las relaciones establecidas entre las propias asociacionesy de su grado de participación interna; conel objetivo de analizar hasta qué punto puede hablarsede sociedad civil en ese ámbito. El estudioaquí presentado toma como objeto de análisis lasorganizaciones de inmigrantes en España, centrándoseen aquellas que gozan de un mayor reconocimientopúblico a través del Foro para la IntegraciónSocial de los Inmigrantes, órgano consultivo del Gobierno.Sobre la base de entrevistas en profundidada líderes y trabajadores de estas organizaciones, seutilizan las contribuciones de la literatura sobre movimientossociales, movilización étnica y capital social para explicar la situación actual. Sin dejar de relacionarlas dinámicas de las organizaciones de inmigrantescon las del resto de organizaciones socialesen España, el artículo argumenta que las relacionesestablecidas con los poderes públicos no se venequilibradas por una red interorganizativa densa nipor una participación activa de sus miembros, y elloen detrimento de una auténtica sociedad civil eneste ámbito. Esto tiene implicaciones negativas parala capacidad de las organizaciones para actuarcomo generadoras de capital social e integración delos inmigrantes, lo cual pone en cuestión el papel delEstado en su apoyo a las organizaciones de inmigrantes.
SSRN
In: American journal of political science, Band 68, Heft 2, S. 797-815
ISSN: 1540-5907
AbstractThe political appointment of bureaucrats is typically seen as jeopardizing development by selecting worse types into the bureaucracy or by depressing bureaucratic effort. I argue that political appointments also affect outcomes through a third, less studied channel, namely, by changing how bureaucrats work. Patronage provides connections between bureaucrats and politicians, and thereby grants access to material and nonmaterial resources, enhances monitoring, facilitates the application of sanctions and rewards, aligns priorities and incentives, and increases mutual trust. Political appointments can thus enhance bureaucrats' accountability and effectiveness, not just for rent‐seeking purposes but also, in certain conditions, for public service delivery. I test this theory using data on Brazilian municipal governments, leveraging two quasi‐experiments, two original surveys of bureaucrats and politicians, and in‐depth interviews. The findings highlight the countervailing effects of connections on bureaucratic governance in the developing world.
In: Political science quarterly: a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs ; PSQ, Band 137, Heft 2, S. 435-437
ISSN: 1538-165X
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2018-18
SSRN
Working paper
In: MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2018-13
SSRN
Working paper
In: MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2016-10
SSRN
Working paper
In: MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2015-12
SSRN
Working paper
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 83, Heft 4, S. 1417-1431
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: Annual review of political science, Band 26, Heft 1, S. 271-290
ISSN: 1545-1577
Bureaucracy is everywhere. Unelected bureaucrats are a key link between government and citizens, between policy and implementation. Bureaucratic politics constitutes a growing share of research in political science. But the way bureaucracy is studied varies widely, permitting theoretical and empirical blind spots as well as opportunities for innovation. Scholars of American politics tend to focus on bureaucratic policy making at the national level, while comparativists often home in on local implementation by street-level bureaucrats. Data availability and professional incentives have reinforced these subfield-specific blind spots over time. We highlight these divides in three prominent research areas: the selection and retention of bureaucratic personnel, oversight of bureaucratic activities, and opportunities for influence by actors external to the bureaucracy. Our survey reveals how scholars from the American and comparative politics traditions can learn from one another.
In: Annual Review of Political Science, Band 26, S. 271-290
SSRN